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Understanding the influence of interest groups in the public policy process is vital 
to comprehending how public policy is created and implemented.  This dissertation 
analyzes the influence of interest groups on the states that were involved with the 
negotiations of two river basin interstate compacts in the Southeastern United States.  The 
compacts originated when the downstream states of Alabama and Florida became 
concerned about the amount of water the metropolitan area of Atlanta was withdrawing 
from the Chattahoochee River.  This study considers which interest groups were most 
influential in formulating each state’s position during the negotiation process.   
While literature exists in the study of river basin interstate compacts in the 
western states, a gap in the literature concerning water policy in the Southeastern United 





explores the similarities and differences between the compacts negotiated in the 
Southeast within the context of the public policy process. 
Federalism is explored not only with the states but with agencies from the federal 
government and their role in the compact negotiation process.  The relationship between 
the federal agencies and the states sets the stage in which the policy process is conducted. 
The data were collected using a mixed methods approach of in-depth interviews 
and a survey.  The interview subjects included individuals intimately involved with the 
negotiation process. The survey respondents were individuals who possessed at least a 
passing awareness of the compacts and how they would affect their jobs, organizations, 
or constituents. Final analysis concludes that several interest groups were able to wield 
enough power to influence not only their state, but also the entire negotiation process.  
The influence exerted by some of the interest groups prevented the compacts from
existing beyond the negotiation period. As a result, the compacts expired and the states 
have resorted to the federal courts in search of a ruling on allocating water.  The lack of 
formal federal involvement as well as involvement of a neutral party in the negotiation 
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Although about seventy percent of the earth’s surface is covered with water, only 
about three percent is freshwater, most of which is stored as frozen glaciers and ice caps 
(Hull, 2000). Since the beginning of civilization, access to fresh water has been vital to 
supporting a population. Fresh water is necessary for basic human needs and can be 
utilized for transportation and commerce.  Consequently, many cities have been 
developed along the world’s major rivers.  For centuries, the demand for fresh water to 
sustain life has not exceeded the supply, with the exceptions of the most arid areas of the 
world. Even so, with the increase in population and technological advances allowing 
water to be transported to arid regions, development increased in areas without major 
rivers. 
During the 20th Century, many rivers were dammed to create a dependable supply 
of fresh water for communities. Typically, the community was located in the same river 
basin as the dam.  In addition to damming rivers to obtain an ample supply of human 
drinking water, the dams were created to control flooding, generate electricity, and for 
agricultural irrigation to support the nearby population.  The artificial reservoirs created 










The landscape of the southeastern portion of the United States provides ample 
access to freshwater rivers and an abundant source of ground water.  Unlike the arid 
western states, states in the southeast have grown accustomed to retrieving as much water 
from rivers as they have desired without concern for the amount of water flowing 
downstream. Since the settlement of the western states, disagreements over access to the 
western rivers and water basins have occurred.  Many of the western states have utilized 
interstate compacts to reach an agreement over who has legal access to a basin’s water.  
An interstate compact is generally preferred over a court battle decided by the U. S. 
Supreme Court. 
Over the past fifty years, many western and southern states have experienced a 
rapid growth in population (U. S. Census 2000). Much of the growth in the Southeast has 
been fueled by Florida, Texas and metropolitan areas in states such as North Carolina and 
Georgia. With the exploding growth of southeastern cities such as Atlanta came
increasing demands for freshwater.  For decades, the Chattahoochee River provided an
adequate freshwater supply for metropolitan Atlanta.  By the 1990s, the growth of 
metropolitan Atlanta created a strain on the water level of Chattahoochee, especially 
during drought years (Stephenson, 2000).  The metropolitan area’s rapid growth not only 
increased the amount of water being used, it also created an increase in the amount of 









Table 1.1 Atlanta Metropolitan Statistical Area Population 







Source: U. S. Census 
As a response to the increase in water usage, Atlanta area water associations 
began looking for other sources of freshwater.  In 1990, the U.S. Army Corps of 
Engineers allowed water associations in metropolitan Atlanta to increase their intake of
water from rivers in the Alabama-Coosa-Tallapoosa (ACT) River basin as well as explore 
the possibility of building a dam that would create a reservoir on the Tallapoosa River 
(Baker, 2003).  Because of concerns about the proposed dam restricting the water flow of 
the Tallapoosa River, the state of Alabama filed a lawsuit against the Corps of Engineers 
(COE) in hopes of blocking the building of the reservoir.  
Many water associations in the southern portion of metropolitan Atlanta began 
looking to other rivers such as the Flint, which is part of the Apalachicola-
Chattahoochee-Flint (ACF) river basin, to retrieve fresh water.  The retrieval of water 
from the ACF affected the flow of water into Florida as well as the southern portion of 
Georgia where the water is used to sustain development and to preserve and enhance 
agricultural commerce.   
By 1997, the states of Alabama, Georgia, and Florida agreed in principle to two 





interstate compact with Public Law 105-104 while the ACT basin interstate compact was 
approved by Public Law 105-105. Although the states agreed to the compacts, they did 
not agree on all details within the compacts.  The states continued to argue over the 
average daily flows and the minimum flows of water during periods of drought as well as 
water characteristics and quality. 
After years of negotiation and deadline extensions, talks for the ACF agreement 
ceased and the compact expired on July 31, 2003.  The states of Florida and Alabama 
began preparing briefs to file a lawsuit against the state of Georgia and the Corps of 
Engineers to prevent the state of Georgia from increasing their withdrawals from the 
Chattahoochee River in Atlanta.  The ACT basin agreement between Alabama and 
Georgia expired July 31, 2004. 
Because the political and legal disputes of river basin interstate compacts are 
different between the ACF and the ACT, this study will consider the influences of 
various interests on the negotiating process that led to the creation and ultimately the 
demise of the two interstate compacts. Also, each state’s policy subsystem is different; 
consequently, each has different uses for the river water and outcome expectations for the 
two river basins. 
This study seeks to explain what perpetuated the continual conflict over the 
specifics of the compacts, what desired outcomes each state wanted, which actions were 
influencing each state, and why differences in desired outcomes remain between the 
states. Vital to understanding this study is an explanation of the role interest groups 









negotiation process. The conflict of interest groups is explained utilizing the subsystems
theory because it considers the complicated nature of the conflict that exists among 
interest groups, government agencies and political institutions.  All three groups played 
important roles in each state’s water policy subsystem.
Why this Study is Important 
This study is the first in-depth study of the river basin interstate compacts from a 
policy subsystems perspective.  While the literature concerning the study of western river 
basin compacts, such as the Colorado River, and agreements with Indian nations 
concerning river water allocation is plentiful (Davis 1995, 2000, McCool 1987, 1998, 
2002); the literature on eastern river basin compacts is weak.  The Susquehanna River 
Basin Compact (SRBC) is the only other river basin compact in existence east of the 
Mississippi River that is primarily concerned with water allocation..  The SRBC created a 
commission to manage water allocation within the basin and to make the political 
decisions that come with managing a public resource.  Throughout the discussion of the 
ACF and ACT, the creation of a region wide commission was not seriously considered.  
The absence of a commission is meaningful because the states in the ACF and ACT 
basins were completely responsible for setting the rules as well as the enforcement 
mechanism for those rules.  Therein, the level of responsibility of the states distinguishes 
this study from the existing literature because it illustrates intergovernmental relations as 








Explanations of why the compacts failed as well as recommendations for 
improving the success of interstate compacts are included in this dissertation.  This 
allows states to improve their relationships with other states and federal agencies and 
better understand how interest groups operate within different states. 
The next chapter is a review of the current literature of interstate compacts, water 
law, and interest groups. This chapter includes a discussion of the Colorado River 
compact, the Upper Colorado River compact as well as a discussion of river basin 
compacts in the eastern portion of the United States such as the Delaware River, the 
Potomac River, and the Susquehanna River.  Landmark legal decisions such as the 
Winters Doctrine are also discussed as well as their impact on western water policy and 
water policy with Indian nations. A discussion of the historical development of the 
different uses of the river water in the ACF and ACT basins is included in the literature
review. Also included is an explanation of the events leading up to the origination of the 
compacts, a discussion of why people join interest groups, and a discussion of the 
characteristics of how interest groups develop strength in a public policy area.  
Additionally, the influence of interest groups within subsystems of government is 
discussed. 
The third chapter discusses the methods used to determine which interest groups 
influenced the states as well as the level of strength of their influence.  Chapter three also 
describes how each qualitative and quantitative method was used to analyze the effects 
interest groups had on each state during the negotiation process.  Justification of the use 





 Chapter four discusses the interview data and analyzes its content to determine 
which interest groups, organizations, and individuals were influential in each state as well 
as to analyze the subsystem as a whole.  The interviews marked the beginning of the data 
gathering process.  Also, the interviews are used to determine if one state was more 
influential than another state during the negotiation process.  The interviews show which 
individuals, acting on the behalf of the different interest groups, exuded influence during 
the negotiation process. 
The fourth chapter discusses the route each interest group took to influence a state 
as well as the negotiation process.  The decision making process each interest group used 
to determine if it should align itself with other groups in hopes of improving its chances 
of accomplishing its goals is also considered.  Finally, descriptions of the most influential 
interest groups in the process as well as the influence level of each state is discussed 
explain why each interest group was able to influence a state as well as the negotiation 
process. 
Chapter five addresses the results of the survey.  The survey was used to 
determine the thoughts of individuals who were likely to possess knowledge of the 
compacts’ negotiations or of the public policy outcomes each state or interest group 
desired from those negotiations.  Chapter five also provides statistical analysis of the 
perceptions of the many different individuals who are familiar with the compacts.  This 
analysis provides a unique perspective since many of the survey subjects were not as 

















chapter illustrates the differences between what the elites in the process knew and how 
the masses perceived the process.  
Chapter six further tests this study’s hypotheses with regression and factor 
analysis where appropriate.  The tests determine the perceptions of how each interest 
group believed the compact would affect a particular aspect of the river water.  Finally, 
after the statistical analysis tests are run and discussed, each of the hypotheses will be
revisited in the chapter. 
The concluding chapter revisits McCool’s model.  Chapter seven discusses which 
quadrant, in McCool’s model, each state’s subsystem is located in and summarizes the 
interaction of each interest group within each state as well as the region-wide subsystem.  














This chapter discusses the origin and evolution of water law in the United States 
and explores the differences in water law between the eastern and western portions of the 
country. It will also cover the role interstate compacts have played in developing water 
policy between states.  Interstate compacts in the West as well as the East will be 
discussed. The different uses of the river water as well as who is using that water is also 
covered. This discussion develops an understanding what interest groups are likely to be 
involved during the negotiations. The role interest groups play in influencing 
government institutions and government agencies will also be discussed because that role 
is crucial in understanding how these compacts originated, developed and ultimately 
dissolved. 
Water Law Differences Between the East and the West 
There are several studies considering water policy in the Western states (Davis, 
1995, 2000, McCool 1987, 1995, 2002, Shurts, 2004). The literature studying water 
policy in the Southeast is lacking. Water rights law is fundamentally different between 
Western states and Southeastern states. The primary difference is that in the arid Western 
states, water policy views ground water as a common good (Shurts, 2004).  The states 









system that gives preference of water rights to those who are considered to have the first 
access to the water. Regarding the access to water, water rights are best described as
first in time, first in right (Dellapenna, 2002, Ruhl, 2003, Shurts, 2004).  
Water Rights under prior appropriation are described by Stehpenson, (2004, p.89) 
as having three conditions: 
1) an intent to divert water for a beneficial use 
2) an actual diversion of water 
3) application of the water to the beneficial use intended 
In addition to these three requirements, many Western states require the appropriator to 
acquire a permit from a court or a regulatory agency before being allowed to withdraw 
the water (Stephenson, 2004). Water laws in the eastern portion of the nation allow for a 
reasonable use of the water by whoever owns land adjacent to the water (Shurts, 2004).
This prior appropriation or first-in-time, first-in-right grew from a practice of the 
settlers who were miners in the West.  The settlers treated water in the same way they 
treated any resource they took from the ground (Shurts, 2004).  The system can be 
summarized by saying that whoever was using the resource first has first right to it as 
long as they are using it. In other words, if a settler is mining for gold, that area is of the 
province of the settler as long as he is looking for gold.  This applied to water in the sense 
that settlers could take as much water as they desired from the source and continue to do 
so as long as they were using the water. During times of drought, a settler first-in-time 
could still lay claim to the amount of water he had been using while those with a later 





and based subsequent rulings on this principle of water use.  The federal government 
deferred to the local courts and agreed to support the system since there was no federal 
law addressing water rights (Shurts, 2004). 
Water laws in the Southeast are considered to be regulated by Riparian Rights 
(Ruhl, 2003). This system considers land adjacent to water to be available for reasonable 
use to whoever owns the land (Dellapenna, 2002, Ruhl, 2003, Shurts, 2004).  While there 
have been modifications made to this by states, most of these modifications involve slight 
variations with defining reasonable use and the specifying the methods by which the river 
water can be extracted (Ruhl, 2003). 
The Southern states’ water laws originate from Common law which gives 
ownership of water to whoever owns the land in which the water rests (Dellapenna, 
2002). If you own the land in which a river flows over, law allows the owner a 
reasonable use of the water.  Withdrawals for reasonable use are currently interpreted to 
mean that an owner of land adjacent to the river, or a person withdrawing water from the 
river can use up to 100,000 gallons a day without creating harm to the downstream users 
of the water (Dellapenna, 2002). 
The Constitution gives the United States Supreme Court original jurisdiction with 
respect to water allocation among states.  The 1907 case in which Kansas and Colorado 
argued over allocation of the Arkansas River struck down Colorado’s argument that it 
had sovereign use of the water within its territory. (Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U. S. 16, 
1907). Ruhl (2003) suggests since that ruling, some guidelines have evolved over water 











1. A state may not save natural resources for exclusive use of its citizens. 
2. States do no have a presumptive priority over any other state with respect to 
use of water, even if that water is completely within its boundaries. 
3. All states have an affirmative duty to make a reasonable effort to conserve 
water usage.
Typically, the geographic dividing line with respect to which principle water law 
is based is the 100th Meridian. In states west of the 100th Meridian, the legal guide of 
“prior appropriation” governs water law (Dellapenna, 2002, Ruhl, 2003).  
In states east of the Mississippi River, “riparian rights” dominate water law 
(Dellapenna, 2002). This has the effect of water being considered a public resource with 
private access (Dellapenna, 2002). Since it a public resource, the river and the quality of 
water in the river are considered a part of the rights of owners downstream. Because of 
this common ownership, owners of the property where the water sits are generally free to 
do as they wish with the water so long as the downstream users rights are not harmed 
(Dellapenna, 2002, Stephenson, 2000). Using legal terminology, water in the states east 
of the Mississippi River is considered common property or sometimes private property. 
In the states west of the Mississippi River, water is considered public property 
(Dellapenna, 2002, Stephenson, 2000). 
As riparian rights evolved with changing demands on water and the technological 






originally written, a “reasonable use” standard has applied to water usage.  The 
reasonable use standard attempts to ensure an equitable right to use of the water without 
infringing upon someone else’s right to use the water in a reasonable manner 
(Dellapenna, 2002, Stephenson, 2000). 
The process by which courts may define reasonable use and injury to the use of 
the water is open for debate. In particular, how do you define injury to an ecosystem in 
economic terms?  How does this economic analysis compare when you are considering 
the need for drinking water versus the desire to maintain an ecosystem and adhere to the 
Clean Water Act as well as the Endangered Species Act?  These are all legal issues that 
have not come before the Supreme Court under the umbrella of interstate water allocation 
(Ruhl, 2003). 
A current trend in water rights law for Eastern states is to use a hybrid of the two 
systems.  The main difference between the past and the current model is that states are 
now requiring a permit process similar to that in Western states in order to withdraw 
water (Stephenson, 2000). However, the rules by which users of water are required to 
follow are still based on riparian law (Stephenson, 2000).  Further complicating matters 
with the ACF, Georgia and Alabama’s law is still based upon riparian law while Florida 
uses a hybrid model (Stephenson, 2000). 
Indian Water Rights 
There are a number of Indian Nations located within the Western river basins.  
This creates additional parties that must be considered when negotiating water rights.  










study. Since the Poarch Creek Tribe does not own land that supports flowing water, it 
does not have rights to the river’s water that would put the Indian Nation on equal legal 
footing with the states. The land owned by the Poarch Creek Tribe, which is located in 
the ACT basin near the Coosa River, supports only a gaming hall and no permanent 
residents.  Because of this lack of need and concern over water rights, the Poarch Creek 
Indian Nation’s water rights will not be explored at great length during in-depth 
interviews and other data collection.  The only Indian Nation in southeastern United 
States that has a water usage agreement is the Seminole Indian Nation.  There is an 
informal agreement between the Seminole Indian Nation and the State of Florida over the 
use and quality of water available to the Seminoles.
Historically, Indian Tribes in the western states have been given water rights that 
complement their sovereign status (McCool 1987, 2002, Shurts, 2004).  There are 
numerous water usage agreements between states, tribes, and the federal government 
(Bureau of Indian Affairs, http://library.doi.gov/internet/native.html).  The agreements 
are governed in principle by the Winters Doctrine. 
Winters Doctrine 
The Winters Doctrine is the primary governing device for Indian water rights 
since 1908 (McCool, 1987, Shurts, 2004). It has become so synonymous with Indian 
water rights that it is often referred to as the Indian Reserved Rights Doctrine (Shurts,
2004). The Winters Doctrine established supremacy of Indian reserved water rights over 










The Winters case itself originated in 1905 when settlers upriver of the Fort 
Belknap Indian Reservation began to withdraw water during a severe drought from the
Milk River to irrigate crops (Shurts, 2004). The settlers, citing Montana law, believed 
this was their right, even if the water withdrawals were so great that downstream users of 
the river would find the river empty.  The United States government sued the water 
withdrawing settlers in federal court.  The federal court cited previous court decisions and 
ruled that the Indians held reserved water rights with the Milk River that would be 
sufficient to support the population in the Reservation.  In particular, this was interpreted 
to mean that the Indian Tribe could use the river water to irrigate crops in the land that
was ceded to them by the federal government (Shurts, 2004).  This case, known as 
Winters –v- United States, was supported on appeal by the Supreme Court in 1908. 
One key element of this decision was that the amount of water that could be 
interpreted as reserved for the Indian Tribe was not merely what was currently being 
irrigated or otherwise used by the Tribe. This was contradictory to the legal principle of 
most Western states’ that gave priority of use to whoever was first using the water 
(Shurts, 2004). In sum, the settlers upstream of the reservation could not have a private 
property right claim to the water that might be needed to satisfy a purpose of the 
reservation.  Because this ruling is so different from the water law of many Western 
states, the Winters Doctrine has often been viewed and treated by government agencies as 
an anomaly (Shurts, 2004). 
The contradiction focuses on three portions of the prior appropriations doctrine. 











1. Privatization of water by means of individual vested property rights 
2. A first-in-time, first-in-right priority allocation, which meant that people who 
came late to a watercourse for water had to yield to those who had come
previously, who drew first in times of shortage.
3. Measurement solely in terms of a diversion of a specified amount for a
beneficial, productive, present use. 
Shurts further acknowledges that as development progressed in the West, the prior 
appropriation system was elevated from a mere preference in law to a divine right. 
As a result of this conflict with prevailing state law, there was great resistance to 
the Winters decision (Shurts, 2004). Shurts contends that Indian reserved water rights 
stemming from the Winters decision immediately disappeared until 1963 when the 
Supreme Court reaffirmed them in Arizona –v- California. 
The legal origins of the Winters decision derived from previous court cases in 
which an implied reservation of water was given to Indian Tribes when they were given 
land concessions (Shurts, 2004). The U. S. Attorney who represented the Indians in the 
Winters case argued that the water rights were expressly given with the land.  It is not 
clear if the Indians living in the Fort Belknap Indian Reservation in northern Montana 
knew or understood the difference between expressed or implied reserve rights for the 
water (Shurts, 2004). This set the stage for erosion of the Indian water rights despite the 






The reasoning for this is a simple case and point in the federalism of American 
government.  The states and non-Indian interests were not pleased with the Winters
ruling. Therefore, they sought to prevent its enforcement.  By influencing the different 
federal government agencies such as the Department of the Interior and the Department 
of Justice, the water rights given to Indians with Winters were not realized (Shurts, 2004). 
Combine the hostility of the Winters decision among the states with the politically weak 
Bureau of Indian Affairs and an anti-Winters Reclamation Service (it later became known 
as the Bureau of Reclamation), and the Winters Doctrine was worth little (Shurts, 2004). 
McCool (1987, 2002) also doubts that the Indian water rights derived from the 
Winters Doctrine are actually superior to that of the states.  Because states are typically 
governed by the prior appropriation (McCool, 1987), conflict continues to occur because 
there are jurisdictional differences between the two doctrines.  Water rights conflicts 
concerning Indian nations are to be settled in federal courts while state courts settle 
conflicts within a state (McCool, 1987). McCool (1987) goes so far as to say that 
currently, the Winters Doctrine continues to suffer from erosion by legislative acts due to 
the strong influence of non-Indian water rights advocates within the iron triangle of 
United States water policy. 
The primary venue for erosion of the Winters Doctrine is the settlements between 
the federal government and the Indian tribes over water rights (McCool, 1987, 2002).  A 
typical settlement involves monetary compensation from the federal government to the 
Indian tribes.  In return, the Indian tribe waives future claims to water.  This freezes the 







are made by states surrounding the Indian Reservations.  This amounts to federal 
spending so states can solve water access problems.  This practice has been criticized by 
some members of Congress as ‘pork barrel’ spending (McCool, 1987).   
Another way Indian Tribes loose autonomy over their water is an increase in 
administrative control by state governments over water that is reserved for Indian tribes.  
McCool (1987, 2002) believes this administrative control is given to the states by the 
federal government.  The process by which the states achieve this control is through the 
iron triangle of water policy. In sum, the states are able to influence the federal 
bureaucracy and the federal legislators to give administrative oversight of Indian water 
rights to the states.  This administrative control harms the Indian tribes the most by 
limiting their ability to sell their water rights in an open market (McCool, 1987, 2002). 
Typically, the settlements restrict who can buy the water rights from the Indian tribe.  
The restrictions follow a pattern in which non-Indians who can bid for the water have a 
geographically close location (McCool, 1987, 2002).  Therefore, the agreements typically 
prohibit parties from long distances from transferring water.  In practice, a group near the 
Indian reservation will buy the water at a low cost, turnaround and sell the water at a 
higher price to a buyer located a great distance away (McCool, 1987). 
Discussion of Interstate Compacts 
The Framers of the Constitution recognized a need to create a way for agreements 
between two or more states to exist without having to get the federal government unduly 
involved. (Zimmerman, 1976, Florestano, 1993). However, interstate compacts typically 











Article I Section 10 of the United States Constitution provides in part that “no state shall,
without the consent of Congress, enter into any agreement or compact with another 
state.” 
Once signed by the president, the compacts have the legal standing of a 
Congressional Act (Zimmerman, 1976).  There is however, legal precedent that allows 
for compacts to be valid without approval from Congress.  Virginia v. Tennessee, 
148.U.S. 503 (1893) allowed an agreement between the two states to stand without 
Congressional approval. Interstate compacts had been permissible under the Articles of
Confederation. The compacts enacted under the Articles of Confederation were also 
recognized upon the adaptation of the Constitution. 
Historically, interstate compacts have typically resolved border disputes between 
states (Barton, 1967, Dimock, 1973, Zimmerman 1976, 1996).  As time progressed, 
compacts were also used to establish boundary disputes that occurred when a river, which 
was considered the boundary between two states, shifted its course.  Generally, the law 
has considered the deepest portion of the river to be the precise boundary line when a 
river is considered to divide state boundaries (Welch, 1973).
The variety of compacts varied over time.  After the initial use of compacts to 
settle boundary disputes faded, many states entered into compacts that addressed legal 
issues of extradition and served mainly to enhance interstate cooperation among law 
enforcement with respect to fugitive apprehension as well as creating regional planning








What makes interstate compacts desirable is their ability to create an agreement 
for a specific situation in hopes of avoiding a costly battle in federal courts (Baker, 2003). 
However, effectiveness of compacts has continually been in question (Dimock, 1973).  
The compacts concerning allocation of resources are often contested in court using the 
Eleventh Amendment.  The Eleventh Amendment prohibits a state from acting on behalf 
of a citizen within its borders in a suit against another state.  Usually when a state 
believes someone is in violation of the compact for using too much of a resource, the 
offended state sues the other state on the premise that the other state is protecting its 
citizens from the legal authority of another state (Dimock, 1973). 
Many of the compacts concerning allocation of water in river basins involve 
Western States (Barton, 1967, Zimmerman, 1976, 1996).  The ACT and ACF represent 
the first compacts concerning river basin water allocation in states from the Southeast 
(Dellapenna, 2002). 
Since discussions of creating the two compacts began, several of the state’s 
governors have stated their preference of an interstate compact as compared to a lawsuit 
before the Supreme Court (Ruhl, 2003, Birmingham News, December 29, 2000).  The 
governors cited a desire to avoid a costly legal battle in the Supreme Court as well as a 
perception that a compact will result in a solution in which each state has at least some 
amount of autonomy (Baker, 2003, Ruhl, 2003, Stephenson, 2000, Birmingham News
December 29, 2000, Atlanta Journal-Constitution, July 26, 2004).  However, each state 






could not achieve an allocation agreement (Atlanta Journal-Constitution, January 6, 
2003, Atlanta Journal-Constitution, July 26, 2004).
Interstate compacts governing the allocation of water are rare in states east of the 
100th Meridian. The Susquehanna River Basin Interstate Compact involving rivers in the 
states of Maryland, Pennsylvania and New York, was the first compact involving a river 
basin east of the Mississippi River, which primarily addressed water allocation to be 
signed into law (Hull, 2000). The ACT and the ACF compacts represent the second and 
third eastern compacts involving water allocation to be approved by Congress.  
There are several non-legal reasons why making river basin interstate compacts 
are different in the South as compared to the West.  First and foremost, since the West 
was first settled, access to scarce water has been a perennial concern of states as well as 
Native American Nations.  The arid region and its lack of abundant rivers and 
underground aquifers mean a higher premium is placed on river water than in the South. 
The South, comparatively speaking, is flush with rivers and underground aquifers.  In all 
likelihood, due to the volume of river water, if growing Metropolitan Atlanta were 
located on the Tennessee River and not the Chattahoochee River, or if there were 
underground aquifers comparable in volume to those found in many sections of the 
Southeast, the ACT and ACF compacts would not have been created (Wise, 2002, New 
York Times, May 17, 2002). 
Finally, a great amount of federal legislation has passed in which new interstate 
compacts must consider before the compact can become law.  Since the each of these 






Act (CWA), as well as other federal acts and laws have been passed which have the 
effect of requiring more than water allocation to be considered during compact 
negotiations. 
The Susquehanna River Basin Interstate Compact 
In 1971, the three states within the Susquehanna River Basin, Pennsylvania, New 
York and Maryland, agreed to the Susquehanna River Basin Interstate Compact.  This 
compact created the Susquehanna River Basin Commission (SRBC).  While flood control 
was the major reason for initiating the compact’s discussions, the SRBC concerns itself 
with pollution monitoring and other concerns that would affect the ecological and 
economic health of the river (Stranahan, 2003).  Members of the SRBC are chosen from 
each of the three states that contribute water into the basin.  Since the birth of the 
compact the commission became the primary intermediary with federal government 
agencies such as the Corps of Engineers with projects such as levee improvement and 
dredging the river to prevent future floods (Stranahan, 2003). 
Although a small portion of the state of Maryland is in the basin, the water 
provided from the Susquehanna is crucial in providing the Chesapeake Bay with fresh 
water as it is the largest source of fresh water for the Chesapeake Bay, about ninety 
percent of the Bay’s fresh water comes from the Susquehanna River (Stranahan, 2003).  
This is a similar relationship with respect to the Apalachicola Bay in Florida depending 
on Georgia’s Chattahoochee and Flint Rivers for fresh water.  This infusion of fresh 
water from the Susquehanna River into the Chesapeake Bay makes the Bay North 






The origins of the Susquehanna River Basin Compact can be traced to 1949. 
Congressman Daniel J. Flood, whose district included the Pennsylvania portion of the 
Susquehanna River Basin, proposed the creation of a Susquehanna Valley Authority.  
The model for the organizational structure of the new federal agency was similar to that 
of the Tennessee Valley Authority. As a member of the U. S. House Appropriations 
Committee, Flood had the ability to infuse a great deal of federal money towards his 
project. Flood’s primary goal was to prevent flooding and keep the fertile soil from being 
washed downstream into Delaware (Stranahan, 2003).   
While Flood’s proposal never came to fruition, the federal government did place 
more attention on watershed management issues (Stranahan, 2003).  By 1951, a 
presidentially appointed Water Resources Policy Committee made a recommendation 
that all of the nation’s major river basins be overseen by federal commissions.  The role 
of these commissions was to be advisory, but many state officials were concerned of the 
possible increase in federal authority at their expense (Stranahan, 2003).  However, it 
became clear to the state officials that if the federal government was going to fund 
projects such as levee improvement and dredging, the states were going to have to 
concede some authority and decision-making to the federal government. 
Congressman Flood became a proponent of the creation of a Susquehanna River 
Basin Commission. Within a few years, negotiations between Maryland, New York, and 
Pennsylvania began. During the negotiations of the compact, there was a great deal of
wariness between the three states (Stranahan, 2003).  Congressman Flood was not 







luncheon saying, “Anybody who’s ever done business with Maryland knows you’ve got 
to hold on to your watch.” (Stranahan, 2003, p. 286).  As was true with Florida and the 
Apalachicola Bay, Maryland’s primary concern was a guaranteed volume flow of water 
into the Chesapeake Bay.  Initially, the wording of the Compact did not guarantee 
Maryland a certain water flow volume.  However, when the Commission began the 
restoration of the Shad fish, a guaranteed volume of water flow for the Chesapeake Bay 
came into being and was managed and enforced by the commission (Stranahan, 2003).  
After the final wording of the compact became public and ready for approval of 
the three state’s governors, Pennsylvanians began to question its wisdom.  Since about 75 
percent of the river basin is in the state of Pennsylvania, the citizens of Pennsylvania 
began to want more than an equal share in the decision making (Stranahan, 2003).  In 
Pennsylvania, farming organizations became the most vocal opposition of the compacts 
(Stranahan, 2003). However, the governors of Pennsylvania, New York and Maryland 
agreed that this was the best venue to manage the river as a resource.  In 1967, the 
governors of New York and Maryland signed the compact.  Despite objections from
agricultural interests and rural communities, that thought the commission might require 
them to create sewage systems for their small communities, the state of Pennsylvania 
signed the compact legislation on July 17, 1968 (Stranahan, 2003).  President Richard M. 
Nixion signed the compact December 24, 1970.
This concept of federal commissions governing each major river basin was not 
new. It was first proposed in 1878 by John Powell, who was an explorer and developer 






West be drawn according to river basins and other natural barriers and not degrees of 
longitude and latitude as became the practice (Stranahan, 2003). 
The primary difference between the Susquehanna River Basin Compact and the 
ACT and ACF compacts is that the there is not a perceived threat to the scarcity of water 
volume.  The Susquehanna River Basin Commission does have the authority to control 
water allocation during times of drought, but this was considered to be a rare occurrence 
(Shannahan, 2003). The commission primarily wants to control water allocation to 
prevent flooding, which is believed to be the primary concern of water allocation decision 
making.  Because of this, the assignment of dam sites became an important decision for 
the commission. 
There are two other river basin compacts in the East that will now be discussed, 
the Potomac River Compact and the Delaware River Compact.  Both compacts address 
issues other than water allocation. 
The Potomac River Compact 
The Potomac River Compact between Maryland and Virgina was enacted into law 
in 1785. Signed two years before the adoption of the Constitution, this compact provided 
the ground work for Article I of the Constitution which became known as the “compact 
clause” (Florestano, 1993). The compact confirmed the ownership of the river with 
Maryland and did not address rights to the river’s surface water.  For decades, Virginia 
and Maryland have argued about the procedure as well as the rights of Virginia to use the 
river’s surface water.  With Supreme Court decisions in 1958 and 2003, the Court has 










population while confirming Maryland’s ownership as well as their rights to use the 
water without Virginia’s consent (Florestano, 1993). 
The Delaware River Compact 
The Delaware River Basin Compact involves the states of Pennsylvania, New 
Jersey, and Delaware (Zimmerman, 1996).  This compact, signed in 1961, addresses river 
pollution as well as flood management, wildlife management and water allocation as it 
related to preventing the freshwater river from salinization at the river’s delta.  
The Colorado River and Upper Colorado River Compacts
There have been several interstate compacts formed among western states with a 
goal of managing the river basins.  The more notable of these include the Colorado River 
Basin compact, the Upper Colorado River Basin compact and the Columbia River Basin 
compact.  These compacts govern two of the largest rivers in the Mountain West area of 
the United States.  The compacts concerning the Colorado River Basin primarily govern 
the allocation of surface water while the Columbia River Basin compact governs access 
to the river’s natural resources.  The negotiation process and issues surrounding the 
formulation as well as current issues of the compacts will be discussed in hopes of 
developing a better understanding the history of river basin compact negotiations. 
In the early years of the 20th Century, development in the western states began to 
take a toll on the availability of surface water.  The city of Los Angeles had been 
doubling and tripling in size in the final two decades of the 19th Century (Wilkinson, 







the river and at increasingly large volumes.  These same advances also allowed for water 
to be transferred between basins and often were sent hundreds of miles away to support 
growing cities in California such as Los Angeles and San Diego.  This diversion of water 
began to concern the less populous western states.  It was from this concern that in 1921, 
the negotiation process of the Colorado River Compact began (Wilkinson, 1992).  The 
compact was signed into law by Congress in 1922. 
The Colorado River Compact did not provide for a formula or a mechanism to 
allocate water to any specific state.  However, it guaranteed a supply of surface water to 
states in the lower basin of the Colorado River and allowed the upper basin states to have 
the remaining amount of the river’s water (Wilkinson, 1992).  The upper basin states 
believed this compact would provide at least some amount of certainty of water access as 
well as protection against a rapidly growing California.  Each of the upper basin states, 
Wyoming, Utah, Colorado, and New Mexico were growing at a much slower rate than 
California. New Mexico is considered an upper basin state because the San Juan River 
feeds into the Colorado River is located within the borders of New Mexico (Wilkinson, 
1992). The goal of the compact was to equally divide the surface water of the Colorado 
River Basin among the lower and upper basin states.  The lower basin states were 
California, Nevada and Arizona (Wilkinson, 1992). 
Shortly after the compacts were approved, it became obvious the upper basin 
states’ guaranteed share of the river was based upon water flow data that was based upon  
higher than normal rainfall and not historical averages (Wilkinson, 1992).  The compact 







basin states. This had the effect of each upper basin state not knowing how much water it 
would be able to access. 
After the upper basin states realized the Colorado River compact had not given 
them the predictability in access to water that they had hoped, in 1948 they began 
negotiations of the Upper Colorado River Basin Compact.  Because most of the river was 
feed by the melting of snow in the Rocky Mountain Range in Colorado, over half of the 
water allocation was given to Colorado. Utah, Wyoming, and New Mexico received 23, 
14, and 11.25 percent, respectively, of the water (Wilkinson, 1992).  The compact was 
ratified by Congress in 1949. 
The Columbia River Compact 
The primary purpose of the Columbia River Compact was to regulate access to a 
natural resource of the river, fish gathering. Gathering fish in the Columbia River basin 
was a commercially profitable industry in the 19th Century and the early decades of the 
20th Century (Wilkinson, 1992).  The compact became an agreement among Oregon and 
Washington. The terms of the compacts are enforced by each state’s Fish and Wildlife 
Commissions (Wilkinson, 1992). 
During the 1950s and 1960s, there was an attempt among Oregon, Washington, 
Montana, Idaho, with Nevada, Utah, and Wyoming being minor participants, to regulate 
water allocations, but the state legislatures of Oregon and Washington failed to ratify the 
compact (Wilkinson, 1992).  The real conflict wasn’t as much over the allocation of 
water as it was the struggle between public and private hydroelectric power generators 









COE to adhere to state laws that regulated dam and reservoir construction.  Ultimately,
lawsuits stemming from this conflict supported the rights of the COE to not follow state 
law in building dams or reservoirs (Wilkinson, 1992). 
Another issue of contention among the states was a provision to allow trading of 
upper-basin water storage for hydropower. In exchange for the upper-basin states 
allowing the construction of larger reservoirs, they would be allowed a certain share of 
the hydroelectric power the reservoir dams produced in addition to a guarantee that much 
of their future water allocation demands would prevail over the lower-basin states’ 
demands (Wilkinson, 1992). 
Lessons Learned From Western Interstate Compacts 
Historically, interstate compacts have been used to allow states to settle disputes. 
Often the disputes involve boundary lines. The literature involving Western states in 
their disputes over water allocation, suggests that states are likely to reach agreement 
when the natural resource is scarce and a third party, usually the federal government, is 
involved in the process as a mediator. 
With the other compacts concerning river basins, each state displayed some 
amount of distrust with other states.  Despite these differences, interstate compacts have 
been negotiated and passed into law. This begs the question of why couldn’t Alabama, 
Florida, and Georgia work through their differences and reach an agreement.  Each state 
is different in its primary use of the water.  Therefore, each state has different goals of the 









meet its needs.  Because the resource is viewed so differently, it is more difficult to reach 
an agreement with Alabama, Florida, and Georgia than the western states. 
The literature suggests that there is a conflict between upper and lower basin 
states in the Western and Eastern river compacts.  There is no evidence of intrastate 
conflict in the study of Western or Eastern river compacts.  It is expected that this will be 
different in the South. Because the entity that wants to greatly increase its water 
withdrawals, the metropolitan area of Atlanta, is located upstream, the downstream users 
in Georgia are concerned the available river water will decrease in quantity and quality. 
History of the Modifications in the River Water Flow in Alabama, Coosa, and 
Tallapoosa (ACT) Rivers 
Shortly after the turn of the 20th Century, the federal government gave money to a 
new corporation, Alabama Power, to build Dams along the Tallapoosa River.  William
Patrick Lay, the person who founded Alabama Power, purchased land along the river 
near some locks that were made by settlers to improve the travel of steamboats.  The 
dams were used to control seasonal flooding and provide electricity to most of the state of 
Alabama.  
One of the early conflicts centered on a 1907 Alabama statute that gave the right 
to condemn the water rights of other entities through eminent domain to power 
companies when the power companies wanted more water than what other companies 
wanted (Jackson, 1995). The case ultimately went to the U. S. Supreme Court.  Alabama 
Power Company received a favorable ruling.  With the power of eminent domain, 






The Tallapoosa was more shallow and narrow than the Coosa and needed man 
made development in order to utilize the river for commercial opportunities that were 
developing in the 20th Century. The cargo boats became larger and needed deeper water 
to travel along the river.  Because the Tallapoosa, with its numerous falls, is more 
challenging than the Coosa for navigation, it has received more artificial alterations, such 
as dams. 
The dams began to be associated with progress by the locals in the region.  The 
vicious and frequent, although not predictable, floods that occurred along the rivers 
motivated the residents as well as local governmental officials to look into options that 
would control the continued flooding of the rivers (Jackson, 1995).  From 1886 until 
1929, the city of Montgomery experienced fifty-nine floods.  Almost half of them were 
labeled severe (Jackson, 1995). The dams altered the severity of the rivers’ flow and 
were able to control the volume of water enough to prevent severe flooding of the 
Alabama River.  
The dams also provided plentiful, reliable, and inexpensive electricity to areas 
that had not been able to get electricity.  With the start of World War II, the federal 
government decided it needed to build more military bases.  With inexpensive electricity 
that was available from the dams, the ACT river basin became a logical place to put new 
military bases.  Maxwell Air Base was built in Montgomery and Craig Air Base was 








Soon, industry followed. The inexpensive electricity lured several paper mills to 
the area. As pine trees began to replace cotton as the primary crop in Alabama; the 
proliferation of paper mills began to dot the rivers’ sides (Jackson, 1995). 
With the inauguration of Eisenhower as president, a new push originated from
within the federal government for private industry to develop the nation’s waterways.  
Alabama Power Company had a plan waiting that involved almost complete development 
of the Coosa River. Alabama congressional delegates to Washington were supportive of 
the plan. Congressman Albert Rains from Gadsden, Alabama applauded the efforts 
saying, “the area will be more inviting to industries needing substantial supplies of 
water.” (Jackson, 1995, p. 213). In order to ensure that the inexpensive electricity that 
would lure industry to Alabama stayed in Alabama, Representative Rains tacked a rider 
to a bill supporting the project which had the effect of, in Rains words, “(electricity) 
never be piped away for use elsewhere.” (Jackson, 1995, p.213,). Between the mid-
1950s and the mid-1960s Alabama Power had built five dams on the Coosa River. 
History of the Modifications in the River Water Flow of the Apalachicola, 
Chattahoochee, and Flint (ACF) Rivers 
This river basin begins in north Georgia and flows south towards Florida and 
emptying in the Apalachicola Bay.  The Chattahoochee River begins in the northern most 
portion of this river basin. Lake Lanier, a man made reservior, lies north of Atlanta and 
has been the primary fresh water reservoir for Atlanta’s metropolitan area.  The Corps of 
Engineers manages all reservoirs and dams along the Chattahoochee River as well as the 








The states of Georgia and Alabama have similar needs from the water in this 
basin. Both states are primarily concerned with water allocation.  However, the state of 
Florida is primarily concerned about the amount as well as the flow for fresh water in the 
Apalachicola Bay, which is home to ninety percent of Florida’s oyster harvesting 
industry (Ruhl, 2003, Stephenson, 2000, Atlanta Journal-Constitution, August 22, 2002). 
The states of Alabama and Florida are homogeneous in their stand on the issues 
central to the conflict.  The state of Georgia is not. (Columbus Ledger-Enquirer, February 
4, 2004). Downstream users of the Chattahoochee River such as the city of Columbus 
believe Georgia’s negotiators are acting on behalf of the interests of metropolitan Atlanta 
and not Columbus (Columbus Ledger-Enquirer, February 4, 2004). 
The tension between states over the water allocation in the ACF basin can be 
traced back to the 1980s (Ruhl, 2003, Stephenson, 2000).  Due to a series of droughts in 
the 1980s along with the continued increase in Atlanta’s metropolitan area population, 
downstream states became concerned about the availability of fresh water (Ruhl, 2003, 
Stephenson, 2000). This need for more water prompted several municipalities near the 
city of Atlanta to ask the Corps of Engineers for a new reservoir to be located in west 
Georgia along the Tallapoosa River (Ruhl, 2003).  This soon prompted a lawsuit against 
the Corps from the state of Alabama (Stephenson, 2000, Birmingham News, January 17, 
2002). With the future of the reservoir in doubt, municipalities began to increase their 
demand upon the water in the ACF basin.  This soon prompted negotiations of the ACF 









increase the amount of water given to Georgia municipalities, especially those using Lake 
Lanier as a water source (Ruhl, 2003). 
A landmark in cooperation occurred in 1997 when all three states agreed to an 
interstate compact that involved allocation of water in the ACF basin which soon lead to 
the development of the ACT basin interstate compact.  However, Florida was continually 
in disagreement with Georgia over the definition of natural flow of the Chattahoochee 
River (Ruhl, 2003). This was primarily due to Florida’s desire to have a strong 
freshwater flow into the Apalachicola Bay that supports the state’s oyster industry. 
Influence of Interest Groups 
Thomas Dye (2001) defines interest groups as “organizations that seek to 
influence government policy-to obtain special benefits, subsidies, privileges, and 
protections-for their sponsors.” (p. 6). In this study interest groups take on many 
different forms.  Interest groups of the more traditional kind such as electric power 
companies, agricultural groups, and economic development groups play important roles 
in the compact negotiations.  Other groups such as property owners, environmental, and 
government agencies will become interest groups throughout the negotiation process.  
Each type of organization previously listed has a particular set of concerns and goals.  
Therefore these organizations will become interest groups in hopes of influencing the 
outcomes of the compacts so that their interests are protected. 
David Truman (1950) believes there are two conditions for becoming an interest 
group. The first requirement is that there must be shared attitudes.  The goals, beliefs, 







public policy outcomes.  The second is that there must be a claim upon others.  The group 
must want something that someone else has that they do not.  This thing can be tangible 
or not. As it applies to the compact negotiations, this thing is river water. 
Olson (1965) discussed the reasons why individuals join interests groups.  In 
particular, Olson (1965) discusses what kinds of inducements are successful in recruiting 
and maintaining members.  Olson (1965) uses a rational choice model to explain how
much individuals will be willing to contribute toward the supply of a desired collective 
good. The model focuses on the marginal costs and benefits of the good.  This likely 
explains why the membership of the river and lake keeper groups increased during 
drought years. When the river and lake water decreased in volume, their property was 
not worth as much.  Boat docks that once were assessable were no longer functional.  
Other recreational activities such as swimming and fishing were not available during the 
drought years. In extreme cases, reports of fish kills and other algae flourished when the 
lakes and rivers decreased in water volume.  These conditions brought increased attention 
to the possibility that their home and property values would decrease if the water levels 
were lowered. It is believed that during drought years, the membership in interest groups 
along the rivers as well as in other organizations increased.  
Olson (1965) believes there are two different types of incentives that interest 
groups can give public and private goods. Olson (1965) considers private goods to have 
two characteristics: competition for consumption and excludability.  Competition for 
consumption is a characteristic because of it prevents two or more entities from using the 






consumption of that good.  Public goods are considered to have nonrivalrous 
consumption and the number of users of that good does not affect anyone else’s use of 
that good (Olson, 1965). 
With respect to the compacts, the river water is a private good.  This is true for the 
quantity of the water as well as the quality of the water.  Therefore the negotiations were 
actually over two private goods: water quality and water quantity.  With the allocation of 
the water, this was obvious. This is not so clear with water quality.  There was no direct 
discussion of water quality issues. However, Alabama lake and river protection groups 
believed water quality was directly affected by the quantity.  This is because the higher 
the volume of water, the quicker and more thoroughly the water can dissolve harmful 
bacteria, chemicals and other pollution that the downriver users of the water would have 
to filter. It is not clear that the Alabama Power company was concerned about water 
quality as much as it was quantity. This explains why lake and river protection groups 
were not content to let Alabama Power be the sole voice for their state.  Their concerns 
were more than water quantity.  In Olson’s words, water quality was a private good that 
the lake and river protection groups believed was going to be harmed if they didn’t get 
involved. 
The Florida users of the water as well as non-Atlanta area water consumers were 
concerned about quality of the water.  The head waters of the Chattahoochee River are 
near the Atlanta area, the pollution associated with its approximately four million people 
flows into downstream Florida.  Because of this, Florida was concerned that none of the 






and the quantity available to the state of Florida at the start of the Apalachicola River was 
the only issue Georgia wanted to discuss. 
Robert Salisbury (1987) believed that as issues became more complex that the 
number of interest groups would increase.  In sum, Salisbury (1987) believes that as a 
society becomes more complex, the groups and interest groups reflect that complexity.  
Ainsworth (2002) offers evidence that as environmental have become more complex, 
specialization has occurred in the iron triangles concerning environmental policy.  
Ainsworth (2002) believes the increase in the number and specialization of interest 
groups is a reflection of the increase in the diversity of our nation’s economy.   
This is true with each of the states involved in the compact negotiations.  Florida 
has a narrow use for the water. That state is primarily concerned with protecting the 
natural flow of the water so that the shrimp and oysters can exist in a way that is 
profitable for the harvesters. The Atlanta area in Georgia is primarily concerned with 
accessing water to continue its economic development while the downstream area is 
concerned with using the water to irrigate crops or develop their economies, which often 
compete with the Atlanta area for economic development.  Alabama uses the water to 
support water levels in lakes to ensure an adequate supply of water to operate the dams
that created the reservoirs as well as having enough water for recreational purposes.  In 
this sense, the more specialized the interest group, the more specific their expectations.  
The level of difference in expectations among each state’s interest groups will affect the 
ability of a state to influence the compact negotiation process with the more unified states 







Salisbury (1987) believes there is an exchange theory at work that explains why 
individuals join groups. As the complexity of the policy issue increases, so do the 
conditions in which a person receives benefit.  Also, the threats to the benefits can 
become more complex and consequently, more difficult to identify and protect an 
individual’s interests. Salisbury’s (1987) discussion on how the complexity of issues 
indicates that interest groups will appear to assist the individuals in protecting their 
interests from this new and complex threat. 
This plays out in the negotiation process with the different users of the water not 
being able to understand or readily observe the affect of the different proposed outcomes 
of the compacts.  This explains why different interest groups appeared along the different 
rivers in Alabama that were focused on explaining to their members the threats to their
wealth and livelihoods. This can also be true in explaining the involvement of the 
interest groups in Florida. The groups who were most involved in the negotiations were 
individuals with great technical expertise who understood the different implications of
how changes in the river water volume would affect the Apalachicola Bay’s ecosystem.  
In sum, new threats brought about new interest groups. 
Salisbury’s (1987) work gives a possible explanation of why the negotiations of 
these two compacts may have failed to produce permanent compacts.  When the 
Colorado River Basin, and the Upper Colorado River Basin compacts were approved, 
there was little environmental regulation.  The ACT and ACF were negotiated after the 
passage of the Clean Water Act and the Endangered Species Act.  To further complicate 








Colorado River. This diversity of use and increase in the number of laws and regulations 
governing the water, as well as a greater number of species inhabiting the rivers and 
lakes, indicates that the number of interest groups involved in the compacts’ negotiation 
processes will be larger than those involved with previous compacts. 
In studying the influence of interest groups, this study examines how interest 
groups form coalitions to increase their influence.  Hojnacki (1997) examines the 
decision making process that interest groups make when they evaluate the benefits of 
joining a coalition or going it alone.  The primary benefit in not joining the coalition is 
that the group does not have to compromise on aspects of their primary purpose or goal 
or take up positions that may not assist in achieving in their mission (Hojnacki, 1997). 
The benefit for joining a coalition is to improve the chances that at least a portion of the 
group’s message will be heard because the group is a part of a larger group that has a 
greater influence. By joining a coalition, a group can share information and possibly 
costs with other members of the coalition (Hojnacki, 1997). 
Hojnacki (1997) believes that the narrower a group’s interest in a particular issue, 
the less likely that group will be to join a coalition of other interest groups.  This is due to 
the perception that the ‘costs’ involved with joining a larger group outweigh the benefits 
received from group membership.  In short, it would be better to go it alone and support 
the issue than to take on other issues and risk not accomplishing the goal.
In the study of interest groups in each river basin, there was great incentive for the 
lake home owner and river keeper interest groups in Alabama to join together.  With both 






the narrow focus of each river and lake interest group located along the Coosa and 
Tallapoosa Rivers, it is expected that each group will likely join together to form an 
alliance. This may explain the formation of the Alabama Rivers Alliance as well their 
role in the compacts’ negotiations. 
Honjinacki’s (1997) theory may also assist in explaining the level of cohesion 
among different groups in each state as well as why different formal and informal 
coalitions were formed during the negotiation process.  Honjinacki (1997) believes that 
interest groups tend to create ‘issue niches’ which each interest group seeks to influence.  
This assists in developing an identity for the interest group and building support for the 
organization’s mission (Hojnacki, 1997).  If the interest group is weak in terms of its 
ability to influence a broad issue, then this becomes a practical strategy.  With this study 
of interest groups in each river basin, the smaller interest groups develop an ‘issue niche’ 
and focus only on their portion of the river, or their particular use of the water.  During 
the negotiation process, the smaller interest groups contend with larger interest groups 
and decide to form coalitions to combat the larger interest groups over broad issues such 
as river water quality and quantity. 
Frequently, organizations that develop this ‘issue niche’ strategy will take on 
geographical or purposive distinctions (Hojnacki, 1997).  This is found to be a 
characteristic among many of the smaller interest groups in this study.  The interest 
groups tend to focus on a geographic portion of a river or the economic climate of a 









the broad scope of the compacts while the larger groups such as power companies will 
likely go it alone. 
With many of the smaller interest groups in this study, there are a few elite 
members of each group which will be interviewed.  Each person interviewed will be 
someone who is familiar with the compact negotiations.  Within each of the interest
groups, the individual members who are involved and aware of the negotiations will be 
interviewed. Each of these individuals has a shared set of characteristics.  Pollock (1982) 
explains the agents of mobilization, which in this study translates to attending public 
meetings of the negotiations as well as seeking community support for their mission and 
communicating with other interest groups that have similar goals.  In sum, these are the 
individuals who are defining the goals and niches of their interest group. 
Dahl (1961) believes there are few who govern and many who follow.  In this 
study of interest groups, Dahl’s (1961) work explains why there are only a few members 
of each interest group involved as well as there being only a few interest groups that are 
able to govern a particular public policy issue.  The study of interest group influence on 
the negotiation process of the compacts is actually a study of how different groups of 
elites interact.  The individuals who are involved with each of the interest groups have an 
above average amount of wealth or education.  In some cases, both are present. 
Ainsworth (2003) believes the direction interest groups take in a public policy 
issue is influenced primarily by the leaders, or elites in the organization.  This supports 







process and tend to be more influential within the interest group’s organization (Dye, 
2001, Kingdon, 1995). 
This is believed to be true in the study of interest groups in Alabama and Georgia.  
In Alabama, the individuals from the different river and lake protection groups who 
attended the public meetings were more affluent and often had large amounts of person 
wealth that could be affected by the outcomes of the compacts.  In example, the 
individuals from the different river protection groups owned homes on the lakefront, 
marinas, or sold lakefront real estate.  If the water levels were reduced by the increase in 
withdrawals from the Atlanta area, the lake levels would lower and the lakefront property 
would loose value. In addition, the reduced water flow would also increase the 
possibility of increased algae and other concerns that would promote certain 
communicable diseases. Clearly, these individuals had a great amount of financial 
incentive to become active in a project that could affect their income and wealth.  This 
principle is also clear with the corporations such as Alabama Power, river navigation 
groups, oyster gatherers and the economic development interests in the Atlanta area. 
Pollock’s (1982) study considers the effect of education and income as agents of 
mobilization within groups.  Pollock (1982) contends that the individuals in an 
organization who posses more income and education are more likely to participate in the 
group’s activities. This is important to the study of interest group influence in the river 
basins because the groups with more individuals who possess higher incomes and 








Pollock (1982) also believes that the groups with more members of higher socioeconomic 
status will have more participation in their activities than other groups. 
While the elites of the different interest groups are involved with the compact 
negotiations, their success depends, in part, upon the elites motivating the individuals 
who make up the groups’ membership (Truman, 1950).  While Truman (1950) 
acknowledges that it is virtually impossible for the leaders of their interest groups to 
solve all of the problems, the problems the leaders choose to tackle are vital to the 
support the leaders receive from the members.   
Throughout the compact process, the availability of the resource fluctuated 
because of the drought seasons the area experienced in the late 1990s.  It would be 
interesting to study if the focus of the leaders were able to use this situation to focus the 
attention of the members on the issue and increase support for their work as well as 
increase the membership in their organization. 
 Because this study considers interest group influence with states, considering the 
characteristics of strong and weak interest groups would be appropriate.  Froman (1966) 
asks the question, “Do political systems that vary in the strength of their interest groups 
also vary in a systematic way with regard to certain structural and output variables within 
their respective political systems?” (p.953).  Froman (1966) believes that political 
systems with strong interest groups will become strong political systems.  Froman (1966) 
tests this by examining the characteristics of each state’s constitution.  
Froman (1966) addresses how problematic it can be to define and measure 







measures such as money given to legislative campaigns would not be telling the entire
story because there are other ways to influence government.  
In measuring the influence of interest groups in the two basins, there are several 
quantitative methods that could be used but have serious flaws.  Using meeting 
attendance or statements to the media could be measured as well as number of members 
in each interest group. The problem with using those measures is that some of the 
discussions between interest groups and each state’s negotiator or state elected official 
took place outside of the public meetings (interview with a state negotiator).  The primary 
reason Froman believed that it is difficult to conduct research that could be quantitatively 
analyzed was that influence can take on so many different forms.  In particular it is 
difficult to measure strength of influence with numbers such as numbers of members or 
how many groups took part in a coalition.  In Froman’s (1966) study, influence was 
measured by outcomes.  In the study the outcomes are clear, but the role the interest 
groups play in determining the outcomes is not as clear.  Froman’s (1966) study did not 
attempt to determine which interest groups influenced each state’s constitution, only that 
there were strong interest groups in states with certain characteristics in their constitution. 
In Froman’s (1966) study, the length of state constitutions was used as the 
measurement of the strength of an interest group.  In this study, qualitative measurements 
are used to determine which interest groups were more influential.  The judgments that 
are used by people familiar with the compact negotiations as well as individuals who 
were influenced by the interest groups will be used as a measurement of the amount of 








Froman (1966) concluded by offering several characteristics of states where a few 
interest groups dominate the policy process.  States that are more rural, have a legislature 
that is dominated by one-party, relatively poor, and more agrarian.  With the state of 
Alabama, Forman’s (1966) discussion explains that the state is ripe for domination from a 
particular interest group. Alabama, a state with moderate population and few major 
urban centers, is heavily dependent on agriculture as its main industry.  Timber is a major 
industry for the state. With Alabama, it is believed that Alabama Power will be the 
dominant interest group.  Georgia, a rural state outside of the Metropolitan Atlanta area is 
dominated by agricultural interests except for the city of Atlanta which is dominated by
many interest groups with the same goal, fighting off any threat to the Atlanta area’s 
growth. The portion of Florida that is in the Apalachicola River Basin is rural with 
timber and oyster gathering as the primary sources of industry.  Froman’s (1966) study 
indicates that one interest group, in this case an agricultural group, would be able to 
influence the subsystem of that area of Florida.   
An important aspect of explaining influence during the negotiations is considering 
the role of the government agencies. The Corps of Engineers, U.S. Fish and Wildlife, the 
Environmental Protection Agency, as well as numerous state agencies were stakeholders 
and participated in the negotiation process.  Boyer (1960) examines how government 
agencies make policy.  Boyer (1960) contends that each agency develops unique 
characteristics that influence how agencies make decisions.  This difference in decision 
making indicates it is difficult for oversight organizations such as a state’s legislative 







between each of the groups is present in the negotiations.  Several government agencies 
with different missions and goals were involved in the negotiations. 
Boyer (1960) also explains that private interest groups provide influence on the 
government agencies.  These private agencies are typically very familiar with the 
government organization’s process and are able to influence the organization’s policies in 
a variety of ways (Boyer, 1960). This influence is typically conducted through providing 
information or feedback concerning existing regulations and proposed regulations.  On 
occasion, this influence may be so strong the interest group will take on the role of the 
government agency.  When the compact negotiation process began, the state of Alabama 
did not believe it had a government agency qualified to represent itself in the 
negotiations. Consequently, it looked toward an interest group, Alabama Power, for 
assistance.  The state’s first negotiator was a former Alabama Power employee.  This 
employee provided the technical knowledge that was needed to present Alabama’s needs. 
These needs were the same as what Alabama Power would need to keep its business 
operating at a level that it was accustomed to operating.  In sum, the state of Alabama 
was representing an Alabama interest group during the negotiations with the other states. 
Within the state of Georgia, the interest groups concerned with protecting the 
ability of the metropolitan area of Atlanta to grow, provided a great deal of information 
and influence with the state of Georgia’s negotiation team.  The organizations that were 
concerned about continuing Atlanta’s growth provided information to Georgia’s 
negotiation team regarding how much water was needed to support its growing 









Florida’s negotiation team was influenced by environmental organizations and 
oyster gatherers who provided information to the team concerning their desires as to how 
much water would be needed to maintain their biologically diverse bay as well as keep an 
environment that would prevent a decrease in the population of oysters. 
Kingdon (1995) indicates that interest groups can influence government and 
public policy agendas in different venues.  Kingdon (1995) believes most interest group 
activity is focused upon blocking legislation rather than promoting a new agenda.  In 
particular, interest groups are involved primarily with maintaining the status quo and 
enjoying the benefits of a particular aspect of public policy. Any change in this policy 
will alter the environment in which they operate and therefore likely harm the benefits 
they are accustomed to under the current policy (Kingdon, 1995).  This will likely hold 
true for the compact negotiations.  Most of the interest groups involved in the process are 
primarily concerned with preventing interest groups around the Atlanta area from
creating a compact that allows for a change in the water level that the interest group is 
accustomed to enjoying.  Alabama Power in particular, would stand to loose a great deal 
of its ability to produce electricity if the water flow of the Coosa and Tallapoosa Rivers 
were reduced. The value of lakefront property would be reduced and the amount of 
oysters that could be accessed by gatherers would decrease dramatically.  Because of this, 
it is expected that many interest groups are likely to follow the type of agenda blocking 
that Kingdon (1995) mentions.  
Kingdon (1995) also indicates that the more complex the agenda, the less likely 







believes the more complex public policy issues that rise to the top of a government’s 
agenda are a result of several factors. Other factors such as a triggering event can ignite 
the issue and place it at the forefront of policymakers’ agenda.  In addition, Kingdon 
(1995) contends that interest groups can often loose control of the agenda for that 
particular issue once it rises to the top of policymakers’ agenda.   
It is likely this scenario plays out within the state of Alabama.  The original focus 
of the state during the negotiations was Alabama Power’s desire for a predictable amount 
of river water flow. Once interest groups along the rivers in the ACT Basin became 
involved, the state’s focus began to shift towards water quality concerns.  More 
specifically, the state began to consider how water quantity and water quality were 
related. This modification of Alabama’s agenda can be attributed to the infusion of 
additional interest groups with broader than, but not contradictory to, the desires of 
Alabama Power. 
Resources are, of course, vital in the success of achieving a goal or having a 
favorable alternative at the top of the agenda (Kingdon, 1995).  It is expected that this 
will be true in explaining the reasons why some interest groups emerge as most dominant 
in the subsystem and others are not able to have their alternatives heard. 
Group cohesion is also an important advantage having an interest group’s agenda 
heard by decision makers.  Kingdon (1995) believes the one of the toughest challenges 
interest groups face is being able to convince policy makers that the leaders of the interest 








case with the policy makers as well as other interest groups that are considering forming 
a coalition. 
It is expected that Georgia is the least cohesive among the three states because the 
state is primarily represented by interest groups in the Atlanta area and are not concerned 
about what kinds of outcomes the other areas of the state desire from the compacts.  
Because the goals of the interest groups surrounding the metropolitan area of Atlanta are 
perceived to be harmful to interest groups located downriver from the Atlanta area, there 
is a great likelihood that a lack of cohesion exists in the state of Georgia.  When 
considering that the states of Alabama and Florida are likely to have strong cohesion 
among its interest groups, this will likely mean that the state of Georgia will act as the 
weakest in the regional subsystem. 
Hrebenar (1997) believes that the balance of power among interest groups can 
shift depending on changing current events in public policy.  While Hrebenar (1997) 
echoes many of the same characteristics of powerful interest groups as Kingdon (1995), 
Froman (1966), and Hojnacki, (1997) he also indicates that forces outside of the control 
of any interest group can change the importance of the public agenda and focus the public 
as well as the policymakers attention on different aspects of a particular public policy. 
Hrebenar’s (1997) discussion illustrates a couple of examples of how the 
compacts negotiated over the ACT and the ACF differ from western compacts is the 
increase in attention to endangered species and water quality.  The western compacts 
were negotiated and approved during a time in which there was no Endangered Species 







than the ones in the west, which focused almost exclusively on water access.  Due to the 
complicated nature of creating two compacts that would ensure compliance with 
environmental regulations as time progressed was a daunting challenge and one more 
reason why the compacts were not approved.  This challenge was amplified because the 
federal government was not formally involved in the negotiation process despite the fact 
that government agencies such as U. S. Fish and Wildlife would be able to provide 
expertise on these complicated biological and legal concerns. 
In measuring the strength of interest groups, Derthick (1974) believes this is 
another way to measure power.  Martha Derthick (1974) measures power by a ratio of the 
group’s achievements to its goals.  A group’s power is maximized when the 
achievements and goals are equal.  The challenge with testing this is determining a 
group’s goals. Often times, the goals change with the conditions in which the group 
operates. Other times, the goals may not be clear to those outside of the interest group.  
Again, the complicated nature of public policy issues ensures that it is difficult to 
measure the power of an interest group. 
Another challenge in measuring interest group influence is Robert Dahl’s (1961) 
definition of interest group power, which is, ’A’ has power over ‘B’ to the extent that he 
can get ‘B’ to do something that ‘B’ would not otherwise do.  However, Derthick (1974) 
and others criticize this definition because it assumes that every time ‘B’ is doing 
something only because of the influence of ‘A’.  In other words, ‘B’ might want to do 








Along the same lines of Dahl’s (1961) theory, this brings up a challenge in 
measuring the influence of the interest groups in this research.  In the state of Alabama, 
Alabama power wants to maintain the water flow of the Coosa and Tallapoosa Rivers.  
The lake and river groups are also trying to protect the water flow along the same two 
rivers. It is difficult to determine which group has more influence given Dahl’s (1961) 
theory. However, where Dahl’s (1961) theory is applicable, distinguishing what ‘A’ and 
‘B’ wants is not difficult. It appears clear that any of the interest groups in the Atlanta 
area would not behaving the same if there was not opposition to the amount of water they 
are withdrawing from the river. 
Hrebenar (1997) believes at the state level of government, iron triangles are 
appropriate in describing how public policy is made.  In particular, distributive 
policymaking is a particularly ripe environment for iron triangles (Hrebenar, 1997).  
Hrebenar (1997) goes further to indicate that the Corps of Engineers has been a favorite 
target of interest groups because of its distribution of public works projects. 
During the course of the negotiations, Alabama and Florida have accused the state 
of Georgia of conducting secret negotiations with the COE.  The negotiations concerned 
how much water the COE would withdraw for use in power production for its 
hydroelectric dams along the Chattahoochee River.  In 2005, Republican President 
George Bush nominated a new head of the southeastern regional office of the COE 
(Associated Press, April 15, 2005). Alabama’s two Republican Senators and all seven of 
its Representatives informed the Republican president they did not approve of his 








water. (Associated Press, April 15, 2005). After the nominee sent a letter to both of 
Alabama’s U. S. Senators indicating he would not change any of the standing restrictions 
of withdrawing water from the Chattahoochee River, the two Alabama Senators removed 
their objection to his appointment (Associated Press, April 25, 2005).  
Subsystems Theory 
Subsystems theory allows us to consider more than just the institutions involved 
in the decision-making process.  It shows how interest groups, including states, motivate 
the political institutions to form the compacts (McCool, 1998).  The subsystems theory 
will also help explain why different views on the two compacts occur not only between 
states, but within states.  It will also help explain why some groups had more influence 
over the negotiation process than others and where that influence was most effective in
formulating the desires of each state during the negotiation process of each state. 
Many studies of policymaking have used iron triangles to explain the relationship 
between government and interest groups.  Scholars contend that the iron triangle does not 
explain enough of the dynamic to have applicability.  Other models have attempted to 
explain subsystems that are in flux as well as subsystems that include Helco’s (1978) 
issue networks. In short, the literature on subsystems is continually considering models 
that can explain the fluid nature of policy subsystems.  
Many models focus on the framework of conflict in policymaking (McCool, 
1995, 1998). A heirarchy of conflict over government resources is the framework used in 
McCool’s model. This model considers as a part of its x-axis, the strength of the political 













considered in determining the position of the interest group along the x-axis of the model.  
The effects of water access in a river basin have to acknowledge zero-sum outcomes.  
This model will explain the role that competing interest groups play in the influencing 
each state’s desired outcomes of the interstate compacts. 
Why McCool’s Model? 
McCool’s model considers conflict and competition for government resources. 
The model ranks this conflict into four quadrants.  The quadrants range from autonomous 
to pluralized while considering the availability of resources. 
McCool discusses the four quadrants in the model: 
1. The top left quadrant of the model represents a low competition and low preoccupation 
of zero-sum outcomes.  This is referred to as an autonomous subsystem.  In this context, 
a subsystem is able to operate with nearly complete control in a zero-sum environment. 
Characteristically, there are many losers and few, often only one, winner.  Subsystems in 
this quadrant have a severe imbalance of power and influence.  Most, if not all, of the 


































Figure 2.1: McCool’s Model (1998) 
 
 
2. The lower left quadrant represents subsystems that are low in their competitive nature 
while operating in a high zero-sum environment.  McCool refers to this group as 
Dominant/Dissident.  Here, one group is dominant but other groups are able to influence 
some policy by achieving a critical mass. 
3. The upper right quadrant is one that is highly competitive but does not sustain the 
pressures of a high zero-sum environment.  This is referred to as a pluralized subsystem. 
McCool (1998) characterizes the pluralized system as one in which the different sides of 
an issue are similar in strength of influence over the policy process.  The only method to 
achieve a policy outcome is through ‘turf balkanization’ (McCool, 1998, p.564).  “Turf 
balkanization” is when a subsystem possess such a high amount of influence over an 










group, that interest groups outside of the subsystem have little influence over the 
decision. 
4. The lower right quadrant indicates subsystems that are highly competitive and in a 
highly zero-sum environment. McCool refers to these subsystems as conflictual. 
Subsystems in this quadrant are similar in strength of influence and have the ability to 
directly influence policy decisions.  However, the limited availability of resources creates 
a zero-sum environment.  This environment creates a situation in which the only gains 
are at the expense of other policy interests (McCool, 1998).  
This model is used to measure conflict within each subsystem over river water 
access because it allows, with the ‘zero sum’ scale, for different levels of competitiveness 
among the interest groups.  It also considers the competition of limited resources in this 
example that resource is river water.   
It is also likely that the model will be able to illustrate how the levels of conflict 
within the subsystem will change as availability of the resource changes during years of 
abnormal drought.  When a drought occurs, the subsystem is likely to move from the 
third to the fourth quadrant as access to river water becomes scarce.  Also as the 
competition for the resource intensifies, the issue moves to the forefront of the policy 
agenda. As Kingdon illustrates, the policy streams come together to put water access at 












Lessons Learned from the Literature Review 
The literature suggests three primary characteristics that measure an interest 
group’s strength: access to resources, simplicity of the issue, and uniformity within the 
interest group on the issue. The hypotheses are derived from these principles. 
Access to political and social resources ensures that the interest group or coalition 
of interest groups will be able to get the attention of policy makers and have their policy 
issue placed at the top of the agenda or have their concerns addressed by the policy 
makers.  If the issue is simple, the interest group will more easily be able to explain its
message so that the policy makers can understand what the interest group desires from 
them.  Finally, if the interest group is uniform with its goals and desired policy outcomes 
then the interest group or coalition of interest groups will be able to get their message to 
the policy makers clearer. By doing this, the policy makers, or the public, can be certain 
what policy outcome is desired by the interest group. 
How this Research adds to the Literature 
This dissertation will add to the literature in four areas. The first area will be the 
discussion of interstate negotiations.  The second will be in better understanding how 
interest groups influence states and federal agencies.  The third will be the discussion of
how business and government interact in formulating public policy.  The fourth and final 
area this dissertation will add to the literature will be the testing of McCool’s (1998) 
model to further explain the public policy process. 
The next chapter will discuss the methods that will be used to determine which 
























The chapter will also describe how each qualitative and quantitative method was used to 
learn of the effects of the interest groups in addition to justifying the use of each 
instrument of measurement and how it was used in the research. 
57 














This chapter explains the different methods used in determining which interest 
groups and organizations were influential in the negotiations as well as what outcomes 
each group desired. The methods used to gather data as well as justification of the data 
collection will be discussed in this chapter.  This will prelude the analysis and discussion 
of the findings of the data. 
Several questions will be addressed in this research.  The focus of the questions is 
learning which actors and interest groups dominated the negotiation of the water 
compacts.  In order to decide which actors and interest groups were dominant, in-depth 
interviews and a survey was sent to subjects who are familiar with the negotiation 
process. 
Research Questions 
1) If interest groups influence state negotiators, how great is that influence and how do 
the groups influence the process?
2) Which interest groups are the most dominant in the negotiation process? 
3) What types of the interest groups are the most influential? 
















5) Does the quantity of water availability cause a policy subsystem to shift quadrants
along the x-axis?
Dependent Variable 
The influence of interest groups on the states as well as on the negotiation process 
will be the dependent variable.  The dependent variables will be measured from results of
the survey and the in-depth interviews.  Influence will be measured by asking the 
respondents who they believe are the most influential actors in the process.  
Other areas that will be considered as dependent variables include: is allocation 
the most important negotiation concern or are there other concerns more important in the 
outcome of the compacts?  Does the respondent care more about water composition, such 
as oxygenation levels, than allocation?  Does the respondent consider agriculture uses 
more important than industrial development uses?  What is the respondent’s main 
concern with respect to the use of the water? 
Independent Variables 
Independent variables will include, which river basin the respondent is located, 
which state the respondent is located, if in Georgia which portion of the state  
(metropolitan Atlanta or downstream).  The current job title of the respondent as well as  
time at current position will be considered.  What is the primary use of water in the water 
 district (agriculture, industrial, or residential), what is the population setting of the water 














other demographic characteristics can be used in the regression analysis to measure  
impact on the dependent variable. 
Statistical Analysis 
The in-depth interviews were analyzed using contextual analysis.  A search for 
themes and common phrases were noted as well.  The questionnaire data will be analyzed 
with appropriate statistical analysis to see if any relationship exists between interest
groups and the outcomes of the compacts as well as the perceived strength of the input 
from the different interest groups.  The statistical methods such as comparisons of means, 
factor analysis, and regression will be used to measure strength of interest groups, levels 
of influence, in each state’s subsystem as well as the subsystem as a whole.  The 
statistical software, SPSS Version 13, was used to compute the statistical analysis. 
Hypotheses
H1: States in a river basin with diverse uses of the river are less likely to be homogeneous 
in the interstate compact negotiations than a state with uniform uses for the river water in 
the river basin. 
H1a: The greater the number of coalitions of involved interest groups in a state, the less 
influential the state will be in the interstate compact negotiations. 
H1b: Georgia is more likely to be less unified in its negotiating position than Alabama or 











H1c: Georgia is more likely to be less influential than Alabama or Florida during the 
negotiation process because the state is more diverse in its uses of the river water than
Alabama and Florida. 
With diverse uses of the water, it is more likely that there will be differing 
opinions within a state for its desired outcomes.  The different uses for the river water 
will create competing interests within the state, which will cause the state to appear not 
unified in its position. With the diversity of uses of the water it is likely that there will be 
several different interest groups that will be working against each other rather than 
together.  This lack of unity within a state will cause a decrease in that state’s strength.  In 
states that have more uniform uses of the water, the likelihood of forming an alliance 
along Hojnacki’s (1997) ‘issue niche’. 
Kingdon (1995) also supports this principle of cohesion among interest groups.  
The more cohesive a state, the more likely it will be in influencing the negotiations 
because it speaks with one voice.  Georgia appears to be the least cohesive because of the 
different uses (agricultural, economic development, navigation, and electrical power 
generation) of the river water throughout the two basins. 
Because the upstream users in the Chattahoochee and Flint River Basins use water 
to support economic development while the downstream users require water for 
agricultural maintenance, there will be different goals for the compacts that are reflective 
of the different uses of the river water.  With the Coosa River Basin, there are 









decrease the River’s water quality and force the price of cleaning the water to increase. 
The downstream users of the Coosa believe this increase in costs of using the natural 
resource will discourage economic development while the Atlanta area is able to continue 
its development.  Therefore, the upstream interests along the Coosa River want increases 
in the amount of water they withdraw while the downstream interests do not necessarily 
desire more water but guarantees of water quality.  
The downstream users of the Chattahoochee and Flint Rivers do not desire more 
water flow, but a guarantee of the volume of water flow, or to preserve what they 
consider the natural flow of the water.  It is believed that since there are clear differences 
in the uses of the water between the interest groups in the upstream and downstream
areas within Georgia’s borders of the Chattahoochee and Flint River Basins, there will be 
a great amount of variation in what position the state of Georgia should take in the 
negotiation process. As previously stated, Kingdon’s (1995) discussion on cohesion 
supports this hypothesis. 
Because of the difference among Georgia’s interest groups in desired outcomes of 
the compacts, it is believed that the conflict among the different interest groups will cause 
Georgia to not have a clear set of desired outcomes for the compacts.  Without clear 
goals, the state of Georgia will be weaker than the other two states.  As previously 
mentioned, Kingdon’s (1995) discussion of cohesion, as well as an increase in the 










The greater the number of coalitions among interest groups, the more difficult it 
will be any coalition of interest groups to achieve a critical mass.  If there is no one 
strong interest group representing the state, then the state will no be as unified in their 
negotiations and they will not be as strong as a state that is unified in its desired outcomes 
of the negotiations. As Froman (1966) suggests, a state with a strong, dominant interest 
group has a strong political system.  This in turn means the state will act decisively with 
one voice during the negotiations. 
Florida does not appear to have a dominant interest group that uses the river 
water. Because there is not a clear choice as a primary user of the water, there will be 
many interest groups who are involved in the negotiations with no single group 
dominating the process. As Froman (1996) suggests, a state with a strong, dominant 
interest group has a strong political system.  Because Florida is a coalition of many 
different interest groups with no single individual interest group or coalition of groups 
being dominant during the negotiations, that state may not be as strong as the other states 
which have dominant interest groups.  However, the interest groups in Florida seem to 
have a high level of cohesion. They are almost exclusively concerned with protecting the 
natural flow of the river’s water.  Therefore, the state is likely to be stronger than Georgia 
in the negotiation process. 
Kingdon’s (1995) discussion on cohesiveness also supports these hypotheses.  In 
sum, Kingdon (1995) believes if there are more coalitions, there are more goals and 
agenda issues that are competing for policy makers’ attention.  If there are many different 
















speak with one voice. This lack of cohesion will cause the state to not be able to clearly 
and effectively protect its goals, which will allow other states to have an advantage in the 
negotiation process. With a narrow focus, the state will be able to use its resources to 
focus on achieving its goal. 
H2: The greater the amount of resources available to an interest group, the greater the 
influence of the interest group. 
H2a: Interest groups with environmental concerns are less likely to influence the 
formulation of the interstate compacts than business interests.
H2b: Lake and river protection groups are more likely to be more influential within 
Alabama’s subsystem than environmental groups because of greater access to resources. 
H2c: Interest groups representing the concerns of the metropolitan area of Atlanta are 
more likely to influence the state of Georgia’s agenda than interest groups outside of the 
Atlanta area.
H2d: No single interest group in Florida will be able to dominate that state’s subsystem 












H2e: Alabama Power will be the most influential interest group in the state of Alabama 
because of the large amount of political resources they possess. 
H2f: The electrical power companies and other stakeholders are more likely to influence 
Alabama’s desired outcomes while state and local government agencies are more likely 
to influence Georgia’s desired outcomes of the compact negotiations because they 
possess more resources to influence the policy makers. 
Considering the state of Alabama chose negotiators who had significant 
professional connections with the Alabama Power Company, the power company is 
likely to be most influential interest group in Alabama.  State and local governments in 
Alabama appear to have little concern over the outcome of the compacts and content of 
allowing an electrical power company represent their interests. 
Georgia, which is likely to be concerned with protecting economic development 
concerns will likely be working closely with governments in the Atlanta area as well as 
the different chamber of commerce organizations.  The local governments, which are 
concerned about promoting their population growth and economic development, will be 
interested in having more access to river water.  These groups, with their vast political 
resources, and similarity of goals, will likely dominate the state of Georgia’s desired 
outcomes of the compacts. 
Froman’s (1966) discussions of interest group strength indicate that Alabama 










Alabama Power is a powerful interest group and has a pattern of dominating policy 
decision making.  The economic development interests in the Atlanta area also have a 
history of being able to exert a great amount of influence over public policy issues in 
Georgia. The reasons for this can likely be explained by the fact these two groups have 
access to many economic and political resources as well as great levels of cohesion in 
their desired outcomes of the compacts.  Kingdon’s (1995) theories on political resources 
and cohesion again support this hypothesis. 
Given the population size and the amount of political resources that are available 
to the metropolitan area of Atlanta, they dwarf the size of the portion of the state that is in 
the lower basin areas of the Flint, Coosa and Chattahoochee Rivers.  This advantage in 
population and resources will allow the interest groups in Atlanta to have their concerns 
heard, even at the expense of the other areas of the state.  Kingdon’s (1995) discussion of 
the importance of access to resources as being an important part of increasing the 
likelihood of having the group’s agenda heard by policy makers directly supports this 
hypothesis. 
Alabama Power needs a steady flow of water along the Coosa and Tallapoosa 
Rivers to operate dams that produce electricity, which is sold to other areas outside of the 
basin. This electrical power company, which is owned by a holding company that also 
owns Georgia Power, has a large amount of political resources and influence in the 
Alabama state legislature (interview with Alabama state legislator).   
It is believed that this high amount of influence will carry over into dominating 










discussion about the importance of possessing resources supports this hypothesis.  Also, 
Hojnacki’s (1997) discussion of an interest group’s ‘issue niche’ indicates that with the 
combination of a large amount of resources and a narrow focus on the issue, the 
likelihood of Alabama Power dominating not only the state of Alabama’s negotiation 
position but the negotiation process as a whole is strong. 
Considering the importance of having decision-making members with higher 
socioeconomic status as well as organizational resources, the interest groups with the 
environmental concerns are likely to have less of both than interests with business 
interests. The literature supports this hypothesis.  Because the environmental groups are 
believed to not have as many resources available to them as business interests, they 
would then not be able to influence the compacts as much as the business interests.   
Dye (2001) and Kingdon (1995) conclude that resource attainment is paramount 
to getting policy makers interested in your wants and being able to place your issue at the 
top of an agenda as well as being able to favorably control the outcomes of the agenda.  
This will be tested with the in-depth interviews as well as the survey.  Interview subjects 
and survey respondents will be asked their perceptions as to which group was more 
influential. 
The literature supports this hypothesis. The lake and river protection groups 
likely possess more financial and political resources than the environmental groups. 
Jackson (1990) illustrated how lake home owners were able to force change in the 
operations of a paper mill when the lake home owners felt threatened by the output of the 














evidence that the lake home owners have the ability influence policy outcomes more than 
purely environmental groups.  It is likely that environmental groups will choose to join 
forces with the lake and river protection groups in hopes of accomplishing at least a 
portion of their goal. Again, Dye (2001) and Kingdon’s (1995) views support this 
hypothesis. 
Also, the cohesion is likely to be higher among the lake and river protection 
groups. Because the groups have the same economic interests and the reduction of water 
allocation will affect each of them nearly the same, the likelihood of strong cohesion is 
great. The affect of cohesion on an interest group’s chances of success is supported by 
Kingdon (1995) in the literature. 
In summary, the more specialized the interest group, the more specific their 
expectations. The challenge interest groups experience is being able to find others that 
have similar interests and forming coalitions while continuing to maintain their goals. 
H3: During drought years the policy subsystem for the region will move from the third 
quadrant toward the fourth quadrant. 
The competition for scarce resources will resemble McCool’s (1998) zero sum
outcome and move the subsystem into the fourth quadrant.  The scarcity of the resource, 
lower water levels in rivers during drought years, will motivate interest groups that were 
not concerned with the availability of the resource to become involved in the subsystem










the resource is lessened, the resource will become more valuable.  This will increase the 
intensity of the competition for the resource, thus moving the subsystem from the third
quadrant to the fourth. 
Discussion of Data Gathering 
Interviews were used because of their versatile nature towards conducting 
research (Rubin, 2005). These interviews allow the researcher the flexibility to ask not 
only a few questions that were conceived before the interview, but to follow the subject’s 
thoughts on the issue in question and possibly give the interviewer different viewpoints 
with which to view the subject matter (Rubin, 2005).  This kind of interviewing should be 
approached with open-ended questions and the interviewer must be prepared to follow 
the subject with questions that originate from the responses of the interview subject.  
Since there were no more than five commissioners at any one time for the three 
states and the federal government, a survey would not be practical.  The number of 
subjects interviewed totaled sixteen.  Of the individuals interviewed eight resided in 
Alabama, six in Georgia, and two from Florida.  One federal commissioner was 
interviewed as well as a contractor hired by the federal government to assist the federal 
commissioners.  One state negotiator was interviewed as well as one member of a state’s 
negotiation team.  One Alabama state legislator was interviewed.  Six people who 
represented interests involving Alabama’s rivers and lakes were interviewed.  One person 
who represented Florida’s Apalachicola River and Bay’s interests was interviewed.  One 
person employed with the City of Atlanta’s environmental protection was interviewed.  










primary reservoir along the Chattahoochee River, Lake Lanier, was interviewed.  One 
county level government employee responsible for environmental monitoring outside of 
the metropolitan area of Atlanta in the Georgia portion of the ACT Basin was 
interviewed. Two people representing the Coosa River’s interests downstream from the 
metropolitan area of Atlanta in Georgia was interviewed.  
There were several methods used in determining who possessed the 
characteristics of people who would be knowledgeable about the compact negotiation 
process. Websites of river and lake water protection advocacy groups located within the 
two basins were reviewed. Editorial and opinion articles as well as non-editorial news 
articles in area newspapers were reviewed to find names of individuals who possess 
knowledge of the compact negotiations.  The identity of the state and federal 
commissioners is a matter of public record.  
In recruiting the subjects, they were contacted by email or by phone.  They were 
informed of the purpose of the research and the nature of the questions they would be 
asked. If the interview was granted, most of the interviews were recorded and all 
subjects were assigned pseudo names.  Some subjects did not want the interview recorded 
and their wish was granted. The interviews with fourteen of the subjects were conducted 
in the subject’s home or place of work.  The remaining two were conducted by phone.  
Recorded interviews were then transcribed.  The transcripts were analyzed to discern









Snowballing was used to determine who was involved with the process but didn’t 
make many, if any, public statements which would normally appear in a newspaper or a 
public document.  Because transcripts of the meetings were not created, it was necessary 
to contact individuals who attended the meetings to determine what was discussed at the 
meetings.  Rubin (2005) defines snowballing as asking interview subjects to recommend 
others who are also knowledgeable on the matter under study.  This technique proved to 
be valuable in selecting the sample.  Many of the individuals who attended the meetings 
began to develop relationships with other attendees.  Because of this kind of relationship, 
snowballing proved to be the most useful tool in determining the qualifications of who 
should be interviewed. 
Also, this technique assisted in deciding who would be more likely to consent to 
an interview as well as providing information as to the subjects’ relevant professional 
background. By understanding the subject’s background, a more representative sample 
of respondents was chosen. This resulted in a more accurate and detailed description of 
the compact process.  The subjects came from each of the three states involved in the 
negotiations as well as a variety of professional backgrounds. 
Some individuals representing river groups as well as economic interests in the 
metropolitan area of Atlanta declined to be interviewed for this research.  Some of these 
individuals suggested that a better person to contact would be an area attorney who 
practices environmental law.  Clearly, there was a lack of comfort in discussing this topic 
with the individuals contacted who resided or represented interests in the Atlanta area. 










concerned about making comments on a topic that was the subject matter of current and 
possible litigation. With some of the subjects, it is possible that they are not interested in 
discussing a topic that may threaten their sources of funding by taking a position that is 
not in agreement with the thoughts of their larger donors.  The possibility of co-optation 
is analyzed further in chapter four. 
Each interviewee provided a different viewpoint of the negotiations as well as 
differing levels of involvement.  Some had been with the process since the creation of the 
compacts and others had only been casual observers to the negotiations.  Interviewees 
from the ACT basin were better represented in the research because the qualified research 
subjects in the Atlanta declined to be interviewed.
The state legislator represented an area outside of the two basins.  He was chosen 
because of his familiarity with the negotiations and his knowledge of water issues in his 
district as well as the state he resided.  He also represented an area in an adjacent basin 
that includes a large man-made lake along a river, which is vital to the local economy he
represents. 
After several interviews were conducted, the data were analyzed for themes that 
continually occur in all or most of the subjects’ stories.  The analysis was useful in 
determining which interest groups were most dominant in each state as well as the entire 
subsystem throughout the negotiations.  This data also assisted in telling a portion of the 
story that was not discussed in newspapers or other media outlets.  
This data also provided a basis for the written survey.  If there were certain 












in the questionnaire. Also, themes that became evident during the interview process were 
tested in the surveys to see if they were true with the broader audience. 
The interviews were conducted during the months of February, March, and April 
of 2005. Two of the interviews were conducted over the telephone while the remaining 
interviews were completed in-person.  The interviews were conducted within the 
interview subject’s residence or place of work. 
Limitations of the Study 
The compacts dissolved without an agreement on water allocation.  Because of 
this, the policies and procedural outcomes of the compact negotiations have not had an 
opportunity to become completely implemented.  The dissertation will focus on the 
negotiation process. Because the compacts no longer exist, it may be unclear what 
outcomes and current policies originated from the compacts.  The current and anticipated 
legal battles between the states and the Corps of Engineers also are influencing current 
policies concerning water use in each of the states. 
Interviewing subjects who may be concerned about pending litigation may be a 
limitation of the data gathering.  Acquiring enough addresses of individuals or interest 
groups who were involved or are familiar with the compacts and their negotiations is 
another concern. Both concerns may hinder getting a representative sample of the variety 
of interest groups as well as each state and region within a state.  This is of particular 
concern with Georgia since the state had greatly differing views on the desirable 










In order to reach more people, information was also gathered from the interviews 
to construct a questionnaire. Each person was chosen based upon having an expectation 
of having knowledge of the compacts or water issues in either basin.  The subjects were 
separated into three broadly defined groups to gauge response rates.  
The first group was referred to as the environmental group.  Members of this 
group were active in an interest group whose primary concern was environmental 
protection. They included river and lake keeper organizations, lake home owners 
associations as well as nature protection groups.  Groups whose area of interest included 
any part of either basin were included. Members of this group were chosen because 
knowledge or concern over the compacts would likely affect their primary interest.  This 
group would likely include members who had attended the meetings or had gathered 
information on the negotiations from news reports.  Some members of this group were 
directly involved with the negotiations such as the lake owners associations or river 
watch groups. Some were only vaguely knowledgeable of the compacts.  Examples of 
these kinds of subjects within the group included outdoor groups such as canoe and 
hiking clubs. 
Water authority or water management associations were included in the 
environmental group.  These subjects were employed by a municipality, county, regional 
water authority or state government as a water resources manager.  
The next group was labeled chamber.  This group in the survey included 










These subjects who were sent a survey consisted of people who chaired a county 
commission or served as president of a chamber of commerce.  This group was chosen to 
obtain their thoughts on the perception of how the compacts would impact their local 
economy was important in determining the concerns of a particular area as well as the 
salience of the issue with pro-development organizations.  These subjects would likely 
have an interest in the compacts because the interview subjects indicated that the 
outcome of the compacts would greatly influence the economic conditions throughout the 
two basins for many years to come.  Chambers of commerce and county commissions are 
two organizations that would be concerned with economic development and would likely 
have an understanding of how the compacts would affect the economic climate in their 
area. 
The final group was legislators. This group was chosen for a couple of reasons. 
First, each state legislature has to approve of any interstate compact before the state can 
legally enter it.  Also, as local legislators they would likely be familiar with water access 
related issues and the salience of those issues would likely be high among their 
constituents.
The survey was sent to subjects in four waves.  The first wave included a 
recruitment letter explaining the research project.  The second mailing included the 
survey and a letter explaining the purpose for the survey.  Each survey was coded to track 
which respondents replied to the survey. The third mailing was a post card that was sent 








the survey. The fourth and final mailing was to subjects who had not yet returned a 
survey and their surveys were not coded for tracking purposes.  
Four hundred and twelve recruitment letters were mailed.  Some subjects 
indicated they were not familiar with the compacts and withdrew from the research while 
other letters were returned due to incorrect addresses.  Three hundred and fifty-one 
possible respondents remained.  Of the 351, 105 were returned for a response rate of 29.9 
percent. 
One hundred and twenty-seven were sent to respondents who could be labeled as 
having an environmental interest.  Of this group 99 were not returned due to an incorrect 
mailing address or subject withdrawal.  Of those remaining, 28 had returned the 
completed survey before the fourth mailing. 
Sixty-four subjects were in the group with commerce or development concerns. 
Of those 64, 47 did not withdraw from the survey or were withdrawn due to an incorrect 
mailing address.  Of those 47, 15 completed the survey before the fourth mailing. 
With the legislators, 221 were sent a recruitment letter.  Two hundred and five 
had valid addresses and did not withdraw from the survey.  Of the 205, 25 were 
completed and returned before the fourth mailing.  Thirty-three completed surveys were 
returned after the fourth mailing.  
The list of addresses to which a survey could be sent to appropriate subjects was 
compiled from several sources.  In compiling the list for the subjects in the environmental 













Alabama Rivers Alliance.  This directory had mailing addresses and contact names for 
groups concerned with the health of rivers in Alabama as well as adjacent areas.  
An Internet search was done to find groups who were located along each of the 
rivers in the two basins. Groups that provided addresses on their website were included. 
Some of the groups were contacted by telephone or email to learn of other groups who 
should be sent a questionnaire. An Internet search for addresses of water associations 
and water authority groups located within each basin as well as government agencies that 
were involved in the negotiation process. Internet searches were conducted to obtain the 
address of each county commission and chamber of commerce that was located in the 
two basins. The same method was also done to search for the water authority employees 
and directors. 
The list of state legislators who represent areas in each of the basins was available 
on the state website of the three states. United States Senators of each state as well as 
Representatives whose district is at least partially located in either basin were also sent a 
survey. Their contact information was available through website searches. 
Some subjects withdrew because of possible or pending litigation.  These subjects 
indicated they did not feel it was appropriate to participate in the survey since the nature 
of the survey concerned itself with material that was also being debated in the lawsuits.  
No completed surveys were received from federal legislators.  Offices of some












The questionnaire was used to get the impressions of those who were intimately 
familiar with the negotiations, but also the interest groups and elected officials who did 
not attend many, if any, of the meetings and acquired knowledge of the compacts through 
secondary sources such as the print media.  The complete questionnaire is attached in 
appendix B. All recruitment letters are attached in appendix C. 
The first question determines the self reported knowledge of the compacts.  It is 
likely that some subjects will have a great amount of knowledge of the compacts and
others will have no knowledge of them. The next two questions determine which basin 
and state the subject resides or conducts his professional duties.  This information will 
assist in determining if location determines the perspective of the respondent.  
Question four lists thirteen different interest categories and asks the subject to rate 
their level of influence during the negotiation process.  The groups were chosen based 
upon responses from the subjects who were interviewed.  If an organization was to be 
listed, an interview subject had to mention the organization and indicate its level of 
influence. If more than one subject mentioned the group, or a particularly well informed 
subject mentioned the group, the group was listed.  The reverse of this is also true. Some
groups that were not believed to be influential were listed.  This was done to learn if any 
differences in perception of influence existed between the most knowledgeable subjects 













The information learned from this question will assist in deciding which groups 
were more influential in the process.  This information will be used to test the hypothesis 
and deciding which quadrant of the model each subsystem is located. 
The fifth question asked respondents to assess the level of influence each of the 
three states had over the process. This was done to assist in understanding if the different 
groups were strong not only in their state’s subsystem but also the regional subsystem. 
The question will also assist in determining if one or more interest groups’ strength 
assists in making the state stronger in the negotiations.  The sixth question asks which 
individual or group was the most influential. 
The seventh question asks the subject to rank each state’s uniformity during the 
negotiation process. In other words, did the state vary in what it wanted as outputs from 
the compacts? 
The eighth and ninth questions ask the respondent to indicate whether a basin-
wide commission should manage the water recourses.  Question eight asks if the 
commission should manage the water allocation formulas and the ninth question asks if a 
commission should enforce allocation agreements. 
The tenth question asks a series of questions about the perceived outcomes of the 
compacts in their final form as well as what goals the compacts should have met.  The 
questions from this section were formulated from the literature on river basin compacts as 
well as the interviews conducted earlier in the data gathering. Each question addresses an 
issue that is believed to be of concern to most of the interest groups involved in 












The eleventh and twelfth questions consider the amount of population in the 
respondent’s area. This is used to determine if there are any urban versus rural contrasts 
in perception of the compacts. 
The thirteenth, through fifteenth questions ask the respondent’s job title, length at 
that position as well as how the respondent was placed in the current job.  This is done to 
determine not only the level of involvement of the individual with the compacts, but with 
other issues surrounding the compacts such as environmental, economic, or other water 
policy issues in general. Question thirteen is used to determine how long the person has 
been involved with such issues. 
The last four questions are demographic questions.  They are used to determine 
the level of education and life experiences of the respondent.  This information may be 
useful for future studies concerning citizen participation which are not directly related to 
the research in this dissertation.  The questionnaire (see Appendix A) was coded and data 
were entered into SPSS, which was used to run the statistical analysis. 
Because the interviews and the survey involved human subjects, the following 
items were submitted to Mississippi State University’s Institutional Review Board for 
approval: design methodologies, copies of recruitment letters, the questionnaire, sample 
interview questions, informed consent forms, and interview protocols.  The in-depth 
interview research was approved February 14, 2005 and the questionnaire was approved 
April 21, 2005. 
The mailings began in May of 2005.  They consisted of a recruitment letter 











and incorrect mailing addresses.  The actual questionnaire was sent approximately one 
week after the recruitment letter.  The questionnaire was included in a business reply 
envelope with a recruitment letter.  Approximately two weeks later a postcard reminding 
the subjects of the survey was mailed to those who did not submit a survey or had not 
asked to be removed from the research.  After approximately two weeks later, the 
questionnaires were mailed out to those remaining in the research.  This was the final 
mailing.  One hundred and five surveys were returned for a final response rate of 29.91%. 
The next chapter will discuss the interview data and analyze its content to 
determine which interest groups, organizations, and individuals were influential in each 
state as well as the subsystem as a whole.  Also, the interviews will be used to determine 
if one state was more influential than another state during the negotiation process.  The 
interviews will also show which individuals, acting on the behalf of the different interest 
groups, exuded influence during the negotiation process.   
This chapter will also discuss the route each interest group chose to take in how it 
influenced the state as well as the negotiation process.  The decision making process each 
interest group made to determine if it should align itself with other groups in hopes of 
improving its chances of accomplishing its goals, will also be considered.  Finally, 
descriptions of the most influential interest groups in the process as well as each the 
influence level of each state will be discussed in hopes of putting into context why each 



















This chapter will analyze the data gathered from the in-depth interviews.  This 
data provides a unique insight into the negotiations.  The data will allow analysis to be
conducted that will determine which interest groups were influential during the 
negotiations and what outcomes they desired.  The analysis of the data will provide 
insight into which organizations were involved with the negotiations formally and 
informally.  This chapter will also discuss how the different organizations and interest
groups sought to achieve their goals and desired outcomes of the compacts. 
The metropolitan area surrounding Atlanta has been rapidly growing at a rapid 
pace. This growth has primarily occurred in rural areas with few zoning ordinances. 
With the growth, a strain on the ability of municipalities to maintain an infrastructure that 
adequately supplies water to its new residences and industries was created.  Many of the 
long time residents of the Atlanta area are accustom to being able to use water in ways 
that are reflective of the perceived abundance of this natural resource in the southeastern 
United States. The residents who have migrated to Atlanta have also noticed the 









Immediately following the Second World War, at the urging of Atlanta mayor 
Hartsfield, a reservoir along the Chattahoochee River was created.  The Corps of 
Engineers (COE) built a dam and created the Lake Lanier Reservoir.  According to the 
dam’s license, the purpose of the lake was to serve as a source of inexpensive power and 
drinking water for the growing metropolitan area of Atlanta.  As the Atlanta area grew, 
concern about the ability of Lake Lanier to provide drinking water for the many citizens 
and industries prompted several different water analysis studies to be completed during 
the 1970s. These studies indicated there would be a need for an additional water source 
in the near future. This prompted government agencies to ask the Corps of Engineers to 
build another reservoir that could service the growing thirst of the Atlanta area. 
By the late 1980s, the Corps of Engineers announced plans to construct a dam, 
about fifty miles southwest of Atlanta along the Tallapoosa River. This initiated a 
lawsuit filed by the state of Alabama against the COE in 1990.  The reservoir, which 
would be located entirely within the state of Georgia, would be upstream from the 
reservoirs built by Alabama Power that are located within the boarders of Alabama.  The 
compact negotiations began in this setting.  The state of Alabama decided to suspend its 
lawsuit and began to discuss usage of the Chattahoochee River with the states of Georgia 
and Florida outside of the court system.  By 1997, the states of Alabama, Georgia, and 
Florida asked Congress to create the ACT and ACF River Basin compacts. 
The compacts provided for one chief negotiator and one alternate negotiator from
each state and the federal government.  Each state was given one commissioner and one 









commissioners represented the federal government and each state in both compact 
negotiations and voted on both compacts with the exception of Florida not having a 
representative on the ACT compact since none of the ACT’s basin was in Florida’s 
boundaries. Formally, each state’s chief commissioner was its governor.  However, each 
state’s alternate commissioner was the person who represented the state at the meetings 
and voted. By all accounts of each person interviewed, each governor’s role was more
ceremonial than substantive. 
From the outset, the federal government was regulated to a back seat type of role. 
While each state’s commissioner had one vote and veto power over the compacts, the 
federal commissioner did not have a vote.  According to one state commissioner, “their 
role was to observe and ensure that federal laws were not being violated.”  To fully 
understand why there was such lack of federal involvement, you have to consider the 
historical background of the states involved.  Each state negotiator had a slightly different 
explanation for why there was so little federal involvement.  However, the common 
reason given by each of the commissioners was a lack of trust of the federal government 
in general and the COE in particular. 
With the state of Alabama, the lack of trust of the COE stems from the fact that
Alabama resented the COE for wanting to construct a dam on the Georgia side of the 
Tallapoosa River without any prior consultation or consent.  “Before the compact was 
created, Alabama felt the COE was running things,” said one person familiar with the 
process of creating the compacts. By not giving the federal government a vote in the 






 Defend Our Rights’ many politicians attempt to create political capital and behave as a 
demagogue to emphasize this point.  A state commissioner concurred that Georgia had 
some suspicion of the role of the federal government stemming from the concern that the 
EPA might have reservations over the quantity of a river’s water flow once the river left 
the state. 
With Florida, it felt it could protect its interests as long as it had veto power.  
With its goals of having an agreement that does not alter the natural flow of the 
Apalachicola River, Florida believed it could protect its interests as long as it possessed 
veto power. With the compacts designed so that each state would be treated as equals 
and no federal involvement that would override a state, Florida believed it could protect 
its interests (interview with a member of the state’s negotiation team).  In short, each 
state feared the federal government would override their veto power and side with a 
different state. This mistrust kept the federal government from becoming an active 
partner in the negotiations. It also prevented the possibility of an objective fourth party 
from having meaningful influence.  A member of Florida’s negotiation team echoed the 
final point when asked why the compacts ultimately failed. 
While the compacts were born in suspicion of the federal government, the 
respondents of the survey strongly supported, by almost a 2 to 1 margin, the idea of 
having a regional commission to manage and enforce water allocation.  Since the survey 
was sent out one year after the expiration of the ACT and two years after the ACF 
dissolved, it is likely this conclusion is a result of a lesson learned from the failure to 








Alabama and Florida believed their suspicions of the federal government were 
justified once the federal commissioner was named.  This person was a former Georgia 
congressman and ultimately served two years as president of the Georgia Chamber of 
Commerce during his tenure as the federal commissioner.  As one river stakeholder 
reflected, “Lindsey (federal commissioner) was a good guy, very bright.  But no matter 
how hard he tried, there was always the appearance of a conflict of interest.” 
Once the negotiations began, Georgia hit the ground running.  “They came ready 
to play”, remarked one Alabama lake stakeholder.  Georgia had the data and the desire to 
get down to business. As one state commissioner explained, “Georgia knew what it 
needed. Georgia had done the studies and knew how much water it needed to meet future 
demand.”  The other states were not prepared for the negotiations.  
Of the three states, Alabama was the least prepared.  It not only did not know how 
much water it needed, but it also did not have a mechanism for determining its needs.
“Alabama was not ready for this in three ways: politically, technically and legally”, 
commented one commissioner.  Alabama didn’t have an agency in its department of 
environmental management that addressed water concerns and didn’t have an agency 
with any experience in interstate negotiations on environmental issues.  Because of this, 
they looked outside of government for help.  They turned to Alabama Power for 
expertise. Alabama Power operates each dam along the Coosa and Tallapoosa Rivers and 
was considered by each commissioner and many stakeholders to be a powerful force with 
great political clout within Alabama’s state government.  Indeed, the first commissioner 









many civil matters.  In 1999, when a Democrat replaced a Republican governor, a 
former Alabama Power hydrologist replaced the state’s negotiator.  Some stakeholders 
believed this was outsourcing government authority as well as technical expertise. 
Legally speaking, Alabama had no state-wide water policy.  The only laws 
addressing water withdrawals required notice for withdrawing more than 100,000 gallons 
a day. Only a notice of intent to withdraw the water had to be filed.  The claim to the 
water could not be denied.  As one person familiar with the negotiations in Georgia 
commented, “If a state doesn’t have the authority to tell its own people to not take water, 
how can it say ‘no’ to another state?”  This attitude fueled the belief that Alabama was 
not prepared for the negotiations and was being unreasonable in asking Georgia to do 
more than Alabama was willing to do in terms of limiting its uses of water.
While Georgia was well prepared to enter the negotiations, the information it had 
came from Atlanta area needs assessments.  From the outset, Georgia’s position became
synonymous with what Metropolitan Atlanta wanted.  “Atlanta fully backs Georgia’s 
position. Our position is their position”, remarked one stakeholder from the Atlanta area.  
Others down river had a different view. One stakeholder down river from metropolitan 
Atlanta echoed Atlanta’s influence, “They (Georgia’s negotiation team) would take a 
position and tell us to trust them.  They wanted us to believe they had our best interests 
involved. Actually, Alabama’s interests were closer to ours.”  This created a political rift 
that became public.  Municipalities in Georgia down stream from Atlanta such as 
Columbus and Rome would publicly express their dismay about the direction their state 









Florida in a lawsuit against the COE for allowing Lake Lanier to maintain a water level 
during drought periods regardless of the water flow down river (Columbus Ledger-
Enquirer, February 4, 2004). 
“This was really a negotiation among four states: Alabama, Florida, Atlanta, and 
the rest of Georgia”, remarked one Florida stakeholder.  Sometimes information given to 
non-Atlanta stakeholders about the compacts was in scarce supply.  One member of 
Florida’s team commented, “People from Georgia would come to the public meetings 
down here and wonder why they had to go to Florida to find out what is going on.”  This 
increased the perception if not the reality of mistrust within Georgia of their state’s 
negotiators. Indeed, there were many issues to be worked out within the state of Georgia.  
At the time, Georgia did not have a state water policy.  After the compacts expired, the
state legislature began the process of formulating one.  
Georgia has a history of economic development similar to its western neighbor, 
Alabama, but currently enjoys a better economic climate.  Both developed as rural states. 
Agriculture has played an important role in the economies of both states.  In the 1950 
U.S. Census Alabama’s largest city, Birmingham, and Georgia’s largest city, Atlanta, 
were approximately the same size.  In the U. S. Census of 2000, Atlanta residents 
outnumber Birmingham residents 440,000 to 260,000, a difference of only about 180,000 
within their city limits. The real difference is the metropolitan areas for the two cities.  
The 2000 Census reports that the Birmingham metropolitan area has about one million 
residents with the Atlanta metropolitan area having almost four million.  But what 






 After the Second World War, the city of Atlanta began rapid growth.  During the 
Civil Rights Movement it was Atlanta that had the slogan, “A city too busy to hate”. 
Birmingham had televised images of police dogs attacking civil rights marchers and 
firemen hosing protestors in the streets.  To a certain degree, the contrast in images 
translated into a contrast in economic development.  While the metropolitan area of 
Birmingham experienced slow growth and today contains around one million people with 
three Fortune 500 companies.  The metropolitan area of Atlanta approaches four million 
residents, is home to over a dozen Fortune 500 companies such as Coca Cola, United 
Postal Service, Equifax, Home Depot, and Southern Company.  It is a hub for a major 
airline, served as host to the 1996 Summer Olympics and a Super Bowl.  It is the home of 
a major league franchise in professional baseball, hockey, basketball, and football, a 
college football conference championship, as well as the playoff games associated with 
their professional sports teams.  It also has a large convention center in the downtown 
area. Several stakeholder in each state indicated, “There is no natural boundary for 
Atlanta’s growth, no ocean, no mountain, no desert, no other big city to bump into, just 
cheap land. The only thing that can restrict Atlanta’s growth is lack of water.” 
With this rapid growth has come an increase in political clout that has upset the 
balance of power in not only the state of Georgia but the Southeast.  Some stakeholders 
have alluded to the fact that there are some regional jealousies of Atlanta’s prosperity.  
“Atlanta has been growing for years, now it is our turn to grow” echoed one lake 
stakeholder from Alabama.  If Atlanta’s growth was limited due to a lack of water, then 










For decades there have been political divisions in Georgia that have pitted the 
Atlanta Metropolitan area against the more rural parts of the state and cities like 
Savannah which are several hundred miles apart.  As one person close to the negotiations 
put it, “It is politically fashionable in some Georgia circles to bash Atlanta.”  This could 
not be truer in Georgia’s intrastate battle over water. 
The belief that the thirst for water of the Atlanta area will ultimately cause rivers 
in the area to run dry, is a fear of many downstream cities (Columbus Ledger-Enquirer, 
February 4, 2004). This fear is also great with government officials in the city of 
Savannah. They have openly expressed concerns of a pipeline being placed in the 
Savannah River and sending the water to the metropolitan area of Atlanta.  Some
municipal officials believe this is pure paranoia.  “I would have to agree with the folks in 
Atlanta that there won’t be a pipe running from Atlanta to the South Carolina border”, 
echoed one municipal environmental planner downriver from Atlanta.  This same
environmental planner indicated that the volume of water in the Coosa River which flows 
through the city where he works, which is approximately one hundred miles from
downtown Atlanta, is twice the volume of the Chattahoochee at the point where the city 
of Atlanta withdraws water. In sum, this planner believes there is enough water nearby 
for the basic needs of Atlanta area. But that does not stop the paranoia of other 
downstream municipalities from being concerned about the Atlanta area wanting water 
from adjacent river basins. 
While areas in the western portions of the United States transfer water from larger 






 adjacent basin of the ACT, financing a water transfer from an adjacent river basin in 
which the main river is several hundred miles away would likely be cost prohibitive.  
Nevertheless, there is distrust if not a feeling of helplessness with water users 
downstream from Atlanta. 
To some, the thought of transferring water from the Savannah River to Atlanta 
may seem to be an unduly high level of paranoia over the seemingly endless thirst of the 
Atlanta area. However, Georgia and South Carolina have begun negotiations over 
allocating the Savannah River’s water (Atlanta Journal Constitution, June 21, 2005). 
Although the Savannah River Basin is not adjacent to the Chattahoochee River Basin, it 
is close to the Flint River Basin.  
Agricultural interests along the Flint River have grown accustom to taking as 
much water as needed for summer crop irrigation.  According to one state negotiator, 
“The agricultural users take out five times as much water in a year than does the entire 
Atlanta area. And that water is consumed (by the crop)…it does not go back into the 
basin like the treated water from Atlanta.” 
Although Georgia’s water withdrawals are from two different rivers, the two 
rivers merge at the Georgia-Florida state line to form the Apalachicola River.  For the 
negotiators and stakeholders in Florida, they see both groups as one entity taking water 
from their river.  A member of the Florida negotiation team echoed, “We tried to get a 
commitment for a guaranteed level of flow at the state line.  That is a concession Georgia 










Georgia’s unwillingness to guarantee a minimum flow illustrates the conflict 
among Georgia water users.  According to one Georgia stakeholder, “I said all along that 
we need to address intrastate water policy before we can negotiate interstate water 
policy.” This lack of cohesiveness within Georgia was not evident to stakeholders and 
commissioners of other states.  When asked which state was the most unified in its 
position, every person interviewed replied, “Georgia.”  The survey data also confirmed 
this with 48.8% of respondents ranking Georgia as the most unified of the three states. 
There are several reasons for Georgia’s appearance of a unified stand.  An 
obvious reason would be consistency with the commissioner.  The two Democratic 
governors and one Republican governor appointed the same commissioner.  Several, who 
were interviewed, saw this as an advantage.  The reason most often given by stakeholders 
as to why Georgia was so unified was that the interests of Atlanta dominated Georgia 
almost exclusively.  Atlanta’s primary interest was to take more water from the 
Chattahoochee River and allow the reservoir at Lake Lanier to hold as much water as it 
needs to meet Atlanta’s needs.  Almost all of those interviewed outside the state of 
Georgia saw this as the state’s sole desire throughout the negotiations.  To better 
understand the region-wide subsystem, each state’s subsystem will now be discussed. 
Georgia 
Georgia came into the negotiations better prepared and more unified than the 
other states. Their primary interest was in protecting the growth of the metropolitan area 
of Atlanta. In short, Georgia wanted to be able to make withdrawals from the 








that would meet the expected water demands of the metropolitan area of Atlanta.  
Georgia came to the initial meetings with specific amounts of desired water withdrawals.  
Georgia’s position never wavered. Each person interviewed believed Georgia was the 
most unified in its position throughout the negotiation process. 
Business and pro-development groups in the Atlanta area were considered the 
most dominant types of interest groups within Georgia.  When the agricultural interest 
groups of lower Georgia wanted some guarantees about how much water they would be 
able to access from the Flint River, they were urged by Atlanta business interests to not 
worry about access until after the agreement had been completed (interview with a 
Georgia stakeholder). 
The state of Georgia had plans to create a statewide water policy after the 
compacts were complete.  That would be the time the different interest groups in Georgia 
would negotiate Georgia’s water allocation. These conflicts lead to lawsuits. The 
Southeastern Power Users sued the Corps of Engineers for compensation because of the 
decrease in the amount of electricity provided to them by dams located near Atlanta 
(State of Georgia –v- The United States Army Corps of Engineers). The decrease in the 
volume of water flowing through the dam would decrease the amount of electricity 
available to the power customers.  The electricity provided by the COE would have been 
less expensive than the electricity the co-ops had to purchase from Southern Company.  
Much of this electricity provided by Southern Company originated in dams or coal plants 










In Georgia, the lawsuits surrounding water allocation have created a tenuous 
situation. The different interest groups inside the metropolitan area of Atlanta are not 
interested in discussing the failed compacts.  Stakeholders, including river protection 
groups, located near Atlanta were hesitant to discuss this topic.  This contrasted greatly 
with river protection interest groups in the other states as well down stream users of the 
water in Georgia which were excited to tell their side of the story. 
At first glance, one may expect a co-optation of the environmental groups.  There 
is some evidence of this.  After a contextual analysis of the IRS Form 990 of each river 
protection group in the two basins, the river protection groups in the Atlanta area had 
more assets, were better funded, had more full-time professional staff, and a better paid 
executive director (Table 4.1) than river protection groups outside of the Atlanta area.  
Some of the groups funding projects of the environmental groups in the Atlanta area were 
entities concerned about promoting the growth of the Atlanta area.  
While each charity is not legally obligated to release the identity of individuals 
who donate more than two percent of the group’s annual revenue, groups do have to 
acknowledge the gifts. According to the self-reported IRS Form 990, the Atlanta area 
environmental group received as much as two-thirds of their funding from these large 
donors. Most other organizations in the basin but outside of the Atlanta area, receive
about ten percent of their revenue from large donors.  The remaining revenue comes from
fund raisers and annual membership dues which are typically under fifty dollars. 
It is, however, possible that the concern over making a statement about pending 











the environmental interest groups to avoid public comment.  Still, no entity was 
contacted throughout the course of this research that was named in a lawsuit and no river 
or lake protection interest groups outside the metropolitan area of Atlanta had this 
concern. 
Table 4.1: Funding of the Non-profits 








2,113,806 858,334 74,042 1,634,359 




31,240 53,898 26,000 71,345 
Note: (Fiscal Year 2003) 
Another possible explanation is that the group does not believe that the position 
the business interests in the Atlanta area have in the compact negotiations is harmful to 
the portion of the Chattahoochee River with which they are concerned.  One of the 
positions the business interests in the metropolitan area of Atlanta take is to allow for a 
great deal of water to be stored in Lake Lanier which would ensure a steady flow of water 
through the Atlanta area portion of the Chattahoochee River. This would put the river 
keeper group’s wishes with the business interests of the Atlanta area. 
It may be that to preserve the upper portion of the Chattahoochee River the lower 
portions of the river might suffer.  However, since the Chattahoochee River interest 








Chattahoochee River near Atlanta, then it would seem logical for their position to be 
similar to the business interests. 
Alabama 
Alabama entered the agreements ill prepared.  One federal negotiator commented, 
“Alabama wasn’t prepared politically, scientifically, or legally to enter into the 
compacts.”  Initially, Alabama’s position was to protect the water flows along the Coosa 
and Tallapoosa Rivers to ensure enough water to operate the dams along those rivers.  
The state of Alabama didn’t have a government agency that addressed water concerns. 
There is still no approval process for acquiring an amount of water from a river that 
exceeds a ‘reasonable use’ of 100,000 gallons per day. 
Within a few years of initiating the lawsuit, the state of Alabama created the 
Office of Water Resources (OWR). Soon after its creation, the head of that agency was 
appointed by the governor to head Alabama’s negotiation team.  The person at the head 
of OWR was a former Alabama Power hydrologist who had designed the water flow 
models that the state of Alabama presented as its needs during the negotiation process. 
Today this person is head of the Alabama Department of Environmental Management. 
One of the interview subjects was a state legislator from Alabama.  This person 
provided insight into Alabama’s water policy.  The legislator confirmed the lack of 
awareness in the state government concerning water issues surrounding these two 
compacts as well as a lack of desire to create a statewide water policy.  This lack of 
awareness of the compacts within Alabama state government is well illustrated by the 






 believed their legislators were not only unaware of the compact negotiations, but they 
did not want to become aware.  “This just isn’t on their (the local state legislators) radar 
screen,” was a common remark from Alabama stakeholders.  The few state legislators 
who were contacted for this research, acknowledged they understood almost no 
fundamental issues of watershed management and admitted they did not feel 
knowledgeable about the topic let alone the compacts.  The legislator interviewed 
reinforced this sentiment, “when I talk with other legislators about interbasin transfers (of 
river water), they begin to get a glazed look in their eyes.  I don’t consider myself an 
expert on water.  I am a lawyer, but I don’t practice environmental law.” 
Over time, lake preservation organizations along the Coosa and Tallapoosa Rivers 
began to form. These lake groups were initially comprised of individuals who were 
retired lakefront property owners. As interest in the compacts progressed, other groups 
which had an economic interest in the water level of the lake soon joined the groups. 
Realtors, amateur fishermen, and marina owners were soon allying themselves with 
environmental groups seeking to preserve the current water flow and lake levels of the 
Coosa and Tallapoosa Rivers. This infusion of interest groups created not only an 
increased Alabama presence during the public meetings of the negotiations, but a change 
in the tone of Alabama’s voice.  The scope of the state’s position during the negotiations 
widened to include guarantees not only of water quantity, but water quality.  These 
groups also modified the focus of Alabama’s argument from talking only about water 
quantity but how the water quantity influences water quality as well as the ecology of the 








In 1996, one year before the compacts were enacted, the Alabama Rivers 
Alliance (ARA) was created.  Previously, there was no state-wide group with a primary 
concern over the health of the state’s lakes and rivers.  Most of the river and lake groups 
in existence in 1996 were primarily concerned with local issues such as litter, waste from
farm runoff, and pollution from area industries such as paper mills.  ARA became an 
organization with a small full-time staff that coordinated efforts and communicated 
information among each of the river protection groups in the Alabama portion of the two 
basins. This group would often become the voice of the different river and lake groups 
throughout Alabama.  Although some groups questioned the often confrontational tactics 
of the ARA, the river and lake groups were grateful for the support ARA provided. 
The lake protection groups proved to be effective in influencing Alabama’s 
position during the negotiations. The lake protection stakeholders were wealthier and 
better educated than most residents in Alabama.  They were able to translate this social 
capital into political capital.  For example, one stakeholder along the Coosa River owned 
several successful businesses and had pictures of him shaking hands with Alabama’s two 
previous Democratic governors, hanging on the wall of his office. 
The ability of lakefront property owner groups to show strong influence in 
negotiations with other interest groups did not begin with the compact negotiations.  In 
the 1980s, a brown film began to develop in the Lake Lay portion of the Coosa River, 
downstream from a Kimberly Clark paper mill (Jackson, 1995).  Homeowners along the 
lake believed the paper mill was to blame for the film.  The group contacted the Alabama 








force the paper mill to quit emitting the discharge.  ADEM responded that the discharge 
was not violating any pollution laws and the aesthetics of the lake would not warrant 
ADEM’s involvement. 
This did not deter the lake owners from trying to stop the emission.  The lake 
owners sought the involvement of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) as well as 
other environmental groups such as Greenpeace.  Volunteers from Greenpeace began to 
post signs indicating the fish from the lake were not safe to eat.  Eventually, with pressure 
from the EPA, ADEM worked out a schedule with Kimberly-Clark which would reduce 
discharges that caused, “odd colors” (Jackson, p.236, 1995) although Kimberly-Clark 
contended that the emissions were not violating any state law, or harming the lake.  
Shortly after the paper mill began to implement the changes, the film over Lake Lay 
disappeared. 
The lake property owners attended most of the meetings.  Of the lake owner 
subjects who were interviewed, each indicated they or someone from their organization 
attended each meeting that was held within their state.  It was clear in talking with the 
interview subjects that their involvement began to move the focus of Alabama’s position 
from quantity of water flow to the quality of the water flowing into Alabama.  Prior to
their involvement, Alabama’s position was largely influenced by Alabama Power, which 
was primarily concerned with the quantity of water flowing through the Coosa and 
Tallapoosa Rivers. 
The lake property owners began to solicit advice from biologists at Auburn 









Coosa River would effect the fish population in the different lakes along the river.  The 
study concluded that the minimum volume of water flow that Georgia was willing to 
guarantee (except during times of severe drought, which would then allow Georgia to 
eliminate the minimum flow requirement) would be so low that the fish in Lake Weiss 
and other areas in the northern portion of the Coosa River would not be able to survive.  
This emphasis on how the quantity of the water affects the quality of the water began to 
influence Alabama’s desired outcomes of the negotiation. 
Florida 
The negotiation team for Florida started with the position to protect the 
Apalachicola River and Bay ecosystem (interview with a Florida negotiation team
member).  The Apalachicola Bay area of Florida is sparsely populated and does not carry 
a large amount of influence in Florida’s government.  Most of the land in the area is 
owned by a timber company or the state that sets aside the land for state parks.  This 
portion of the Florida Gulf Coast does not have sandy beaches and is not an area that 
attracts tourists, as do the cities to its west such as Destin and Panama City. 
Over several decades prior to the compacts, the state of Florida had been 
purchasing hundreds of thousands of acres in the Apalachicola River Basin to be set aside 
as state parks. A member of Florida’s negotiation team indicated that this was done to 
protect the estuary and monitor and manage growth in the area.  The state of Florida 
worked with the federal government to create a national Estuarine Research Reserve. 






 basin, the state of Florida viewed it as a state resource and wanted to see its investment 
protected. 
As in the case with Alabama, soon after the negotiation process began, interest 
groups in the Apalachicola Bay area began to express concern over the outcomes of the 
proposed compact agreements.  The concern in Florida was over water flow levels that 
were needed to protect the unique mixture of fresh and salt water in the Apalachicola 
Bay. The bay is home to an oyster harvesting industry that grows most of the state’s 
oyster harvest and about ten percent of the nation’s oysters. 
Georgia’s negotiators would often lay blame of the increase in salinization of the 
bay with the creation of a water canal from the gulf into the bay.  “A while back, (before 
the approval of the compacts) Florida created a canal on the eastern portion of the bay.  
They cut through the island that protected the bay from the Gulf of Mexico.  They did 
this so boaters wouldn’t have to go around the island to get to the sea.  They didn’t seem 
to be worried about the bay’s salinity then,” remarked one member of Georgia’s 
negotiation team. 
When asked about the man-made cut in the island, the member of the Florida 
negotiation team replied, “it was done back in the 1950s when no one fully understood 
the impact it would have on the bay’s salinity.  It was done to assist the local shrimp 
catchers in getting their boats to the bay quicker.” 
Florida’s negotiation team was continually challenging the water flow data which 
was provided by the state of Georgia. Alabama’s negotiators rarely provided data 








the water flow along the Coosa and Tallapoosa Rivers, but rarely the Chattahoochee. 
Florida presented models based upon different data and consequently arrived at different 
conclusions about the effects of water withdrawals along the Chattahoochee and Flint 
rivers. This lack of trust and ability to have a common data set in which to measure the 
effects of water withdrawals blunted significant progress towards an agreement. 
The End of the Compacts 
In January of 2003, all three states had Republican governors, a first since 
Reconstruction. This brought hope that an agreement would soon occur once the three 
governors got together. In May of 2003, all three governors signed a memorandum of 
understanding. All the memorandum of understanding said was that each governor 
would agree to work together to reach an agreement.  An agreement was soon met with 
both compacts.  Georgia sent a proposal to Florida, with Alabama’s consent, hoping to 
get the final signature. By 2003, the Apalachicola River Basin area of Florida gained 
political clout with the governor.  After the redistricting following the release of 2000 U. 
S. Census data, the Apalachicola River Basin area was a part of district of the Speaker of 
the Florida House. The Speaker, a fellow Republican, was a long time ally of Florida 
governor Jeb Bush. Once the stakeholders of the bay area saw Georgia’s proposal, they 
contacted the Speaker and urged him to discourage the governor from signing the 
agreement.  The governor listened to the Speaker and did not consent to the agreement. 
Governor Bush was skeptical from the outset of Georgia’s desired compact 
outcomes.  One of the members of Florida’s negotiation team indicated the state had 










This land was used to create several state parks.  The purpose of the parks was to protect 
the bay area’s estuary from commercial development and ecological change.  This same
person also indicated how this spending took on increased importance from members of 
the state’s government who did not want to see the Apalachicola Bay area erode in the 
same fashion as the Everglades in the southern portion of the state. 
After nearly six years of negotiations and extensions, the states decided to end 
negotiations and the ACF compact expired in July of that year.  Since some of the 
provisions of the ACT compact were contingent on water access within the ACF Basin, 
Alabama and Georgia did not want to continue negotiations with the ACT compact.  The 
ACT compact expired in July of 2004. 
Discussion of Findings 
Each state’s subsystem is different.  Georgia is dominated by pro-growth of 
metropolitan Atlanta interests.  The influence of environmental groups or any pro-growth 
groups outside of the metropolitan area of Atlanta is negligible.  Alabama is heavily 
influenced by Alabama Power concern with the volume of water flow being sufficient to 
keep the power generators along the dam producing enough electricity to keep the 
company profitable.  Environmental and river groups have minimal influence within 
Alabama’s subsystem, although shipping interest groups tended to be stronger than 
expected. Florida has many interest groups concerned with the ecology and agriculture 
industry that make the state’s subsystem uniquely balanced. 
The dams and reservoirs along the Coosa and Tallapoosa Rivers, which are 






 Company.  Southern Company is a holding company consisting of Alabama Power, 
Georgia Power, Mississippi Power and Gulf Power.  Southern Company provides much 
of the electricity throughout both river basins.  If an entity wants water from a reservoir 
along the Coosa River, the entity must ask permission from Alabama Power to withdraw 
the water. Alabama Power also produces more electricity than is demanded from the 
customers near the dams.  Consequently, much of the electricity is sold to users in the 
metropolitan area of Atlanta. 
Due to the diverse nature of the interest groups in the tri-state subsystem as well 
as the lack of federal involvement in the negotiation process, the ACT and ACF interstate 
compacts exist no longer.  The conflict within the subsystems suggests that the chance of 
an out-of-court agreement is slim.  As it sits today, the United States Supreme Court will 
soon hear arguments from each state over how much water government agencies such as 
the COE can allow state and local water authorities in the Atlanta area can withdraw or 
store in Lake Lanier. Any legal precedent that would aid in predicting the outcome of 
each lawsuit would be outdated given recent developments in environmental law.  
Several of the interest groups that once formulated the negotiations of each state are now 
assisting in formulating the legal briefs of each state. 
Design and execution of the compacts’ design flawed the negotiation process.  
The federal government’s involvement was kept to a minimum.  A neutral third party 
with some decision-making authority would have greatly increased the chances of a 
compact agreement.  The different states could not agree on a common data source, 








mechanism for the outcomes of a compact.  The presence of a neutral third party would 
have, at minimum, given the states a common starting point.  
The compact process illustrated the complexity of water issues in a region of the 
country where water concerns have historically been few and far between.  Each state had 
different uses for the same water.  For Georgia, the use was primarily for economic 
development.  For Alabama, it was for power generation and recreation.  With Florida, it 
was for harvesting aquatic life and protecting the bio-diversity of the basin. 
After the interviews were completed, a survey was designed that would be sent to 
legislators, interest groups and government organizations that played a role in developing 
the state’s desired outcomes of the compacts.  The interviews assisted in deciding which 
questions would be asked in the questionnaire.  The interviews were also helpful in 
determining who should receive a questionnaire. 
The interviews revealed which interest groups were influential in the negotiation 
process. Each state has a different water policy subsystem and therefore, different 
interest groups influencing each state with different goals of the compacts.  
Understanding which interest groups were perceived to be influential by the interview
subjects assisted in formulating the fourth question in the questionnaire.  This question 
asks respondents their perceptions of interest group influence.  The results of this 
question better assist in understanding the desired outcomes for each state. 
The interview data also provided insight into the results of the different compact 
proposals. There was no other data source available for learning the outcomes of the 










respondents their perceptions of the outcomes of the compacts in their final wording.  
This assisted in providing an understanding about the different perceptions of the survey 
subjects. By analyzing the perceptions using independent variables such as state of 
residence and the nature of their professional affiliation, the desired outcomes as well as 
perceptions of which interest group influenced the process was determined. 
The interview data also revealed which interest groups and which individuals 
were influential with the process.  It provided an understanding of how uniform and 
influential each state appeared during the negotiation process.  With this information, a 
better understanding was developed of how well each interest group influenced each 
state. 
The next chapter addresses the results of the survey.  The survey was used to 
determine the thoughts of individuals who were likely to possess knowledge of the 
compacts’ negotiations or the outputs from those negotiations.  This chapter will also 
provide statistical analysis as to the perceptions of the many different individuals who are 
familiar with the compacts.  This analysis provides a look from a different viewpoint
since many of the survey subjects were not as familiar with the compact negotiations as 
those who were interviewed.  In sum, this next chapter will illustrate the differences 













After conducting the interviews, a survey was sent to individuals who were likely 
to have some knowledge of the compacts.  The population included state legislators in 
either river basin. Contact information for this group was found on each state’s website.  
Executive directors or presidents of interest groups concerned primarily with river water 
issues in either basin were contacted. The primary source of information for these 
individuals originated from a directory of river basin groups located in the three states 
and was published by the Alabama Rivers Alliance.  Other sources, such as Internet 
searches, were used to learn of additional groups that might have an interest in the issues 
surrounding the compact negotiations.  The population also included a group of 
representatives from chambers of commerce and county commissioners.  The collection 
of this list was completed primarily through Internet searches since membership 
directories are available only to association members. 
The purpose of the survey was to learn the opinions of different groups of citizens 
in each basin who likely had some interest in the compact negotiations as well as water 
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during the negotiation process. With this information, it was determined which groups 
were influential within each state along with the subsystem as a whole. Also, descriptive 
statistics were employed to learn characteristics of the respondents, which was important 
in determining who responded to the survey and who was interested in the compact 
process. Most of the individuals surveyed responded with at least some familiarity of the 
compacts and their negotiations.  
Initially, 412 recruitment letters were sent.  After eliminating the subjects who 
chose to withdraw from the study and subjects with incorrect mailing addresses, 351 
potential respondents remained.  Of those remaining, 105 surveys were returned for a 
response rate of 29.91 percent. 
In terms of location, the respondents were evenly split between the two basins.  
About 41 percent identified themselves as conducting their professional duties within the 
ACF Basin versus about 40 percent within the ACT.  About ten percent were involved 
with both basins and about nine percent were involved with neither basin.
Similarly, the respondents were evenly split between Alabama and Georgia with 
very few respondents from Florida.  Fifty percent (52) identified themselves as residing 
in Georgia and 48 percent (50) reside in Alabama.  Only three percent (3) reside in 
Florida.1  Because of the low response rate from Florida, they are not included in the 
statistical analysis involving state comparisons. 









Table 5.1 reports the demographics of survey respondents.  The respondents 
were older than the general population, with 70 percent identifying themselves as over 
the age of fifty and 91 percent over the age of 40 (Table 5.1). 
Table 5.1: Age and Education Levels of the Respondents 
Age Percent Education Percent 
20-29 4.0 High School 2.0 
30-39 5.1 Some College 13.8 
40-49 20.9 College Degree 40.4 
50 and over 70.1 Graduate Degree 43.7 
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Note: Percents do not equal 100 due to rounding. 
The respondents have completed higher levels of education than the typical 
resident of their respective state, with about 84 percent of respondents having at least a 
college degree (Table 5.1). The respondents were predominately male, with 77 percent 
identifying themselves as such (data not shown).  
The high levels of education is not surprising since the individuals who were sent 
a questionnaire either take on leadership and responsibility roles in their interest group, 
are elected officials, or have achieved a high level of expertise in a field that is involved 
with environmental management.  Knowledge of the negotiations was not common 
among most of the general population living in the ACT and ACF River Basins.  










of education, which was needed to understand some of the more complex aspects of the 
negotiations. 
The respondents were asked if they conducted their professional duties in a 
Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA).  This question was included to determine if any 
rural versus urban differences in policy preferences or perceptions on the strength of 
interest groups existed. Approximately 69 percent of respondents from Georgia 
conducted their professional duties in an MSA while roughly 54 percent of Alabamians 
did, which was found to be statistically significant at the .05 level (Table 5.2). 
Table 5.2: Percent of Respondents who are Located in a Metropolitan Statistical Area 
State Total Responses Yes No 
Alabama 48 54.17 45.83 
Georgia 49 69.39 30.61 
Both States 97 61.86 38.14 
Note: No respondents from Florida indicated residence in an MSA. 
In order to more closely examine the differences between rural and urban 
respondents, the questionnaire asked respondents the population of the area in which they 
resided. A plurality of respondents from the state of Georgia indicated they live in a city 
with a population over 100,000.  A plurality of Alabama residents indicated they live in a 
rural area or a city with a population smaller than 10,000 (Table 5.3).  A statistically 
significant difference existed at the .01 level in the analysis of the population where each 










Table 5.3: Population of the Area Where Respondents Conduct their Professional  
Duties. 
Location Alabama Georgia 
Large city 
(over 100,000) 22 46 
Medium city 
(more than 50,000 but less than 100,000) 12 10 
Small city 
(more than 10,000 but less than 50,000) 24 19 
Rural area 
(less than 10,000 or primarily unincorporated area) 42 19 
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Note: Percent for each Category 
Note: Percents do not equal 100 due to rounding. 
The difference in population was expected since the majority of the Alabama, 
Coosa and Tallapoosa river basins are undeveloped or populated with small cities.  The 
exceptions are the cities of Mobile and Montgomery; both cities have over 200,000 
residents (U.S. Census, 2000).  The state of Georgia was expected to have a plurality of 
its respondents indicate living in a city with over 100,000 people since the largest city in 
the Georgia portion of both basins is Atlanta with over 400,000 people and suburbs, such 
as Marietta, having a population over 100,000.  Also, some respondents in the 
metropolitan area of Atlanta likely consider themselves to live in the Atlanta area and 
would respond to the question as if they lived within the city limits of Atlanta.  The 
difference between Alabama and Georgia also illustrates the differences the two states 
have in their use of the water. Alabama, being a more rural state, uses the water for 










maintain a large population and to support development in the metropolitan area of 
Atlanta. 
No statistically significant difference was found between Alabama and Georgia 
concerning the respondents’ gender, age, and education (data not shown).  When asked 
how long the respondents had been at their current position, the responses ranged from 
three months to 33 years.  The most popular responses were three, five and two years 
(data not shown). This information determined if, and how long, the respondent held 
their current position during the compact negotiation process. 
Perception of Influence among the Organizations
To determine which interest groups were perceived to be the most influential, the 
respondents were asked to rate level of influence from one to five; five representing the 
most influential and one representing the least amount of influence.  The scores were 
added, averaged, and ranked. 
Electrical Power Companies 
When considering the responses of individuals from both states, electric 
companies were considered to be the most powerful interest group with a score of 4.07 
(Table 5.4). In comparing the responses of Alabama and Georgia residents, respondents 
from Alabama rated the electric companies higher than those from Georgia; this was 
found to be statistically significant at the .01 level.  This difference indicates that 
respondents from Alabama believed power companies, like Alabama Power, had more 







conclusion is likely considering both of Alabama’s lead negotiators had significant 
professional ties with Alabama Power. 
These survey results support the findings from interviews with the negotiators and 
stakeholders. The individuals interviewed often mentioned that Alabama Power had a 
great amount of influence over Alabama’s position during the negotiations.  Again, this 
perception reflects the impact of the professional background of Alabama’s negotiators 
since both negotiators had significant professional connections with Alabama Power.   
When the respondents from each state were analyzed by separating them
according to their knowledge of the compacts, no statistically significant difference 
existed (data not shown). This lack of a difference indicates that the level of influence 
was evident by the casual observer as well as a dedicated follower of the negotiations. 
The questionnaire also asked respondents to list the single most influential group 
during the negotiation process; results are shown in Table 5.5.  Alabama Power was also 
listed as most influential by four of the survey respondents, with Alabama Power’s parent 
company, Southern Company, being listed four times as well (Table 5.5).  Georgia Power 
and Gulf Power, which supply power to the Apalachicola Bay area and are subsidiaries of 
Southern Company, were not listed. 
Federal Agencies 
Two federal agencies, the Corps of Engineers (COE) and the Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA), also ranked high in terms of influence over the compacts 
negotiations (Table 5.4). Three respondents indicated the COE was the most influential 










influence in comparison to their lack of formal participation illustrates their perceived 
ability to influence the federal government as well as their reputation for establishing 
control over the water volumes of the Chattahoochee River and Lake Lanier.  
No statistically significant difference existed between Alabama and Georgia 
respondents in the analysis of their perceptions of influence strength of the COE or the 
EPA. When the data were separated by respondent’s knowledge of the compacts, the 
respondents in all categories indicated the level of influence of the CEO was strong.  The 
fact that the COE controlled the dams along the Chattahoochee Rivers and had a great 
deal of influence in setting the water level for Lake Lanier, which supplies water for the 
metropolitan area of Atlanta, explains this lack of difference.  The strong and easily 
visible influence of the COE over the commodity of Chattahoochee River water was 
illustrated the near identically high rankings of the COE from both states, 3.81 for 
Alabama respondents and 3.78 for Georgia respondents, (Table 5.4).  The high ranking 
given the COE is also likely due to the perceived impact the court settlement reached 
between the COE and the state of Georgia had on the compacts and the perception that 
each state would likely seek advice from federal agencies to help support their cases.
The EPA, which presented concern over the possible reduction of water flow 
along the Chattahoochee and Flint Rivers, was also viewed similarly by both states as 
having strong influence. In summary, both states understood and saw evidence of the 





River and Lake Keeper Groups 
While the perceived strength of river and lake keeper groups was not ranked as 
highly as power companies and federal government agencies, a statistically significant 
difference was evident between the Alabama and Georgia respondents’ perceived 
strength of these groups. This difference between the respondents of the two states was 
statistically significant at the .01 and .05 levels respectively for each group (Table 5.4).   
Because the river and lake keeper groups were more numerous and more involved 
in Alabama than in Georgia, both groups were more likely to be considered stronger by 
respondents from Georgia than respondents from Alabama.  Also, Alabama Power often 
had similar interests as the lake and river keeper groups.  The blending of the two groups’ 
interests may have sent the message to observers from Georgia that Alabama Power was 
supporting these groups, which would also inflate their perceived influence among 
Georgians. In Georgia, most of the river keeper groups did not get involved in the 
negotiations. Just the opposite was true in the state of Alabama.  As discussed in the 
analysis of the interview data, Alabama’s river keeper groups attended each meeting and 
were involved in the negotiations throughout the process.  These groups also had the 
political resources to gain influence within the state of Alabama and often formed a 
coalition with Alabama Power to protect the rivers’ volume of flow. 
The lake and river protection groups were believed to have a higher level of 
influence from those who identified themselves as being very knowledgeable about the 








with the responses from the interviews subjects who were most familiar with the 
negotiations. 
State Government Agencies 
State government agencies were perceived to be the second most influential group 
with a score of 3.91 (Table 5.4).  A statistically significant difference occurred at the .1 
level between Alabama and Georgia respondents; with Georgians viewing the statewide 
elected officials as more influential than respondents from Alabama viewed them. This 
reinforces the qualitative data indicating that electrical power companies and other 
stakeholders primarily influenced the negotiations in Alabama while the state government 
agencies in Georgia took a more active role in the process.  This finding is likely due to 
the fact that the state agencies in Alabama were viewed as being influenced primarily by 
Alabama Power while the state agencies in Georgia were viewed as being influenced by 
broader concerns such as development; however, the specific driving forces of each 
interest group were not specifically listed in the survey. The perception of the influence 
of state government agencies was uniform throughout the respondents with respect to 
their level of knowledge of the compacts (data not shown).  
Alabama’s governor was listed three times as most influential while the Georgia 
Governor’s Office was listed ten times, more than any other group (Table 5.5).  This 
perception of influence stems from the governors choosing each lead negotiator, as well 
as each governor becoming involved near the end of the compacts, as evidenced by the 







State government agencies were listed frequently by the subjects as the most 
influential agencies in the state of Georgia (Table 5.5).  Six respondents from the state of 
Georgia listed the Department of Environmental Protection as most influential and 
Georgia’s governor’s office was mentioned by eight of the state’s respondents.  The fact 
that the top leadership in the state was so influential in Georgia, along with other 
government agencies, not only suggests that the state was the most uniform, but also 
helps explain why Georgia is listed as the most influential of the three states.  With a 
large portion of the state’s government invested in the outcome, it is likely that Georgia 
put more effort into influencing the negotiations; therefore, the state had a greater amount 
of influence. 
Another likely reason state agencies ranked highly among Georgia’s respondents 
is because the state’s federal negotiator spent two years as president of the Georgia 
Chamber of Commerce while serving as the federal negotiator.  Some of the participants 
in the public hearings of the negotiations believed it was not possible for the Federal 
Commissioner to be completely unbiased; some of the respondents believed that the 
Georgia Chamber of Commerce held a great amount of influence due to one of their 
employees being the Federal Commissioner.  The perception of this situation probably 
contributed to the statistically significant difference between the responses gathered from 
the two states, in which Georgians were more likely to rank the influence of state 







Locally elected officials and local governments, with a score of 2.5, were not 
considered very influential in the process.  Although a statistically significant difference 
existed at the .05 level between Alabama and Georgia respondents when the perceived 
levels of influence of city and county governments and locally elected officials were 
considered. The respondents of the survey from Georgia believed local and county 
governments were more influential in the negotiations than the respondents from
Alabama believed they were (Table 5.4). 
When considering the influence of elected officials and local governments, 
respondents from Georgia viewed the influence of these local groups higher than those 
from Alabama did.  This difference is likely due to the influence of local groups in the 
Atlanta area such as the Atlanta Regional Council (ARC), which was considered to be 
influential throughout the process by some of those interviewed.  According to one 
Georgian, who is a local government employee outside of the metropolitan area of 
Atlanta, the ARC formulated the proposals that the state of Georgia would present to the 
other states. The ARC works with local governments in the Atlanta area and assists in 
planning issues. Water planning is considered one of its duties 
(www.atlantaregional.com).   
Additionally, the only local government mentioned as the most influential was the 
City of Atlanta, which was mentioned by three respondents.  The city of Atlanta being 
perceived as most influential was to be expected; as Atlanta as well as other governments 






governments in Alabama’s area of the river basins.  This finding is also supported by 
this finding. 
 Several of the interview subjects throughout the Coosa and Tallapoosa River 
Basins indicated their locally elected officials were not knowledgeable about the 
compacts and expressed little desire to become involved in the negotiations.  The survey 
data also supports the interview data by indicating that Alabama residents believed their 
locally elected officials were less influential than those in Georgia. 
Other Groups 
While the EPA was ranked fourth among all interest groups, environmental 
groups (3.28) and the U.S. Fish and Wildlife (3.26) were ranked eighth and ninth 
respectively (Table 5.4). Although Alabama and Georgia had similar views on the U. S. 
Fish and Wildlife’s influence, a statistically significant difference existed between 
Alabama and Georgia in their perceptions of environmental groups.  Georgians viewed 
the environmental groups, which were predominantly located in Florida, as more 
influential than the Alabama respondents viewed them.  
This finding assists in explaining how Georgians perceive the state of Florida’s 
role during the negotiations. The interview subjects from Georgia considered Florida to 
be the state that ended the negotiations and the primary reason the compacts failed.  In 
fact, it was Florida that rejected Georgia’s proposal after the three governors made an 
agreement of understanding.  Florida’s rejection lead to the expiration of the ACF and 
subsequently the ACT compacts.  The fact that the environmental groups influenced the 













interviews, and ultimately prevented Georgia from getting the water they desired, helps 
explains why environmental groups were ranked higher in influence by Georgia 
respondents than Alabama respondents. 
River navigation interests (3.01) and home-builders associations (2.59) ranked 
near the bottom and received uniform rankings from the two states (Table 5.4).  Although 
they were mentioned by some of the interview subjects as being influential, they did not 
receive much consideration from the subjects surveyed. 
The agricultural interests, located primarily along the Flint River, were rated near 
the middle with a score of 3.29 (Table 5.4).  No statistically significant difference 
occurred between the two states in the analysis of these interests.  The perceived 
weakness of agricultural interests influence was supported by the interview data as 
subjects in Alabama, Florida, and Georgia rarely mentioned agricultural interest as 
influencing Georgia’s negotiation position.  With each person interviewed, the 
agricultural interests were seen as having little influence.  In fact, each subject suggested 
that the state of Georgia was not influenced by agricultural interests, but by economic
development interests in the metropolitan are of Atlanta. 
 
 
Table 5.4: Average Score for Influence with the Compact Negotiations  
 
Average 
Organization Score Alabama  Georgia 
Electric Power Companies 4.07*** 4.36 3.76 
State Government Agencies 3.91* 3.69 4.09 
COE 3.76 3.81 3.78 
EPA 3.48 3.40 3.48 




Environmental 3.28** 3.07 3.54
U. S. Fish and Wildlife 3.26 3.26 3.29 
Lake and River Keepers 3.07*** 2.74 3.4 
River Navigation 3.01 2.95 3.07 
City and County Governments 2.77** 2.5 2.97 
 Home Builders 2.59 2.56 2.68 




Statistical Significance between Alabama and Georgia 
* = .1 
** = .05 








Table 5.5: Free Responses for Most influential in the Subsystem
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Georgia Governor’s Office (10) 
Georgia Department of Natural Resources (6) 
State of Georgia (6) 
Alabama Power (4) 
Southern Company (4) 
Corps of Engineers (3) 
Alabama Governor Bob Riley (3) 
City of Atlanta (3) 
Georgia’s Chief Negotiator (3) 
Alabama’s Chief Negotiator (2) 
Alabama Department of Environmental Management (2) 
Federal Commissioner (2) 
Alternate Federal Commissioner (2) 
N = 66 
Note: Only multiple responses are listed 
While not listed as most influential, the other major power company in the region, 
Georgia Power, also played a role in influencing water supply during the compact 
negotiations. The main issue of the State of Georgia –v- COE lawsuit was the water level 
of Lake Lanier. The Southern Power customers wanted the COE to be able withdraw as 
much water as needed to produce electricity for their consumption.  Any excess demand 
of electricity was to be made up by Georgia Power.  The state of Georgia wanted the 
COE to increase the minimum level of water held in Lake Lanier, which would ensure 
that not enough electricity would be produced by Southern Power to meet peak demand 
during the summer months.  One person close to the negotiations commented that 
Southern Power users had been guaranteed electricity by the COE from the Buford Dam
at Lake Lanier. This electricity is provided at a lower cost than that provided by Georgia 






While no survey data directly addressed the question of Georgia Power’s 
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influence on the negotiations, some observers of the negotiations speculated that Georgia 
Power was influential in the process.  One observer who worked with the federal 
negotiators commented, “Alabama Power and Georgia Power were at all of the meetings. 
But they never said anything. You would think that at some point Southern Company 
(parent holding company of both Alabama Power and Georgia Power) would have gotten 
them together and said, ‘Okay guys, here is our game plan’ but if they did, it never 
became public.”  
The court settlement was concurrent with the negotiations and some observers, at 
least one a member of another state’s negotiation team, alleged that the settlement 
negotiation occurred without the knowledge of the other states and was done to surpass 
the possible outcomes of the compact negotiations.  More than once observers of the 
negotiations whose interests were within the state of Alabama or Florida accused the state 
of Georgia of ‘negotiating in bad faith’. The respondents possibly saw this settlement as 
a way for the COE to influence the outcome of the compacts with an approach outside the 
negotiations. 
Question six of the survey asked respondents to list the most influential group 
during the compact negotiations.  The respondents of both states viewed the state 
government agencies as having a high level of influence.  Georgia’s Department of 
Natural Resources was listed six times as the most influential group.  Alabama’s 
Department of Environmental Management was listed twice.  The lead negotiators of









with environmental management.  The chief negotiator for Alabama was listed twice as 
the most influential, while Georgia’s counterpart was listed three times. 
Perceived Strength of the States
The survey asked respondents to identify the state they perceived as being most 
influential in the negotiations; a score of five representing the most influential and a score 
of one representing the least amount of influence.  Georgia, home to the state agencies 
most often mentioned as being influential, is listed as the most influential state (table 
5.6). The interviews data supports the survey responses.  Each subject interviewed 
indicated Georgia was the most influential of the three states during the negotiation 
process. Also, five survey respondents mentioned Georgia as the most influential 
organization (Table 5.5). Florida and Alabama are listed as the second and third most 
influential states, respectively (Table 5.6). 
A statistically significant difference in perception of influence of the states existed 
between respondents from Alabama and Georgia.  The respondents from each state 
considered the other state to be more powerful than their own which was found to be 
statistically significant at the .01 level.  When asked which state was the most influential, 
respondents from Alabama indicated Georgia was the strongest while Georgians 
indicated Florida was the most influential (table 5.6).  
With respect to the perception of Alabama’s level of influence, a statistically 
significant difference was evident at the .1 level between the respondents from Alabama 






Table 5.6: Average Score of Perceived Influence of Each State During the Negotiation  
Process 
Alabama Georgia 
State Average Score Respondents Respondents 
Georgia 4.15*** 4.51 3.82 
Florida 3.85 3.83 3.88 








negotiations than Alabama respondents believed their state was (Table 5.6).  Alabama 
and Georgia respondents had nearly identical responses for Florida’s perceived influence. 
* = statistically significant at the .1 level 
** = statistically significant at the .05 level 
*** = statistically significant at the .01 level 
The fact that each state was believed to have at least a moderately strong degree 
of influence indicates that each state participated in the compact negotiations in a 
purposeful manner.  While each state exuded at least some level of influence during the 
negotiations, Georgia was clearly the most influential.  This conclusion is entirely 
consistent with the interview data; each person interviewed indicated that the state of
Georgia was the most influential of the three states. 
Putting on a Unified Front 
When asked which state was more unified in its position, 40 percent of 
respondents from both states strongly indicated Georgia was the most influential (Table 
5.7). Alabama and Georgia respondents were almost identical in this response.  When 






overwhelmingly indicated Georgia was the most unified (data not shown).  Respondents 
with vague knowledge also indicated Georgia was most unified while those with some 
knowledge were divided between most and least. 
Georgia respondents also believed agricultural interests were more influential 
than respondents in Alabama believed they were.  This finding is consistent with the fact 
that agricultural interests in the Flint River Basin were concerned about the amount of 
water they could withdraw and worked to influence the negotiations to protect their 
interests. The finding demonstrates that respondents in Georgia noticed the influence of 
the agricultural interests while those in Alabama did not, which is consistent with the 
perception of Georgia being the most unified of the three states during the negotiation 
process. While Georgians acknowledged the voice of the agricultural interests, the pro-
economic development interests of Atlanta were powerful enough to repress their voice 
during the negotiations making it appear as if Georgia was speaking with one voice. 
Alabama was ranked last according to uniformity in its goals (Table 5.7).  While 
Florida ranked in the middle, Georgia was placed at the top.  Forty percent of the 
respondents indicated Georgia was the most uniform in their position.  Fourteen percent 
of respondents indicated Florida was the most unified while Alabama received about 
seventeen percent.  Overall, Alabama residents were mostly in agreement that Alabama 
was at the bottom, and Georgia respondents were more evenly dispersed between top, 
middle, and bottom in how they perceived the state (data not shown).  Those with the 
most knowledge of the compacts agreed predominately that Alabama was the least 







statistically significant difference existed between the responses from the two states 
(data not shown). 
The interview data did not yield clear results for the uniformity of Alabama.  A 
large portion of this can be explained in a discussion of the influence of the two most
influential interest groups within the state.  While Florida’s negotiation team changed 
little and Georgia’s chief negotiator didn’t change throughout the process, Alabama’s 
team changed with each governor.  The one consistent characteristic of Alabama’s chief 
negotiators was that they all had a professional connection to Alabama Power.  The other 
interest group representing individuals from Alabama that exuded influence had similar 
desires as Alabama Power, but had more demands than Alabama Power.  A casual 
observer to the process may not be able to distinguish which group was supporting which 
policy agenda. As the interview respondents noted, Alabama Power rarely made a public 
comment at the meetings or after the meetings.  To further cloud the picture, with the 
infusion of the river keeper groups as an active interest groups in the process, the 
message of what Alabama wanted from the compacts began to change from water 
quantity to both water quantity and water quality. 
The interview respondents often spoke of Florida as having a consistent goal of 
wanting more water than what Georgia was willing to give, but few other desired 
outcomes such as water access to spur development, to generate electricity, or to meet 
agricultural needs. The interview respondents were not clear as to what Alabama’s goals 







Table 5.7: Uniformity of Desired Outcomes During the Negotiation Process 







A score closest to ‘1’ signifies the most unified.  
A score closest to ‘3’ is the least unified. 
Differences in Knowledge Levels of the Respondents 
The first question of the questionnaire asked respondents to indicate their 
knowledge of the compact negotiations.  The four possible responses included very 
knowledgeable, somewhat knowledgeable, vague knowledge and no knowledge.  Due to 
low category size, the four responses were combined into two groups for analysis.  The 
first group consisted of respondents who were very or somewhat knowledgeable and the 
second group was made up of respondents who considered themselves as having either 
vague or no knowledge. Analysis was conducted to determine if statistically significant 
differences existed between the respondents who considered themselves knowledgeable 
versus those who reported vague or no knowledge. 
Crosstabs analysis was conducted to see if any differences in perceptions of 
fairness of the compacts outcomes could be found among the different levels of 
respondent knowledge. Two knowledge groups were found to be statistically significant 









The two knowledge groups that were statistically different at the .05 level had 
differing perceptions of a group having an advantage over the other in terms of 
influencing the quality and quantity of water as written in the compacts final form.  In 
both cases, those more familiar with the compacts disagreed more with the statements 
than those who knew less about the compacts’ final wording (data not shown).  The other 
differences were over the perceived influence of environmental groups and the COE (data 
not shown). Those less familiar with the compact negotiations believed environmental 
groups had more influence than those who were more familiar with the negotiations.  
Finally, those less familiar with the compacts believed the COE had less influence than 
those who identified themselves as more familiar with the negotiation process (data not 
shown). 
Attitudes about the Compacts 
In order to understand the thoughts of the respondents concerning what the 
compacts’ outcomes were or should have been, the questionnaire included several 
questions regarding water management.  The questionnaire asked respondents to rank, on 
a scale of one to five, if they agreed or disagreed with the statement.  A ranking of ‘one’ 
indicated strongly disagree while a ranking of ‘five’ indicated strongly agree.  A few 
questions were found to have statistically significant differences between the respondents 
from Alabama and Georgia. 
The question with the most statistically significant difference asked respondents if
the compacts, as written in their final form, would have given no state an advantage in 





more likely to disagree with this statement than Georgians (2.24 to 2.92 respectively).  
This was found to be statistically significant at the .01 level (Table 5.8).  Since the 
compacts allowed Georgia to keep as much water as it needed during times of drought 
this response was expected. 
One question, found to be statistically significant at the .05 level, asked 
respondents to consider if interest groups with environmental concerns were most 
influential in the negotiation process (Table 5.8).  Respondents from Georgia were also 
more likely to agree with this statement than were respondents from Alabama (3.24 to 
2.59 respectively). 
Another question asked if the compacts would limit the economic development 
for downstream users.  With a statistically significant difference at the .05 level (Table 
5.8), Georgians were more likely to agree with this statement than the respondents from 
Alabama (3.48 to 3.0 respectively).  The results from this question likely reflect 
Alabama’s primary concern over water quality as well as their uses of the water for non-
economic development reasons. This finding also reflects the concern of some Georgians 
located downstream of Atlanta who felt their economic development opportunities may 
have been limited if the final wording of the compacts became law. 
One question also asked if the compacts in their final form would not give an 
advantage to one state, at the expense of another, in terms of water quantity.  As 
expected, Georgians were more likely than Alabama respondents to agree with this 













Another question in which Alabama and Georgia had statistically significant 
differences in their responses asked if the compacts would have limited economic 
development in the Atlanta area.  Respondents from Alabama were more likely to 
disagree with this statement than respondents from Georgia (2.44 to 3.25). 
In summary, these findings indicate that the interest groups in Alabama have a 
primary concern of water quality.  Some believe a reduced quantity of water would affect 
the quality of water in the state.  The fact that Georgian’s saw environmental groups as 
more influential than respondents from Alabama viewed them indicates Georgian’s saw 
interest groups with environmental concerns as an obstacle to reaching an agreement, 
which is supported by the interview data.  One interview respondent from the Atlanta 
area indicated that “If the Florida Panhandle were a part of Alabama, there would have 
been an agreement.”  The primary concern for the state of Florida was the Apalachicola 
Bay’s ecosystem.  These statements support the idea that environmental interest groups 
were not only viewed as an obstacle preventing an agreement but as an obstacle for 





Table 5.8: Respondents in Each State Who Agreed With the Statement. 
Statement Overall Alabama Georgia
Improve Your Water Quality 2.53 2.40 2.63 
Increase Your Water Quantity 2.39 2.24 2.5 
No Advantage to a State in Quantity 2.23* 2.00 2.52 
No Advantage to a State in Quality 2.56*** 2.24 2.92 
Environmental Influence 2.91** 2.59 3.24 
Housing Development Influence 2.95 3.05 2.88 
Should Have Managed Urban Growth 3.66 4.00 3.38 
Would Limit Metropolitan Atlanta Development 2.82** 2.44 3.25 
Would Limit Down River Development 3.22** 3.00 3.48 
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Note: A Higher Number Indicates a Likeliness of Agreeing. 
* = statistically significant at the .1 level 
** = statistically significant at the .05 level 
*** = statistically significant at the .01 level 
When Florida interview subjects were asked why the compacts failed, their 
response was, “The compacts were not a failure because we didn’t sign a bad agreement. 
If we had signed a bad agreement, then they would have been a failure.”  Reflected in this 
statement are the concerns that Florida was unable to take a proactive stand during the 
negotiations and the state of Georgia presented options for them to consider that did not 







In summary, fairness is the primary concern of most of the Alabama and Florida 
interest groups that responded to the survey.  While respondents from Alabama did not 
believe as strongly as Georgians that the compacts would have limited Metropolitan 
Atlanta’s growth, they did believe the potential for an increase in water quantity 
withdrawals in the Atlanta area would have negatively effected economic development 
downstream more than the Georgians believed it would (data not shown).  
A similar analysis was conducted to learn if any differences existed in the 
perceptions between respondents who indicated they were from a Metropolitan Statistical 
Area versus those who were not. In this respect, only the responses from one question 
were statistically significant (p<.10).  The question asked if the compacts would limit 
economic development in down-river areas. Respondents from a Metropolitan Statistical 
Area were more likely to agree with this statement than respondents not from a 
Metropolitan Statistical Area (3.37 and 3.00 respectively).  This finding illustrates the 
different uses of the water by down river users.  Down river users do not use the water for 
economic development in the same manner as up river users; therefore, they may not
have the same views on how the rivers effect economic development.  The finding 
doesn’t dispute how the economies of downstream users are dependent upon recreational 
and shipping uses of the water for their economic development and quality of life.  In 
conclusion, differences in perception exist concerning what aspect of the rivers is valued 






With almost a two-to-one margin, the respondents wanted a regional commission 
to decide how the water should be allocated and to create enforcement of the allotment 
(Table 5.9). This finding is surprising when considering the resistance of the states to 
allow the federal government participation in the negotiations.  A desire for more federal 
involvement, or at least a region-wide governing organization, has likely occurred due to 
the failure of the states to reach an agreement.  In summary, the desire to better manage 
the water in the river basins and have a neutral third party as the managing organization is 
evident. 
No statistically significant differences were found between Alabama and Georgia 
respondents on either question regarding water management and enforcement (data not 
shown). Some differences were apparent among respondents most familiar with the 
compacts versus those not as familiar with the compact negotiations.  Those most 
familiar were less likely to support the involvement of a regional commission in 
allocating the water and were against, by a three to two margin, a region-wide 
commission enforcing water allocation (data not shown).  This finding likely illustrates 
the lack of trust each state has for the other and acknowledges that the structure of the 
compacts was faulty from the beginning.  The finding also illustrates the hopelessness 
some respondents in the state of Georgia may feel about having their concerns heard.  
The uniformity among Alabama and Georgia respondents concerning federal 




















decision from a neutral third party or the federal government as more fair and closer to 
their interests. 
 
Note: Percents do not equal 100 due to rounding. 
The questionnaire was used to determine which interest groups were influential 
and what respondents felt were the desired outcomes for the compacts.  Gathering this 
information assisted in determining which quadrant of McCool’s Model each state’s 
subsystem was located in.  The questionnaire was not only able to reach more individuals 
than the interview data, but was able to reach a broader audience and was subsequently 
able to tell a different aspect of the story.  The survey’s strength is that it determined 
which interest group was most influential as well as relative influence among the 
different interest groups.  The inclusion of people who were not very familiar with the 
compacts gave some indication as to the perceived importance of each interest group.  
Learning which groups and individuals were or were not familiar with the compacts 
assisted in learning the salience not only of the compact negotiations, but the issues 
surrounding the compacts and water policy in general. 
The next chapter further tests the hypotheses with regression and factor analysis 













believed the compact would affect a particular aspect of the natural resource.  After the 
statistical analysis tests were run, each of the hypotheses were revisited and are discussed 











TESTING THE HYPOTHESES WITH FACTOR AND REGRESSION ANALYSIS
The purpose of this chapter is to discuss the specific concerns and goals of the 
different interest groups. Question four of the survey asked respondents to evaluate the 
amount of influence demonstrated by several interest groups involved in the compact 
negotiation process. Some of the interest groups with similar goals for the compacts 
were combined into three groups for analysis.  The three groups are labeled 
‘environment’, ‘government’, and ‘economic development’.   
The interest groups are also categorized according to the subject matter of their 
desired outcomes of the compacts.  The three groupings include fairness in expected 
outcomes, promoting economic growth, and improving water quality.  Factor analysis is 
used to determine the membership of each group.
Correlations were utilized to determine what motivated each interest group, state, 
or goal of the compact.  Additionally, regression analysis was used to explore the 
interactions with several independent variables on the dependent variables index to 








analysis is to determine the goals of each group, and further decide if those goals 
were reflected in the compacts’ negotiation agenda.  The analysis also helps corroborate 
the interview analysis in determining which interest groups influenced the negotiation 
process. 
Factor Analysis 
Factor analysis is used to study association among variables (O’Sullivan, 1999).  
Factor analysis considers these associations and determines if the variables are measuring 
the same characteristic, concept, or theoretical constructs (O’Sullivan, 1999).  The 
analysis determines how closely these variables are associated with one another and if 
they can be grouped together in an index. Typically, the first step in factor analysis 
examines the relationships among the variables (Kim and Mueller, 1978).  If a 
relationship exists between two or more variables, then factor analysis can be used to 
combine the different variables into an index with fewer variables to explain similar 
aspects of a dependent variable. 
Factor analysis was used to determine the capability of any of the different 
influences to be grouped together.  Several of the interest groups were grouped together 
based upon similarities in their factor scores.  Principle component analysis with a 
varimax rotation was used to decide the factor loadings.  The purpose of varimax 
orthogonal rotation is to determine the relationship between the measures of each of the 
variables (Kim and Mueller, 1978).  
Factor analysis was used to determine if there are similarities in perceptions of 










groups with similar goals were perceived as having similar levels of influence on the 
negotiations. The results of the factor analysis show that interests groups loaded on three 
factors: environmental, government, and economic development. 
The first factor relates to concerns with the environment and includes perceived 
influence of the U.S. Fish and Wildlife, environmental groups, the Environmental 
Protection Agency, and lake and river protection groups.  The next factor is primarily 
concerned with local and state-wide governments and includes responses from: city and 
county agencies, state agencies, and local elected officials.  Finally, the third factor 
measures development issues such as crop irrigation, production of electricity and 
sustaining an increasingly large population.  This factor includes responses from the
following groups: the Corps of Engineers, homebuilder associations, river navigation 
interests, agricultural interests, and electric power generators. 
The outcome of the loading is evidence of the logical expectation that government 
groups had similar desired outcomes of the compacts while the environmental groups and 
federal government agencies, such as the EPA and Fish and Wildlife, were considered to 
have similar goals.  Other groups such as the Corps of Engineers, electric power 
generators, and river navigation, which were groups whose goals could be described as 









Table 6.1: Factor Analysis of Interest Groups with Varimax Rotation  
(Eigen values) 
Items Loadings 
Organization 1 2 3 
Fish and Wildlife .894 .195 .130 
Environmental Groups .779 .261 -8.169E-02 
EPA .762 .183 .180 
Lake and River groups .714 .352 .129 
City or county agencies .177 .801 .242 
State gvt. Agencies .113 .779 -2.128E-02 
State elected officials .311 .736 .134 
Local elected officials .167 .727 .278 
COE .556 -.198 .612 
Home builder 3.275E-02 .374 .725 
River navigation .395 3.049E-02 .614 
Agricultural .321 .331 .520 









Table 6.1 reports the results of the factor analysis.  The Eigen values from the 
factor analysis in Table 6.1 indicate the interest groups can be grouped into three 
different categories. The first of the groups is considered to be primarily concerned with 
issues relating to the environment.  The second group is concerned with advancing the 
wishes of state and local government, and the final category of interest groups is 
concerned with economic development. 
Each of the variables on the far left column represents an interest group from
question four of the questionnaire. The respondent was asked to rank the influence of the 
interest group with a scale of one through five.  One was coded ‘strongly disagree’ and 
five was coded ‘strongly agree’. 
Correlations
Correlations were used to determine the desired compact outcomes of different 
interest groups.  Rather than running a correlation with each interest group, the interest 
groups were grouped into three indices as determined by the results from the factor 
analysis. The three groups include interest groups with similar public policy goals and 
are labeled ‘government’, ‘development’, and ‘environmental’.  
The government index includes several variables that determined the perceptions 
of state and local governments (Table 6.2).  With a Pearson’s R of .356, a statistically 
significant (p<.01) moderate relationship between environmental groups and state and 
local governments is shown.  The relationship between the two groups indicates that 
government groups believed the desires of environmental groups influenced the compact 












variable labeled, ‘influence of environmental groups’.  This correlation, with an 
unstandardized beta of .202 and a t-score 2.826, is statistically significant at the .05 level 
(Table 6.5). The correlation of this variable also indicates that state and local 
governments believed the environmental groups were influential in the process.   
Additionally, Pearson’s R shows a statistically significant moderate relationship 
(.420, p< .01) between ‘state and local’ and the variable labeled ‘economic development’ 
(Table 6.2). This relationship indicates that the state and local government respondents 
believed that interest groups concerned with economic development were influential in 
the process. 
The analysis of the government index lends support to the hypotheses concerning 
the domination of interest groups in the Atlanta area, which were concerned with 
economic development, over the position of the state of Georgia.  The correlations 
suggest that interest groups concerned with economic development influenced each 
state’s government, especially considering both Alabama and Georgia were influenced 





   
       
       
      
      
   
    




















































































Economic Development .420** .336**
Improve Quality .014 .337** .183 
Improve Quantity .167 .248* .011 .558**
Advantage Quantity .098 .313** .138 .577** .514** 
Advantage Quality .159 .510** .172 .469** .482** .666**
Infl. 
Env. .246* .623** .080 .320** .420** .406** .685**
Infl. 
House .119 -.032 .264* .024 .099 .113 .154 
Urban Mgt. -.186 .009 .142 -.123 -.090 -.284** -.267* 
Limit ATL .007 .396** .110 .295** .136 .413** .544** 
Limit Down River .013 .211 .044 -.030 -.015 .057 .285** 
N = 105 
* = P < .05 








The correlations also indicate that environmental groups believed the compacts 
would assist in the improvement of both water quality (Pearson’s R of .337, p<.01) and 
water quantity (Pearson’s R of .248, p<.05) for the area in which they live or work (Table 
6.2). 
The analysis supports the hypothesis that environmental groups were not able to 
control the negotiations. Table 6.2 strongly indicates that the environmental groups were 
concerned not only about water quantity but water quality.  Analysis of the interview data 
indicates that water quantity, not water quality, was discussed in the negotiation 
meetings; which indicates environmentalists did not succeed in having their goals on the 
policy agenda.  Because the environmentalists were unable to have their goals heard, they 
did not influence the negotiations as much as groups concerned with promoting economic 
development. 
Variables dealing with the concerns of one state having an advantage over another 
in water quality were found to be statistically significant.  The variables originated from
the questionnaire.  The respondents were asked questions soliciting their thoughts on
likely outcomes of the compacts in their final form.  The respondents were asked to rank 
their likelihood of agreeing with a statement; a response of ‘1’ indicating ‘strongly 
disagree’ and a response of ‘5’ indicating a response of strongly agree.   
Perceptions of the influence of environmental groups and beliefs that the 
compacts would limit Atlanta’s growth (Pearson’s R of .320, p<.01) were found 
significant when compared with the desire to improve water quality (Pearson’s R of .337, 







   
  
 






water quantity with a Pearson’s R of .248 which was found to be statistically significant 
at the .05 level (Table 6.2).  Consequently, attitudes about whether or not the compacts 
would limit the Atlanta area’s growth (Pearson’s R of .458, p<.01) and attitudes that the 
compacts would limit downriver growth (Pearson’s R of .317, p<.01) were also 
statistically significant (Table 6.3). 









Influence Housing -.002 
Urban Mgt -.190 .243* 
Limit ATL .458** -.016 .007 
Limit Down River .317** .296** .086 .361**
N = 105 
* = P < .05 
** = P < .01 
Also, respondents indicating the influence of environmental groups correlated 
with the desire to improve water quality (Pearson’s R of .320, p > .01).  The sign of the 
correlation with managing urban growth and one state having an advantage over another 
with water quality and quantity was negative, which indicates that although some
individuals valued fairness in the compacts, urban management was not something the 
compacts should have addressed. 
Respondents indicating they wanted the compacts to improve water quantity or 






give one state an advantage over another in water quantity or quality.  Each correlation 
displayed this with a strong statistical significance (Pearson’s R of .577, p<.01 and .469 
respectively, p<.01) (Table 6.3). A strong correlation also existed between respondents 
who wanted to improve water quality and quantity, and those believing that 
environmental groups were influential in the negotiation process (Pearson’s R of .320, 
p<.01 and .420, p<.01, respectively) (Table 6.3). 
Respondents with concerns about one state having an advantage over another in 
water quantity correlated with the perception of the influence level of environmental 
groups (Pearson’s R of .406, p<.01).  Respondents believing that one state would have an 
advantage over another in water quality correlated with respondents believing that urban 
management should have been one of the goals of the compacts (Pearson’s R of p<.01) 
and with those believing that the compacts would limit Atlanta’s growth (p<.01) (Table 
6.3).
Strong correlations existed between the influence of environmental groups and 
limiting Atlanta’s growth (Pearson’s R of .396, p<.01) as well as limiting the downriver 
growth (Pearson’s R of .317, p<.01) (Table 6.3).  Similarly, correlations between the 
influence of housing groups and value of urban management existed (Pearson’s R of 
.243, p<.05). Concerns among those who believed the compact would give one group an 
advantage in water quantity correlated with respondents who believed the compacts 
would limit growth downstream from Atlanta (Pearson’s R of .285, p<.01), (Table 6.3).  
Those who believed that urban growth should be managed by the compacts believed that 






housing interests were strong also believed that the Atlanta area would grow at the 
expense of the downstream areas.  Most of the housing interests involved in the 
negotiations were located in the Atlanta area.  Finally, beliefs about whether the 
compacts would limit growth in Atlanta were correlated with beliefs that they would limit 
growth downriver from Atlanta (Pearson’s R of .361, p<.01) (Table 6.3).  
In review, the analysis supports the idea that economic development in the 
Atlanta area was an important aspect of the compacts and that economic development 
groups, such as housing interests, were influential in the process.  The analysis also 
supports the belief that access to the water would benefit either the Atlanta area or
downriver areas, but not both. One of the areas would have to loose. 
In summary, the analysis in Table 6.2 and Table 6.3 indicates that while improved 
water quantity and quality were expected outcomes of the compacts, also expected was 
that one state would have an advantage over another, not only in water quantity and 
quality but also in economic growth.  A likely conclusion of this analysis is that a battle 
exists between the states not only over water allocation and quality, but over the future of 
economic development.  The hypotheses that economic development groups were driving 
the negotiation process and that the future of Atlanta was believed to be greatly 
influenced by the outcomes of the compacts are supported by this analysis.  The analysis 
also shows how economic development interest groups were able to define the 













The analysis also indicates the reality that each side believed the compacts was a 
zero sum situation, which assists in explaining why the compacts failed.  Both Alabama 
and Georgia believed that one state would win and the others would loose.  They believed 
that no agreement could be reached that would improve the access to water and water 
quality as well as allow for future economic growth.  Given this perception, one can 
easily see why the compacts failed and were likely doomed to fail from the beginning. 
The Goal of each Group 
To review, the individual interest groups were grouped into three indices 
according to results of the factor analysis.  The groups include interest groups that have
similar public policy goals and are labeled ‘government’, ‘development’, and 
‘environmental’.  The purpose of developing these three indices is to create variables at
the interval level in order to learn the desired policy outcomes of the three groups by 
using linear regression analysis. Regression analysis is used to determine if the values of
the different interest groups can explain why the different groups had different 
preferences in outcomes of the compacts. 
In ordinary least squares (OLS) regression eight conditions must occur.  
According to Berry (1993) the following conditions, generally referred to as to as Gauss-
Markov assumptions, must be present: 
1. All independent variables must be dichotomous and the dependent 
variable must be unbounded and continuous. 
2. All independent variables have a nonzero variance. 
 
 








3. There is not perfect multicollinearity.
4. The mean value of the error term is zero. 
5. Each independent variable is correlated with the error term. 
6. There is constant variance of the error term. 
7. Error terms for different observations are uncorrelated. 
8. The values for the independent variables must be normally distributed. 
Once the assumptions are met, the OLS estimators will give an estimate of the 
parameter of the entire population.  Once this parameter is determined, the estimate can 
then be considered the best linear unbiased estimator. 
The dependent variables are indexes created by combining the factors discussed 
above into three indexes. In the factor analysis it was found that the goals of the interest 
groups could be loaded into three groups. The first group is concerned with the impact 
that the compacts would have on the environment and is labeled ‘environment’.  Interest 
groups that are members of this group include: United States Fish and Wildlife, 
environmental groups, the EPA, and lake and river groups.  The environmental group has 
a minimum of six and a maximum of 29 with a mean of 19.47 and a standard deviation of 
4.79. The second category of interest groups includes groups with governing concerns.  
The group, labeled ‘government’, includes state elected officials, city or county agencies, 
state government agencies, and local elected officials.  The ‘government’ minimum is 
four and the maximum is 19 with a mean of 12.65 and a standard deviation of 3.74.  The 





labeled ‘development’.  The group includes home builders, the COE, river navigation 
groups, electric power generators, and agricultural development groups.  The minimum 
of the development category is three and the maximum is 20 with a mean of 2.55 and a 
standard deviation of 10.23. 
The variables originated from the questionnaire.  The respondents were asked 
questions concerning their thoughts on the likely outcomes of the compacts in their final 
form.  The respondents were asked to rank their likelihood of agreeing with the 
statement.  A response of ‘1’ indicated ‘strongly disagree’ and a response of ‘5’ indicated 
a response of strongly agree. 
The second group of variables were created by the desired compact outcomes of 
the respondents and were loaded into three groups, ‘fairness’, ‘quality’, and ‘growth’.  
The variables were created by combining responses from the questionnaire that measured 
the respondents’ attitudes about the likely outcomes of the compacts in their final form.   
For the category labeled ‘fairness’, the minimum is three and the maximum is 12, 
with a mean of 7.17 and a standard deviation of 2.43.  Questions concerning a 
respondent’s attitudes about the compact giving one state or a downstream area an 
advantage over another state or an upstream area on water allocation, development, or 
quality were included in the ‘fairness’ index.  For the ‘quality’ category, the minimum is 
four and the maximum is 18, with a mean of 11.49 and a standard deviation of 3.18.  
Included in the category labeled ‘quality’ are questions from the questionnaire 
concerning a respondent’s attitudes about whether or not the compacts, in their final 






‘growth’, the minimum is two and the maximum is ten, with a mean of 6.65 and a 
standard deviation of 1.86. Questions from the questionnaire included in the ‘growth’ 
category are concerning a respondent’s beliefs concerning how the compacts, in their 
final form, would affect the opportunity for economic growth for each state as well as 
upstream and downstream users of the river water in each basin. 
The independent variables include interest groups the questionnaire respondents 
believed were influential (COE, state and local government, power generators), indices of 
the different interest groups created from the factor analysis, other demographic variables 
such as the state or population of the area in which the subject lives, and the specific 
expectations of the compacts, such as one state having an advantage in water quantity or 
quality. Again, the variables originated from the questionnaire.  Respondents were asked 
questions concerning their thoughts on the likely outcomes of the compacts in their final 
form and were asked to rank their likelihood of agreeing with the statements.   
A questionnaire respondent indicates the perceived strength of influence over the 
compacts’ outcomes with a ‘one’ indicating the weakest relationship and a ‘five’ 
indicating the strongest relationship.  The independent variables representing values are 
measured with a ‘one’ indicating a strong disagreement with the value and a ‘five’ 
indicating a strong agreement with the value.  Some of the analysis uses the indices as the 
independent variable and those variables are measured at the interval level.  
The dependent variables are measured on an interval scale.  The dependent 
variables represent the amount of agreeability that the respondent had with the statement.  





respondent chose ‘five’, this indicates a strong agreement with the value.  Other 
independent variables are measured at the nominal level as described above. The t-scores 
and unstandardized Beta are reported. 
The groups concerned with fairness and improving water quality were expected to 
believe that the compacts would give one state an advantage over another in the water 
quantity and quality. The same group is also expected to believe the compacts would 
limit economic growth and development downriver from the Atlanta area. 
The group concerned with economic development and economic growth was 
expected to indicate that the electrical power companies and government groups in the 
Atlanta area were the most influential in the negotiations.  Also predicted is that they did 
not believe the compacts would harm economic development downstream from the 
Atlanta area.  The government group is expected to be primarily concerned with 
economic development and to perceive interest groups in the Atlanta area to be more 
influential than others. 
Table 6.4 reports the results for the first three models: Environment, Government, 
and Development.  The first variable concerning the index labeled ‘environment’ reports 
that the perception that the compacts, in their final form, would give one state an 
advantage in water quality did exist.  This variable has an unstandardized beta of .476, a 
t-score of 2.589, (Table 6.4) and was found to be statistically significant at the .01 level.  
Every unit of increase in the water quality variable increased the dependent variable by 







those who believed that environmental groups were influential also believed the 
environmental groups were concerned primarily with water quality.  
The variable labeled ‘government’, which contains each government group, was 
regressed against several different variables that measured perceived outcomes of the 
compacts.  None were found to be statistically significant at the .05 level (Table 6.4), a 
likely outcome since the government organizations represented many different areas of 
the region as well as the different interest groups that influenced each state.  Because of
this wide range of representation of interests with the different governments, no variable 
was found to be statistically significant among the desires of the governments.   
The third variable, labeled ‘development,’ includes interest groups such as electric 
power companies, navigation interests, and the COE which are primarily concerned with 
promoting economic development and commerce.  The economic development groups 
were expected to be concerned with having enough water to support future population 
growth and industrial development.  No support was found for this expectation.  This lack 
of support is likely due to the fact that many different groups expressed concern over the 
quantity of the water, not just the interest groups concerned with economic development. 
The purpose of this analysis was to better understand the motivation of each of the 
different groups. Understanding their motivation assists in explaining why coalitions 
formed and why some of the coalitions dominated the subsystem within their state.  This 
analysis also explains the differences in the coalitions’ goals.  Because the perception of









the interest groups in the environmental index, this fairness concept explains some of the 
concerns they had with the compacts. 
The three variables derived from the result of the varimax orthogonal rotation 
(environment, government, and development) were regressed against the perceived 
outcomes of the compacts.  To review, each questionnaire respondent was asked his or
her perceptions of the compacts in their final form and was asked to indicate the 
likelihood of agreeing with specific statements.  A ‘1’ indicated a response of ‘strongly 
disagree’ and a ‘5’ indicated a response of strongly agree.  Each of the questions 
represents each of the dependent variables in Table 6.4. 
Table 6.5 displays the expectations of the three groups discussed in Table 6.4, 
‘development’, ‘government’, and ‘environmental’.  The indices are measured by 
combining the scores of the individual interest groups that comprise the index.  The 
scores are derived from the questionnaire responses as to the perceived level of influence 
or how much they agree with a particular goal of the compacts’ outcomes. Again, the 
responses ranged from ‘strongly disagree’, which was coded as ‘one’, to ‘strongly agree’, 
which was coded as ‘five’. The independent variables measure a perceived outcome of 
the compacts as expected by the questionnaire respondent.  The three dependent variables 
indicate the groupings of interest groups that share similar goals and desired expectations 









Table 6.4: Perceptions of Respondents Indexed by Goal 
155 
Variable Environment Government Development 
U. B. t-score U. B. t-score U. B. t-score 
Improve Water quality .165 1.23 -.096 -.629 .160 1.040 
Improve Water Quantity -.026 -.541 .178 1.179 -.177 -1.167 
Give State Adv. Water 
Quality .476 2.589** .154 .808 .198 1.039 
Give State Adv. Water 
Quantity -.084 -.026 -.038 -.214 .070 .393 
Manage Urban 
Development .142 1.268 -.145 -1.127 .172 .181 
Limit Atlanta Area 
Growth .119 .871 -.063 -.397 -.026 -.165 
Limit Downriver 
Development -.001 -.012 -.001 -.010 -.026 -.193 
Adjusted R-squared .224 .104 -.026 
F statistic 4.060 .957 -.730 
Statistical Significance .001 .477 .647 
N = 105 
* = P < .05 
** = P < .01 
*** = P < .001 
In Table 6.5, the independent variables in the far left column are the goals of the 
compacts.  The variables were listed in question ten of the questionnaire and the 
respondents were asked to indicate if they agreed with each statement.  Table 6.5 shows 






that loaded in the economic development factor influenced the process (unstandardized 
beta of .622 and a t-score of 3.725, p<.001). 
Environmental groups shared the belief that water quality and quantity would not 
be improved by the compacts and that one state would have an advantage over another in 
terms of water quality and quantity.  As was anticipated, the government index was not 
influenced by any of the independent variables.  The development index was likely 
influenced by whether or not economic growth would be limited by the compacts in 
Atlanta or downriver areas. 
State and local governments were concerned primarily with economic 
development (Table 6.5).  With an unstandardized beta of .202 and a t-score of 2.826, this 
relationship was found to be statistically significant at the .01 level.  This finding 
supports the interview analysis which showed that the government organizations most 
involved and most influential in the negotiation process were located in the Atlanta area.  
The primary concern of those groups was promoting economic growth.  Also the state of 
Georgia was found to be influential in the government index (Table 6.5).  With an 
unstandardized beta of 2.639 and a t-score of 2.835, this relationship was found to be 
statistically significant at the .01 level.  The positive sign on the t-score indicates that 
government groups were influential in Georgia but not in Alabama, which also supports 
the analysis of the interview data which found that the state and local governments of 
Georgia and the Atlanta area were involved in the negotiation process; whereas, the 












Table 6.5: Concerns of Respondents by Characteristic 
157 
Variable Development Government Environmental 
U. B. t-score U. B. t-score U. B. t-score 
Population .305 1.273 -.806 -1.899 .253 .555 
State and Local 
Government .202 2.826* --- --- .256 1.813 
Knowledge 
Level -.074 -.140 .864 .945 -1.518 -1.612 
Fairness .091 .755 .047 .225 .035 .158 
Development --- --- .619 2.826** .247 1.017 
Environment .073 1.017 .225 1.813 --- ---
Georgia -.673 -1.200 2.639 2.835** -.900 -.870 
MSA -.061 -.099 -1.313 -1.229 1.514 1.360 
Water Quality -.024 -.238 -.130 -.735 .622 3.725*** 
Economic 
Growth .173 .755 -.159 -.673 .146 .589 
Adjusted R-
squared .130 .207 .318 
F statistic 2.075 2.882 4.373 
Statistical 
Significance .047 .007 .001 
N = 105 
* = P < .05 
** = P < .01 





Table 6.6 indicates the respondents perceptions about which desires or 
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characteristics influenced the different interest group indices.  The independent variables 
include characteristics about the respondents such as population of area where the person 
works, state of residence, as well as the desires of what the respondent wanted from the 
compacts. 
In Table 6.6, three new variables were created in order to group the respondents 
according to their goals for the compacts.  The groups were labeled ‘growth’ for those 
interest groups wanting economic growth, ‘quality’ for the groups concerned primarily 
about water quality and ‘fairness’ for the respondents who were primarily concerned with 
the compacts treating each state fairly in its outcome.  The three indices used in the 
previous two tables are also used as independent variables to determine the characteristics 
of the respondents who were concerned with economic growth, water quality, or fairness.  
Each of the interest groups was placed into three categories.  Each category 
represented a goal of the interest group.  The three goals of the interest groups are 
growth, quality, and fairness. As is the case with Tables 6.4 and 6.5, the variables 
measuring the respondents’ desired outcomes of the compacts were measured on a scale 
of one through five with one representing ‘strongly disagree’ and five representing 
‘strongly agree’.  The variables measuring perceptions of influence are measured on a 
scale of one through five with one representing ‘little influence’ and five representing 
‘much influence’.  The knowledge level variable is measured as one or two with one 
representing more knowledge and two representing less knowledge.  The population














areas and four representing the more rural areas.  The MSA variable is represented as the 
one indicating the respondent lives in an MSA, and two indicating the opposite.  A 
respondent with residency in Georgia is indicated with a one and Alabama with a zero. 
In Table 6.6, the characteristics of the respondents are regressed against the same
three indices. This is done to determine the characteristics of the interest groups that are 
grouped in the three categories. 
The analysis is expected to show that the development group was influenced by 
interest groups from Georgia and those concerned with economic growth.  The index of 
government interest groups is expected to be influenced by interest groups concerned 
with economic growth and economic development.  A strong likelihood exists that the 
respondent from Georgia perceived the influence of government as powerful.  The index 
composed of perceptions of influence of environmental interest groups is expected to be 
influenced by whether or not a respondent believes water quality is important as well as a 









Table 6.6: Desired Outcomes of Compacts for Respondents 
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Variable Growth Quality Fairness 
U. B. t-score U. B. t-score U. B. t-score 
Georgia -.649 -1.174 1.737 2.45** -.244 -.388 
Environment .042 .589 .320 3.725*** .013 .158 
State and Local 
Government -.050 -.673 -.073 -.735 .019 .225 
Development .168 1.294 -.042 -.238 .111 .755 
Fairness -.091 -.774 .503 3.502*** --- ---
Quality .085 .853 --- --- .358 3.502*** 
MSA -.324 -.533 -.825 -1.027 -.394 -.578 
Knowledge 
Level .559 1.091 -.191 -.276 -.234 -.402 
Population -.083 -.338 .121 .368 -.244 -.866 
Growth --- --- .151 .853 -.116 -.774 
Adjusted R-
squared .028 .460 .198 
F statistic .801 7.159 2.782 
Statistical 
Significance .616 .001 .009 
N = 105 
* = P < .05 
** = P < .01 





In which state the respondent resided influenced whether or not that person was 
concerned with water quality.  The positive sign on the t-score (2.45) indicated that 
Georgia residents were not as concerned with water quality as Alabama residents.  This is 
statistically significant at the .01 level and had an unstandardized beta of .320 (Table 6.6).  
This finding is consistent with the interview data which indicated lake and homeowner 
groups in Alabama were concerned not only with the quantity of available water but the 
condition in which that water would be received from the upriver Atlanta area.  Again, 
Georgia was concerned primarily with economic growth and water quality is not as 
strong of a concern. 
As expected, interest groups with concerns of water quality also had similar goals 
as did interest groups in the ‘environmental’ index that had broader environmental 
concerns. This was found to be statistically significant at the .001 level with an 
unstandardized beta of .320 and a t-score of 3.725 (Table 6.6). This finding was expected 
because the interview subjects indicated that environmental groups were not only 
concerned about the quantity of water but the effect water quantity has on water quality.  
Nothing in the growth variable was found to be statistically significant. Residence in 
Georgia, with an unstandardized beta of 1.737 and a t-score of 2.45, was statistically 
significant (p<.05) in determining whether or not the respondent supported water quality 
as an outcome of the compacts (Table 6.6).  Groups concerned with fairness, with an 
unstandardized beta of .358 and a t-score of 3.502, (p<.001) also affected beliefs that the 












fairness and water quality were primary concerns with environmental groups and those 
who valued fairness also valued water quality.
Independent and Dependent Variables Revisited 
The dependent variable is considered to influence each or several interest groups 
in the states as well as the negotiation process as a whole.  The dependent variables were 
measured from the results of the survey and the responses given by the subjects of the in-
depth interviews. Influence was measured by asking the interview subjects and survey 
respondents who they believed were the most influential in the process.  While this is a 
subjective measure of a variable, the variable was difficult to define otherwise.  Despite 
the difficulty in defining the variable, the validity of the method of determining the 
amount of influence is without question.  The interview subjects and individuals familiar 
with the compacts are uniquely qualified to determine which groups influenced the 
process as well as the strength of their influence. 
The independent variable is concerned with the interest groups’ access to political
resources and ability to form coalitions to achieve influence.  The desired outcomes were 
considered by the amount of water each state wants to withdraw from the river basins. 
With the additional regression analysis, the hypotheses are revisited and 
considered. The regression analysis provides a way to evaluate each of the sub 








H1: States in a river basin with diverse uses of the river were less likely to be 
homogeneous in the interstate compact negotiations than a state with uniform uses for the 
river water in the river basin. 
The data do not support this hypothesis. Within the state of Georgia, the desires of 
the different interest groups varied widely. Although the state uses the water for 
economic development and agricultural development, recreational uses are also important 
to several Georgian interest groups.  However, the interest groups in the metropolitan
area of Atlanta were so influential that the other interest groups’ concerns were not heard 
by the state’s negotiators.  Because they were not heard, the state had the appearance of
speaking with one voice and was acknowledged by the interview subjects and the survey 
respondents as the most unified of the three states.  Each interview respondent and the 
survey data indicated Georgia was the most united in its message throughout the course 
of the negotiations. Furthermore, Florida had very similar uses and desired outcomes for 
the water and was generally considered to be united in its desired outcomes.   
River and lake water users in the state of Alabama use the water in many different 
ways. The river and lake water is used for the generation of electricity, recreation on 
multiple lakes, navigation of barge traffic, as well as economic development.  However, 
the most dominant users of the water, Alabama Power and river and lake protection 
groups, wanted similar outcomes from the compacts.  Alabama experienced an evolution 
in its desired outcomes during the negotiation process.  In summary, the diversity of the 






H1a: The greater the number of coalitions of involved interest groups in a state, the less 
influential the state was in the interstate compact negotiations. 
No support was found for this hypothesis.  While Georgia does have interest 
groups that use the water in many different ways, interest groups connected with one of 
the uses had an enormous amount of influence when compared to the other interest 
groups. Due to the strong influence of the interest groups in the Atlanta area, the state 
was able to be the most influential of the three.  This conclusion was supported by all of 
the interview subjects as well as the survey respondents. 
H1b: Georgia is more likely to have been less unified in its negotiating position than 
Alabama or Florida because of the conflict between the different interest groups within 
that state. 
No support was found for this hypothesis. While the state of Georgia had several 
different coalitions including agriculture and downstream river users, Alabama had fewer 
coalitions. Alabama’s coalitions were lake homeowners and river keeper groups and 
Alabama Power.  The interviews indicated that Alabama had the smallest number of 
coalitions; however, Alabama was viewed as the least influential of the three states.  
Georgia, with more coalitions than Alabama, was viewed as was more powerful.  The 
difference between Alabama and Georgia is that one of Georgia’s coalitions was so 
influential that it dominated that state’s position almost exclusively, which allowed 










Florida had few stable coalitions and was considered by survey respondents as the 
second most influential of the three states. 
H1c: Georgia is more likely to have been less influential than Alabama or Florida during 
the negotiation process because the state is more diverse in its uses of the river water than 
Alabama and Florida. 
No support was found for this hypothesis. Because of the state’s uniformity and 
the dominance of a few interest groups in the state, Georgia was viewed by the interview 
subjects as well as the survey respondents as the most influential. 
H2: The greater the amount of resources available to an interest group, the greater the 
influence of the interest group. 
The research analysis supports this hypothesis. The survey respondents indicated 
that the most influential interest groups were Alabama Power and economic development 
groups from the Atlanta area. Alabama Power and the economic interests of the Atlanta 
area possess many resources.  The influence of these two groups is particularly reflected 
by Alabama’s negotiators having significant professional connections to Alabama Power 
and the Federal commissioner serving as the president of Georgia’s Chamber of 
Commerce. 
H2a: Interest groups with environmental concerns were less likely to influence the 







The research analysis supports this hypothesis.  The interview subjects indicated 
that business interests in the Atlanta area dominated the state’s position during the 
negotiations. In Alabama, Alabama Power Company was the dominant interest group.  
In both states, the groups concerned about the environmental impact of the possible 
outcomes of the negotiations were not able to influence the negotiations in a meaningful 
way. Business interests dominated the position taken by Alabama and Georgia.  In the 
state of Florida, no interest group with business concerns appeared to be active or 
interested in the negotiations other than the oyster gatherers.  The oyster gatherers’
desired outcomes for the compacts were so intermingled with the environmentalists that 
determining which group held more influence was difficult.  In fact, the two groups 
worked together with the goal of maintaining a ‘natural flow’ of the Apalachicola River. 
Additionally, the analysis of the survey data indicated that the business interests 
were among the most influential of all stakeholders.  Environmental groups were ranked 
near the middle of all stakeholders. 
H2b: Lake and river protection groups are more likely to have been more influential 
within Alabama’s subsystem than environmental groups because of greater access to 
resources. 
The research analysis supports this hypothesis.  The survey data proved the lake 
owner groups to be more influential, which is likely due to the fact that they formed a 
coalition while the environmental groups chose to stand alone or not participate during 







access to financial and political resources that the environmental groups did not.  In 
addition, the lake owner and river keeper groups had a narrow focus while the 
environmental groups had a more broad focus.  The tunnel vision of the river and lake 
keeper groups allowed them to focus time, financial, and political resources on a 
specified goal.  However, the environmental groups did not have that luxury. 
H2c: Interest groups representing the concerns of the metropolitan area of Atlanta were 
more likely to influence the state of Georgia’s agenda than interest groups outside of the 
Atlanta area.
The research analysis supports this hypothesis.  Each individual interviewed 
indicated that the compacts were really a battle between the metropolitan area of Atlanta 
and everyone else.  Interview respondents, including those familiar with Georgia’s 
negotiation team, indicated that Atlanta exuded a great amount of influence on the state’s 
negotiators, even though other interest groups existed, such as agricultural and economic 
development interests in the Columbus, Georgia area, that felt they were not adequately 
represented by the state of Georgia in the negotiations.  
Three of the survey respondents listed the city of Atlanta as the most influential 
organization. Atlanta was the only municipality mentioned.  A statistically significant 
difference was evident between Georgia survey respondents and Alabama respondents in 
that Georgia respondents believed city and county governments to be more influential 








involvement or awareness of the issues surrounding the compacts with local 
governments in Georgia than in Alabama. 
H2d: No single interest group in Florida was able to dominate the state’s subsystem
because no interest group had enough resources to dominate the subsystem. 
The research analysis supports this hypothesis.  According to a member of 
Florida’s negotiation team, the interest groups in Florida were concerned with protecting 
the Apalachicola River and Bay’s ecosystem.  The only other interest group, shrimp and 
oyster gatherers, was also concerned with protecting the ecosystem of the Apalachicola 
River and Bay.  Neither group had a great amount of resources.  Economic development 
interest groups were non-existent in Florida.  The key to the effectiveness of Florida was 
that no conflict existed among the interest groups; thus, the interest groups were able to 
work together to achieve one goal. No evidence was given by the interview subjects 
indicating that any one interest group was able to dominate Florida’s position during the 
negotiations. 
H2e: Alabama Power was the most influential interest group in the state of Alabama 
because of the large amount of political resources they possess. 
The research analysis supports this hypothesis.  Alabama Power was the only 
organization listed by the survey respondents as most influential during the negotiations.  
Electric Power companies were listed as the most influential of all categories of interest 








interview subjects from Alabama indicated Alabama Power was the most influential 
interest group in the state. Evidence of the strength of their influence is that the two 
negotiators for the state of Alabama had significant professional ties with Alabama Power 
Company. 
Alabama Power has a great amount of resources in that they operate the dams and 
control the water volume of the reservoirs along the Coosa and Tallapoosa Rivers.  This 
provides that company with a continuous and reliable source of inexpensive electricity 
and the ability to sell it throughout the two river basins as well as to other power 
generation companies. 
H2f: The electrical power companies and other stakeholders were more likely to 
influence Alabama’s desired outcomes while state and local government agencies were 
more likely to influence Georgia’s desired outcomes of the compact negotiations because 
they possess more resources to influence the policy makers. 
The research analysis supports this hypothesis.  The quantitative data strongly 
suggests that the most influential organizations in the state of Georgia were state agencies 
and statewide elected officials.  State agencies and state elected officials were listed in 
the top five of the most influential groups with a statistically significant difference 
indicating that the respondents in Georgia viewed them as more influential than 
respondents in the state of Alabama.  Also, the Georgia Governor’s office, a state 
government agency, and the generic response of “the state of Georgia” were the three 












With a strong statistically significant difference, Alabama residents believed 
electrical power companies were more influential than Georgia residents believed they
were. Alabama Power was ranked highest among Alabama organizations with respect to 
the amount of influence each organization exuded over the negotiation process.
H3: During drought years the policy subsystem for the region will move from the third 
quadrant toward the forth quadrant. 
The research analysis supports this hypothesis.  The interview subjects indicated 
that state agencies became more interested in the discussions of the meetings during 
drought years. Also, during the drought of the late 1990s, the frequency of the meetings 
increased. Members of river keeper groups reported an increase in membership during 
drought years as awareness of the compact negotiations increased.  These conditions 
moved the region wide policy subsystem into the fourth quadrant because more interest 
groups got involved in the negotiations as well as some interest groups gained strength 
due to an increase in membership. 
The concluding chapter revisits McCool’s model.  The chapter discusses in which 
quadrant each subsystem is located.  The chapter also summarizes the interaction of each 
interest group within each state as well as the region-wide subsystem.  Recommendations 











The purpose of this study was to use McCool’s (1998) model to describe the 
interaction of interest groups in each state involved in the ACT and ACF River Basin 
Compacts, as well as the entire river system basin.  This study employed multiple 
methods to answer the research questions posed in the beginning.  Interviews were 
conducted with individuals who were familiar with the negotiations, participated in the 
negotiations, or monitored the negotiations.  These subjects provided crucial insight to
understanding the negotiation process and were the foundation for future data gathering.  
After the interview data were analyzed, certain themes emerged which were used to 
author a mail questionnaire.  The survey provided a basis to reach other individuals who 
had some or a limited knowledge of the compacts.  The survey also provided an 
indication of how salient the issues surrounding the negotiations, as well as the 
negotiations themselves, were to elected officials, environmental and commerce interest 
groups, as well as government agencies. 
The analysis indicates the states held little trust for one another throughout the 








federal agencies, in particular Alabama and the Corps of Engineers; this lack of trust 
contributed to the compacts having little chance of achieving success.  
Many of the region’s interest groups motivating each state’s desired policy 
outcomes had dramatically different goals for water use.  Therefore, each state’s desired 
outputs from the compacts were significantly different.  As is the case in any policy issue, 
the interest groups were not similar in strength.  The variance in strength of the interest 
groups was reflected in each state. As a result of this difference, a climate was created 
that was conducive to a state taking a more obstructionist than conciliatory strategy.  The 
difference in uses of the river water along with no neutral third party assisting in the 
negotiation process, lead to the expiration of the compacts.  Consequently, no agreement 
over water allocation was reached among the three states. 
The failure to reach an agreement was met with mixed reactions.  Interest groups 
from Florida believed they won because their state had not signed an agreement that 
would harm their ecosystem.  While some interest groups in the Atlanta area were 
frustrated that no agreement was reached, other groups were not concerned and have
since begun negotiations exclusively with the COE over the amount of water stored in 
Lake Lanier along the Chattahoochee River.  Alabamians were also mixed in their 
reactions in that they are pleased their state did not sign an agreement that would likely 
drain their reservoirs, but were concerned that they might not be able to stop 
organizations in Georgia from increasing the amount of water stored or transferred from 
the ACT basin. 



































McCool’s Model Revisited 
McCool’s model labels the x-axis as ‘zero sum’.  In this study, zero sum is 
believed to be too limiting in describing the interactions within the subsystem.  
173 
The dynamic nature of the policy subsystems in each of the three states and the 
region as a whole is shown by this study. Each state has a different subsystem that 
influenced the state’s negotiation position.  Although each state had veto power in the 
negotiations, Georgia clearly set the agenda of the negotiations.  With the metropolitan 
area of Atlanta in need of a greater access to water, they were the most prepared for the 
negotiations. In addition to being the most prepared, their subsystem of government was 
in place before the negotiations began. Georgia’s subsystem, and subsequently its 
desired outcomes of the compacts, did not change during the negotiations process.  
Georgia can best be described as having a subsystem of water policy located in the first 
quadrant. During times of drought, its subsystem moves to the second quadrant with the 






development interests downstream from Atlanta become dissident due to the lack of the 
available resource. 
Florida’s subsystem is in the first quadrant and does not change during drought 
conditions. This lack of change is due to the uniformity of the interest groups in Florida.  
Each group is interested in preserving the ecosystem and protecting some, if not all, 
portions of the river’s diverse ecosystem. 
Alabama is located in the first quadrant and moves to the forth during drought 
periods. When there is plenty of the resource, the lake owners, environmentalists, as well 
as the electric power producers are content and non-competitive.  During drought 
conditions, conflicts arise over the priority of the uses of the water.  During periods of 
scarcity of the resource the dominant interest groups, recreation and electricity 
generation, disagree over how much water is necessary to maintain water levels in 
various lakes and how much needs to be released through the dams.  Disagreement 
during periods of drought shifts the subsystem into the forth quadrant, with the electric 
power generators dominating the use of the water during drought periods because they 
own the land in which the water is stored as well as have the authority to regulate 
reservoir levels. Their authority not only gives them influence as an interest group, but a 
level of authority that similar to that enjoyed by government.  
In this study, access to the resource is not a zero sum outcome.  Ample water can 
be transferred from one basin to another.  Yet, the perception of a scarcity of the resource 







The perception of resource scarcity is also based upon the different uses of the 
water, which is vital to understanding why the compacts failed.  What interest groups in 
Alabama considered a scarcity of the resource, those in Georgia did not.  If enough water 
is in a lake for human consumption of clean water, but not enough water for each lake 
resident to access the lake with his boat, then a scarcity of the resource was experienced 
in Alabama that Georgians did not believe existed.  While enough water may be available 
to support economic development in the Atlanta area, enough water may not be available 
to support the oyster harvesting industry in Florida.  These differences were strong 
between the states and prevented the negotiations from moving forward.   
To Georgia, the resource of water is used to support development.  For Alabama, 
the primary uses are recreation and electricity generation.  What is considered a scarcity 
to one interest group may be considered an excess capacity to an interest group in a 
different state, which explains why Florida was reluctant to sign any of Georgia’s 
proposals. To Florida, any agreement that might have limited the ‘natural flow’ of the 
water would have created a scarcity of the resource. 
The interest groups behavior was based upon perceptions of the strength and 
influence other groups exuded. When survey respondents of one state commented on 
another state’s interest groups, they would often describe the interaction of the interest 
groups in each subsystem through perceptions of influence.  Just as one interviewee from
Georgia, who represented an interest located downstream from Atlanta, commented, 










unrealistic.” Yet, this perception created action that tried to influence the policy 
subsystem within the state of Georgia. 
The region-wide subsystem shifts from the third to the fourth quadrant depending 
upon drought seasons. During drought years, the number of interest groups involved as 
well as the diversity of interest groups would increase because as the shortage of water 
grew, it began affecting more people in different ways. 
Critique of McCool’s Model 
McCool’s model is better measured qualitatively than quantitatively due to 
problems with measurement of competition as well as the perception of the x-axis ‘zero 
sum’ label. Quantifying influence is a challenge to any researcher because influence can 
be both tangible and intangible. 
Because influence is a concept open to interpretation, the survey respondents and 
interview subjects also had a difficult time quantifying influence.  While they could attest 
to which state was united, spoke often during the meetings, or seemed to drive the 
negotiations, their thoughts were dependent on their view of what was an important 
outcome of the compacts.  Again, this illustrates the challenge of quantifying influence.
This critique indicates that the label of the x-axis should be changed to reflect the 
inability to quantify ‘Zero-Sum’ with a government resource.  A label such as ‘Perceived 










Differences between Western and Eastern Compacts 
Why did the problems that ultimately lead to the failure of an agreement persist 
with the compact negotiations and allocation issues in the Southeast, yet several 
compacts in the arid West have been signed?  The following four explanations are given: 
1) Public lands are more frequent in the West than in the South.
Throughout the West, many of the environmental interest groups advocate 
removal of dams and the destruction of reservoirs.  In the South, the interest groups 
seeking to protect the rivers were also advocating the protection of the reservoirs.  These 
groups wanted to maintain the artificially created reservoirs and keep their water levels 
high. 
Throughout the interview process, only a few subjects spoke of wanting to protect 
ecological balances. Most were concerned about having a higher cost of cleaning water, 
being able to continue their recreational use of the lake, and keep the water levels high 
enough to protect property values of the land adjacent to the lake. 
2) Environmentalism is more extreme in the West than the South. 
Because so much of the land in the western states is owned by the federal 
government and reserved for public use, a culture of public enjoyment of natural 
resources has developed, which is in stark contrast to the lack of public ownership of land 
in eastern states. This history has cultivated a culture of environmental activism in the 








negotiators is an example of this.  This negotiator was appointed by the Democratic 
governor of one of the three states to provide advice on environmental policy.  When the 
governor ran for reelection he told the appointed advisor, “Your job is to make sure I 
don’t get the endorsement from the environmental people” (interview with compact 
negotiator). 
The lake owner groups were also careful not to be lumped into the ‘extreme
environmentalist’ group.  While the interview subjects from the lake groups were 
concerned about safe drinking water and having a healthy ecological balance, they clearly 
stated that they were also for economic development and protecting the value of lakefront 
property. 
3) Water scarcity in the West creates more awareness among the different policy actors 
than in the South. 
Because of the scarcity of the resource, a greater incentive exists to reach an 
agreement.  If a gross imbalance of water existed among the states, it is likely that the 
federal government would be inclined to become involved so that citizens could have 
adequate water for the most basic household needs.  Due to the abundance of water in the 
South, a perception of this level of scarcity was never a concern.  Most of the concerns 
were over maintaining current uses including recreation, future economic development, 
and power generation. Only interests from Florida expressed ecological concerns 
associated with a reduction of water.  However, no group believed the compacts would 










4) The lack of a federal government involvement in the Southeast compact negotiations. 
Throughout the negotiations, federal agencies had no formal involvement.  They 
played only a minor role in the negotiations.  The lack of federal involvement created a 
vacuum that should have been filled by a neutral third party.   
In the negotiations of river basin compacts in the West, the federal government 
played an active role as well as being a stakeholder because the Bureau of Land 
Management owns a large amount of land in the western states.  
Similarities between Western and Eastern Compacts 
1) Both areas have rural versus urban concerns. 
In the Colorado Compact, Los Angeles was the large city with a growing 
metropolitan area.  In the South, the large city with a growing metropolitan area was 
Atlanta. The difference in the South is that Atlanta is in the headwaters rather than near 
the mouth of the river.  In both regions of the country, the area outside of the major city is 
rural. Agricultural interests exist in both regions of the country and continually become
less influential as the urban areas grow stronger with economic capital. 
2) Both areas have conflicts with the federal government over power generation. 
A compact among the states for management of water in the Columbia River 
Basin was not approved because the states wanted dams built by the Corps of Engineers 
to follow the same guidelines as dams built by private companies in those states.  The 
conflict between the power generators involved in the ACF and ACT compacts is similar.  






competition and conflict is similar with respect to which group gets water to operate 
their dams in a way they believe will make them as profitable as possible.  Also, states 
that regulate private dams would also like to regulate federally owned and operated dams, 
or at least force the federal government to adopt the state’s regulatory rules. 
Why the Compacts Failed 
The negotiation process for the compacts began after the state of Alabama 
suspended a lawsuit it had filed in federal court against the COE.  Without a third party to 
moderate the compact negotiations, the compacts began with a slim chance of 
succeeding.  All three states had the power to veto the compact.  The power to veto gave 
each state a great amount of leverage over the others in the sense that each state could not 
be completely ignored.  This power also gave each state the feeling that it could keep all 
of its original goals. In summary, the compacts originated from animosity and mistrust 
and were without an incentive for compromise.   
Another reason the compacts were not successfully implemented was that each of 
the states had different uses for the river water.  Georgia wanted water from the 
Chattahoochee for urban development and water from the Flint River for agricultural 
maintenance.  Florida wanted a ‘natural flow’ of the Apalachicola River while Alabama 
wanted enough water to power hydro dams and keep the lake levels high enough to allow 
recreational opportunities to be preserved. The failure of Georgia and Florida to reach an 
agreement on defining ‘natural flow’ was a significant obstacle contributing to the 
collapse of the negotiations.  Due to the different uses of the river water, getting each 





finding a common starting point for the negotiations.  This difficulty was likely due to 
Georgia initiating almost all of the proposals while the other two states worked to block 
each of the proposals. 
Considering each state had veto power, very little evidence was found that 
showed any state offering to settle for less than their original position.  Georgia was 
continually designing proposals that were repeatedly viewed as unacceptable by Florida.  
Not clear is whether Georgia’s proposals gave concessions to the other states over the 
length of the negotiations. A member of Florida’s negotiation team believed Georgia’s 
proposals were simply rewordings of the same proposal with no substantive change. 
In the later days of the compacts, Alabama and Georgia appeared to be willing to 
come to terms on the allocation of water in the ACT basin, but that agreement was 
contingent on knowing the outcome of the ACF compact.  In particular, Alabama was 
concerned with the possibilities of interbasin transfers of water from the ACT to the 
ACF. Because Florida vetoed Georgia’s proposal for the ACF, an agreement between 
Alabama and Georgia over water allocation in the ACT could not be reached. 
When the compacts expired, each state began to develop a strategy to advance its 
goals. Georgia asked and was granted permission from the COE to increase the amount 
of water area water associations could withdraw from the Chattahoochee River.  The state 
of Florida sued the COE in hopes of preventing an increase in the withdrawals of water 
from the Chattahoochee River 
(http://www.ajc.com/metro/content/metro/0905/20water.html, accessed September 20, 









state of Georgia in hopes of preventing increased withdrawals of water from the 
Chattahoochee River (interview with policy director of a riverkeeper organization in the 
Apalachicola Bay area).The state of Alabama eventually renewed its original lawsuit 
against the COE in hopes of convincing the COE to not allow water associations in the 
state of Georgia to increase their water withdrawals from the Chattahoochee River.  The 
issues of interbasin transfers of water between the ACT and the ACF have not been 
addressed in the court system. 
Recommendations for Future Compact Negotiations
A neutral third party should have been involved in the compact negotiations.  In 
this case, the federal government should have played the role of a moderator.  Even 
though the federal government had representatives present at each of the meetings, they 
were not allowed to vote on any proposal. In order for the third party to appear neutral, 
the members of this third party should not come from any of the three states.  The 
interview data suggests that a great deal of mistrust of the federal commissioner 
originated from the fact that he was a former congressman from Georgia as well as a 
current president of Georgia’s Chamber of Commerce.  Because the interests of the 
Atlanta area and, ultimately, the state of Georgia were economic development, this 
conflict of interests created the appearance of a lack of objectivity.  
Other interstate compacts concerning river basins have created commissions that 
have the ability to make difficult and often politically sensitive decisions concerning 
water allocation. These commissions may also address water management issues within 





each state involved in the negotiations as well as representatives from the federal 
government.   
The commissions serve to actively manage the river basins.  This system ensures 
input from not only each state, but the federal government.  The issue of basin 
management was missing from the ACT and ACF compact negotiations.  In addition to a 
lack of federal involvement, the COE was not formally represented in the negotiations 
despite operating the dams and managing the water levels of reservoirs along the 
Chattahoochee River. The omission of the COE likely created some of the animosity 
resulting in its the negotiations with the state of Georgia, which were independent from 
the ACT and ACF negotiations, over water levels in the Chattahoochee River’s Lake 
Lanier Reservoir. 
The survey data supports the desire for a separate commission for management of 
the two river basins. An overwhelming majority of the respondents wanted a region-wide 
commission created for the management of the river basins as well as enforcement of 
regulations designed to implement the management of the basin.  The desire for a region-
wide commission is contradictory to the original design since the federal government was 
initially excluded from the compacts, but it likely reflects the reality that despite the 
efforts of each state, an agreement could not be met amongst themselves.  More 
involvement from the federal government would have likely filled the role of a neutral 
third party.  After the states failed to reach a negotiated agreement, the desire to have 
more involvement from a party that is not affiliated with any of the states is evidently 







Along the same lines, more formal involvement from government agencies such 
as U.S. Fish and Wildlife, the Environmental Protection Agency, and the Corps of 
Engineers would have assisted each state in better understanding the complexity of issues 
surrounding the compacts, including the Clean Water Act and the Endangered Species 
Act as well as how the different proposals would impact each of these Acts.  If the federal 
agencies had been allowed to have a formal voice in the negotiations, they might have 
been able to create a compact that would have been agreeable to each of the three states 
as well as the federal agencies that were stakeholders in the river basins. 
Limitations of the Study and Considerations for Future Research 
The data collection is weak in two areas.  Stakeholders from the Atlanta 
Metropolitan area are underrepresented in the sample of individuals who were 
interviewed, which is due to a low response rate from members of the area’s different 
interest groups.  A clear lack of willingness to discuss the compacts was evident when 
compared to the other regions in both river basins.  This limitation was addressed by 
contacting the state’s primary negotiator, a federal government commissioner, and a 
contractor for the federal government who assisted in maintaining the records of the 
negotiations. The federal negotiators assisted in providing Georgia’s desired outcomes as 
well as Georgia’s role in the region-wide negotiations.  The inclusion of their negotiator, 
who was Georgia’s negotiator through the entire duration of the compacts, greatly 
assisted in addressing the issue of under representation from the Atlanta area.  
Fortunately, the number of survey responses from Georgia was high which assisted with 







The other weakness was in the survey’s low response rate for the state of Florida.  
The survey began with Florida having the lowest number of subjects due to the 
comparatively small geographical area of the Apalachicola River and Bay as well as the 
area’s low population.  This weakness was accentuated due to many of the survey 
subjects withdrawing from the research because of pending and possible litigation 
involving Florida and government agencies over the water flow of the Apalachicola 
River. This weakness was addressed with the data from the interviews.  One interview 
subject, who was involved with the negotiations throughout the entire process, was a 
member of Florida’s negotiation team.  This person was very forthcoming with thoughts 
and insight not only into Florida’s subsystem but also the negotiations as a whole. This 
person also provided a unique insight into Florida’s goals and desired outcomes.  The 
other members of the federal government’s representatives also provided insight into 
Florida’s water policy subsystem as well as their desired outcomes of the compacts.  
Also, stakeholders in the Apalachicola Basin were quite forthcoming and eager to discuss 
their thoughts on the compact negotiation process. 
Future studies should focus on the interaction of policy subsystems between states 
and federal agencies. Other issues also exist regarding federalism and the nature of 
power between federal agencies and state governments.  Future data collection should 
focus on interviewing individuals who are familiar with the compacts with the hope of
gaining the perspective of interest groups outside of the Atlanta area and interest groups 
with environmental concerns within the metropolitan area of Atlanta.  The involvement 















those in Atlanta would assist in better understanding Georgia’s policy subsystem.  The 
search for survey subjects who are familiar with the topic has been exhausted.  Several of
the survey subjects indicated they had little or no knowledge of the compacts.  
Interviewing more individuals who are familiar with the desired outcomes of interest
groups in the Atlanta area would be most helpful with improving the validity of this 
study. 
Final Thoughts 
McCool’s model of policy subsystems can be improved by acknowledging the 
perceptions of scarcity of the resource and considering the difference in uses of the 
resource by the users. These improvements would help to better understand which 
quadrant a subsystem should be placed in the model.  The competitiveness among the 
different interest groups is difficult to quantify due to the intangible nature of influence 
and some of the stronger aspects of influence are applied outside the researcher’s view of 
the subsystem. Recognizing this limitation explains why learning the perceptions of 
influence has been the best method for learning the competitiveness of each interest
group. After all, who better knows the strength of an interest group than the ones 
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When did you first get involved with the compact negotiations?
How long were you a negotiator for _______?
How did you become a negotiator for ______?
Would you explain to me the negotiation process for the two interstate compacts?
Did you attend many of the meetings?
How united do you feel your state is in its goals for the compact?
How much autonomy do you feel you had in the negotiations? 
Do you believe one state had a disproportionate amount of leverage in the negotiating 
process?  Why?
Which public or private interest groups that influenced the process more than most?
Why?






























































Q1: How familiar do you consider yourself with the Alabama-Coosa-Tallapoosa 
(ACT) and/or the Appalachicola-Chattahooche-Flint (ACF) River Basin Interstate 
Compacts? (please circle) 
a. Very knowledgeable 
b. Somewhat knowledgeable 
c. Vague knowledge 
d. No familiarity at all 
Q2: Which river basin do you conduct your professional duties or which river basin 
does most of your constituents reside? (please circle)  
A. Alabama-Coosa-Tallapoosa (ACT) 
B. Appalachicola-Chattahooche-Flint (ACF) 
C. Other: ____________________ 




If more than one state occupies roughly equal amounts of your concern, please list  
























Q4: In your professional opinion, how much influence were the following groups 
able to have with the compact negotiation process? (please circle the number) 
Little Influence Neutral Much Influence 
Corps of Engineers 1 2 3 4 5 
Environmental Protection Agency 1 2 3 4 5 
U.S. Fish and Wildlife 1 2 3 4 5 
Home Builders Associations 1 2 3 4 5 
Environmental Groups 1 2 3 4 5 
Electric Power Companies 1 2 3 4 5 
Agriculture Groups 1 2 3 4 5 
River Navigation Groups 1 2 3 4 5 
Lake/River Protection Groups 1 2 3 4 5 
State Government Agencies 1 2 3 4 5 
City or County Government 1 2 3 4 5 
State elected officials 1 2 3 4 5 






















Q5: In your professional opinion, how much influence did each state have in the 
process?
Very Little Moderate Very Much 
Alabama  1 2 3 4 5 
Florida 1 2 3 4 5 
Georgia 1 2 3 4 5 
Q6: Please name the group or individual you believe had the most influence in the 
negotiation process of the compact in which you conduct your professional duties. 
Q7: Please rank the states with respect to the level of uniformity of their position over 
the course of the negotiations. A ranking of “1” indicates the state’s position was 
the most unified throughout the negotiation process while a ranking of ‘3’ would 




Q8: Do you believe a basin-wide commission should be created to formulate water 
allocation levels? 
Yes No (please circle) 
Q9: Do you believe a basin-wide commission should be created to enforce compliance 
with any water allocation agreements?  
















Q10: To what extent do you disagree or agree with the following statements: 
    Strongly Disagree  Strongly Agree 
Adoption of the compact(s) as  1 2 3 4 5 
worded in their final form will 
improve the quality of 
water in your district. 
Adoption of the compact(s) as 1 2 3 4 5 
worded in their final form will 
increase the quantity of water in 
your district. 
In their final form, the compacts 1 2 3 4 5 
were written so that no state 
would have an advantage over 
another state in terms of water 
quantity. 
In their final form, the compacts  1 2 3 4 5 
were written so that no state would 
have an advantage over another 
state in terms of water quality. 
Those who most influenced 1 2 3 4 5 
negotiations of the compact(s),  
viewed environmental concerns as 
important. 
Those who most influenced 1 2 3 4 5 
negotiations of the compact, 
viewed housing development 
as important. 
Managing urban growth should 1 2 3 4 5 
have been one of the goals of the 
compacts. 
As written in the final proposal,  1 2 3 4 5 
the compacts would limit economic 

























As written in the final proposal,  1 2 3 4 5 
200 
the compacts would limit economic  
development in other portions of  
the basins. 
Q11: Which of the following best describes the area where you conduct your 
professional duties? If more than one applies, please give an approximate percent 
composition. 
Urban Large City (over 100,000 in population) 
           Medium city (between 100,000 and 50,000 in population)  
           Small city (less than 50,000 but over 10,000 in population) 
           Rural (mostly or all unincorporated area) 
Q12: Is your district considered a part of, or include, a Metropolitan Statistical Area?
Yes No (circle one) 
Q13: What is your job title? ______________________________ 
Q14: Is this an elected position?   Yes No (please circle) 
Q15: How long have you been at this current position? _________ 



















Q17: Which category best describes your age? (please circle) 
a. 20 – 29 
b. 30 – 39 
c. 40 – 49 
d. Over 50 
201 
Q18: Which of the following best describes the highest level of your formal educational 
attainment? (please circle) 
a. high school graduate 
b. some college 
c. bachelors degree
 d. graduate degree (including J.D.) 
If you have any information about the compacts that might help me feel free to provide 
those comments in the space below.
Thank you for taking the time to complete the questionnaire. Your thoughts are 
important. 
Please return the completed questionnaire in the envelope provided or return to: 
James Newman 
Department of Political Science and Public Administration 
PO Box PC 
Mississippi State, MS 39762 































































I am a graduate student at Mississippi State University conducting a survey as part of my 
dissertation. The dissertation is considering the influence of interest groups on the 
negotiation process of the failed Apalachicola-Chattahoochee-Flint (ACF) and Alabama-
Coosa-Tallapoosa (ACT) River Basin compacts.  Very little research discusses the 
political process surrounding the negotiations of these compacts.  I am gathering 
information concerning opinions and knowledge of individuals familiar with the 
compacts as well as water policy throughout the each basin.  I have chosen to send you a 
questionnaire because you are involved with implementing or developing water policy in 
one or both of the basins. I am requesting your help. 
Within the next few days, I will be sending a questionnaire asking you about your 
thoughts of the compact negotiations.  Your responses will be confidential, and you will 
not be singled out by your responses.  Your name will never be attached to the 
questionnaire or the database used to analyze the results.  Because this study focuses only 
on the negotiation process of the two compacts, your responses to the enclosed 
questionnaire are important to maintain the integrity of this study.  It is my goal for the 
results from this survey to help both policy makers and scholars to better understand the 
issues and process of interstate negotiations as well as the issues surrounding water 
policy in the Southeast. 
I will be happy to answer any questions you might have about this project or 
questionnaire. Feel free to email me at jan54@msstate.edu or call me at 662-325-9282.  
For information regarding your rights as a research subject, please contact the Office of 
Regulatory Compliance at Mississippi State University at 662-325-5220. 

























I am a graduate student at Mississippi State University conducting a survey as part of my 
dissertation. The dissertation is considering the influence of interest groups on the 
negotiation process of the failed Apalachicola-Chattahoochee-Flint (ACF) and Alabama-
Coosa-Tallapoosa (ACT) River Basin compacts.  Very little research discusses the 
political process surrounding the negotiations of these compacts.  I am gathering 
information concerning opinions and knowledge of individuals familiar with the 
compacts as well as water policy throughout the each basin.  I have chosen to send you a 
questionnaire because you are involved with implementing or developing water policy in 
one or both of the basins. I am requesting your help. 
Enclosed is a questionnaire asking about your thoughts of the compacts and water policy 
issues. Your responses will be confidential, and you will not be singled out by your 
responses. None of the letters will be coded.  This will be my final request of information. 
Your name will never be attached to the questionnaire or the database used to analyze 
the results. Because this study focuses only on the negotiation process of the two 
compacts, your responses to the enclosed questionnaire are important to maintain the 
integrity of this study. It is my goal for the results from this survey to help both policy 
makers and scholars to better understand the issues and process of interstate negotiations 
as well as the issues surrounding water policy in the Southeast. 
I will be happy to answer any questions you might have about this project or 
questionnaire. Feel free to email me at jan54@msstate.edu or call me at 662-325-9282.  
For information regarding your rights as a research subject, please contact the Office of 
Regulatory Compliance at Mississippi State University at 662-325-5220. 















Recently I mailed you a questionnaire seeking your opinions about your experience with 
and knowledge of the ACT/ACF compacts. If you have already completed and returned 
the questionnaire, please accept my sincere thank you. If not, please complete the 
questionnaire at your earliest convenience. I am especially grateful for your help. I 
believe that your response will be helpful to both policy-making professionals and 
scholars. I will be more than happy to share the results of the survey with you so you 
may assess the views of these compacts throughout the two basins. 
If you did not receive a questionnaire, or if it was misplaced, please call me at 662-325-
9282 or email me at jan54@msstate.edu, and I will get one in the mail to you today.  For 
information regarding your rights as a research subject, please contact the Office of 




Mississippi State University 
